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NOTES ON
GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX

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NOTES ON GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX

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PREFACE

THE aim with which these notes have been written is to assist students of syntax by directing their attention to the most important constructions in the Greek and Latin languages, and to indicate the correct method of discussing grammatical difficulties in critical sentences. Accordingly the method which should be followed has been explained in the Introduction, and throughout an attempt has been made not merely to classify constructions, but also to show the process of their development. It is my hope that the work may prove useful in the higher forms of schools, and to candidates for University and public examinations.

As far as possible the treatment of Greek and Latin constructions has been made parallel. Only a limited number of illustrations of each construction has been given; but there will be found a large collection of illustrative passages arranged promiscuously at the end of the book, which will, I hope, be found useful for practice in application of what has been learnt, both in class-work and by the private student. The illustrative passages quoted have been taken by preference from poetical authors, on the ground that they are more easily remembered; but it has been my

object to point out the divergence of poetical from prose uses.

The work is based for Greek primarily on Monro's *Homeric Grammar* and Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses*; for Latin, on Roby's *Latin Grammar* and the *Latin Grammar* of Gildersleeve and Lodge, though use has been made of other grammars and grammatical notes in various editions of texts and in the *Classical Review*. My obligations to these authorities are frequently acknowledged, and are everywhere apparent. Where I have ventured to differ from them, I have done so with diffidence, and, I trust, without lapsing into grave errors. My chief object is to show that there are unvarying principles which underlie all grammatical variations, and to arouse a real interest in grammar by tracing out these principles. If I have any success in this, I trust it may atone for my mistakes and omissions.

G. B. G.

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NOTES ON GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX

INTRODUCTION

THE object with which these Notes have been written is to bring prominently forward the most marked constructions in the Greek and Latin languages, and to suggest the right method of discussing and commenting on such constructions, as they are found in the various passages which are usually set in examinations. Accordingly they assume a knowledge of the elementary syntax, and it has been considered unnecessary to mention, or, at any rate, to treat at all fully in them, many of the ordinary rules of both languages. And it is scarcely necessary to say that for purposes of reference, and exhaustive treatment of the questions involved, they cannot take the place of works such as Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses*, and Roby's *Latin Grammar*, or any other similar works of first-class authority. They may, however, it is hoped, give in brief a tolerably exact account of the conclusions arrived at in these and other such works, and will be of some use if any of those who use them are thereby led to refer to these more complete investigations of the subject, and there to study the processes by which the conclusions are reached, and the data on which they depend.

In the use made above of the term "the most marked constructions in the Greek and Latin languages," it is by no means implied that these Notes are confined to the discussion of idiomatic peculiarities, or irregularities occurring in both languages or either. The term is to be understood to imply those constructions whose use is most important, and to understand which is indispensable, as, for example, those of case and mood. At the same time special care is taken to indicate variations from the normal form of any construction, and their especial force. Variations, be it observed, is a better term than irregularities, though the latter has been used above. For there cannot in language really be anything contrary to rule, that is, if the language is that of an educated and intelligent speaker; though there may be variations from rules of limited application, which are to be referred to the working of some law of speech or thought which overrides the rule particularly appropriate to the case in question. This point naturally leads to the consideration of the right method of explanation which should be given in dealing with the various constructions which are usually set in examinations. In many cases these constructions are variations from the normal use, and it is the habit of the beginner in his comments on them to treat them as irregularities, and to make a start by remarking "This ought to be so-and-so." There can be no worse mistake. In such cases, or nearly all of them, if "this were so-and-so" the exact effect intended by the writer would not be attained. What really needs exposition is precisely the gain of meaning, the different shade expressed by the unusual turn of expression. In others the variation must be explained as being due to a principle of more general application than the particular rule involved, as, for example, the general tendency of these languages for words that are closely connected with each other to agree in number, case, and

gender shows itself in the various forms of attraction, by which words are assimilated in one or other of these respects, although they are not strictly speaking in agreement, or under the same construction.

A similar mistake to the one which we have just mentioned is that which leads beginners always to look for some irregularity, some abnormal construction, in the passages with which they have to deal. They have to learn that this is by no means what they ought to try to discover. These passages are given to them to test their knowledge of the syntax of the languages, and they can show this knowledge best by a clear exposition of the ordinary rules of construction, and their exact force. In fact, to give a piece of practical advice in such passages, their attention should be directed primarily to uses of cases, tenses, and moods; if there are none which call for notice, then to such points as the uses of the negative particles, of prepositions, of the article or particles like *ἀν* and *κέν* in Greek, or of the different forms of attraction, etc. They must remember also that the faculty of seizing on the right points for consideration is above all tested by such questions. It is not every point in every passage that requires consideration. A certain point may be passed over in one passage, while it needs discussion in another, where it takes the most important place; and nothing so clearly shows a lack of thorough comprehension of the subject as the treatment of what is commonplace, combined with the neglect of an unusual and noteworthy construction. An example may be given from the following line:

Heu, terra ignota canibus date praeda Latinis.

Here, in the writer's experience, the locative ablative of place, *terra*, and the ordinary dative, *canibus*, have been carefully explained, and the striking and comparatively

infrequent vocative use of *date* has been utterly overlooked. To repeat, the necessary thing is to distinguish some construction or constructions, and, if they are regular, to explain their exact use and meaning; if they vary from common use, to account for the variation, and bring out its force.

Next we must consider in what such a full explanation consists. The first essential is that it should be absolutely adequate to the particular passage under discussion; that is, that the explanation should agree with what is adopted as the correct translation of the passage. This may appear to be superfluous advice; but a brief experience in teaching soon shows that an excellent translation may be accompanied by, and based upon, a totally erroneous conception of the main points and difficulties involved in a sentence. No doubt a correct translation does imply an unconscious mastery of the difficulty; but the exact quality which is tested by this kind of work is the power of expressing consciously and completely what precisely constitutes such a difficulty.

Secondly, the explanation must be logical; that is, the explanation given of the exact force of any construction as existing in a particular passage must be deduced by regular steps from what is assumed to be the general force of that construction; and, if necessary, this general force must be shown to be capable of being derived from what is recognized as the original force of the construction in question. For example: an ablative of the agent in Latin, when used without a preposition, must not be confused with an ablative of the instrument, but it must be shown that the use with a preposition implies an earlier use without a preposition; and the connection of such an ablative with the original meaning of the ablative case must be traced. It may be observed here that the use of the term "original meaning" of a case

tense, mood, or any form or construction does not signify that the originators of the language determined consciously on this meaning, and divided the various meanings among the different cases, tenses, moods, etc., intentionally. On the contrary, they no doubt were quite unaware of this original meaning, and indeed could not have understood such a term. But scientific study of language shows that unconsciously such an original meaning is contained in all forms, though it is unsafe to be too dogmatic in deciding what that meaning was. Still, if in many cases certainty is not possible, the reason of that is simply that we have not enough data to work upon. If the earliest speakers of the Indo-Germanic tongues had left a literature, all or most of that uncertainty would have been removed.

Thirdly, a good explanation of any point should be supported by a comparison of Greek and Latin uses, wherever that is possible. It is to emphasize the necessity of this treatment, and to facilitate its use, that in these Notes Greek and Latin constructions have been classified together in most cases, and contrasted in others. There are many constructions of which the explanation can be improved, and made more lively and vigorous, by a reference to English, or other modern languages. Indeed, the perfect explanation and treatment of difficult grammar points requires a perfect knowledge of at least all the languages of our family of human speech; but such perfection is unattainable to mere mortals. However, it follows that any knowledge of, or comparison with, other languages like Sanskrit, German, Welsh, etc., is often of great use.

Fourthly, the explanation given should *always* be supported by the quotation of one or more parallel passages. This is a requirement that ought invariably to be insisted on, and therefore the student should take care to make himself thoroughly acquainted with a large number of

passages illustrative of as many various constructions as possible. The reasons why this accessory should be demanded are of various kinds. In the first place, the power to quote shows familiarity with the authors. Again, it proves that the rules have not merely been studied in the abstract, but that their working has been noticed in these specimens, as we may call them, of the grammatical science. Thirdly, because a novel explanation is worthless without such support—and a novel explanation, even if it cannot be accepted, may show more ingenuity and real knowledge of the subject than a mere reproduction of the orthodox view, and therefore be worth far more—for however good it is in theory, it must be proved applicable to more than one passage before it can win approval. Above all, because it is only the correct choice of an exactly similar passage which proves the complete apprehension of the difficulty. Just as a bad explanation may accompany a good translation, so an inappropriate illustration is too often attached to a fairly satisfactory explanation. In fact, it is the production of the parallel precedent that settles the law of the question at issue.

These are the essentials of a good explanation of grammatical difficulties. We may add that the explanation should not depend on the use of set terms, hypallages, oxymorons, datives of reference, prospective subjunctives, *et hoc genus omne*; rather such terms should be entirely avoided, and the use should be explained in simple, ordinary words, which should plainly and carefully state what it does signify. There is, of course, a use for such terms. They are useful labels under which to classify constructions, and convenient abbreviations which are of service in answering questions *viva voce*, and in making notes on passages as they are read; but they are often a cloak to ignorance, being used without a true idea of their meaning. The explanation of their meaning is also precisely the explanation which is

required by the constructions they designate. A further argument against their use is that this classification, which assumes to be exhaustive, into so many definite uses results in a wooden and lifeless method of explanation. One of the worst faults in translation is invariably to use the same word to translate a given Greek or Latin word. In different languages no two words, except the simplest terms, have precisely the same shade of meaning; and it is only by using different renderings in different passages that the exact meaning of a word can be reproduced on all occasions. Similarly, the force of a particular construction varies slightly according to its surroundings. In each passage this varying force can be explained in ordinary terms, whereas the use of a fixed designation would disregard the alteration of meaning. In fact, a system of set terms tends to be, as it were, a bed of Procrustes for constructions. Something needs to be added to or subtracted from their meaning in the places where they are found to make them fit the designation assigned to them. They may also lead to the false impression that in other languages distinctions were made, because we make them ourselves; in fact, that Greek and Latin speakers and writers consciously followed a method of classification of uses which we can trace with our wider knowledge, which, as *Monro* points out (*H. G.* § 147), is to suppose that the distinctions of thought preceded the language by which they are expressed.

Finally, classification can never be complete, for a language is a living thing; even in these dead languages, as they are called, new discoveries of lost works might widen, or even overthrow many theories. Let us avoid the mistake of the grammarian in *Browning*, who thought

“He settled *Hoti*’s business—let it be!—

Properly based *oun*—

Gave us the doctrine of the enclitic *De*

Dead from the waist down.”

This is the effect which is inevitably given by an over-rigid division and subdivision under mutually exclusive heads.

Of course, a system of classification must be, and has been followed in these Notes; but it is pointed out here, as it is in other places afterwards, that it is undesirable and impossible to insist on many explanations and classifications being regarded as certain and final.

We may conclude by recapitulating the essentials of a good explanation; they are:—

- (i.) An exact translation;
- (ii.) An explanation which corresponds to the translation;
- (iii.) A logical connection between the particular and general use of the construction in question;
- (iv.) Where possible, a comparison between Greek and Latin, and, it may be, other languages;
- (v.) The quotation of a passage which is really parallel

THE CASES

SECTION 1. In order to obtain a thorough grasp of the uses of the cases in Greek and Latin, it is necessary to understand what was the number and uses of the cases in the Aryan or Indo-Germanic language, from which both Latin and Greek are derived, or perhaps we ought to say, of which they are collateral developments. The cases in Aryan, Greek, and Latin can be exhibited in a tabular form, the Aryan cases being placed in the centre column, the Greek in the left-hand, and the Latin in the right-hand column. The brackets signify the manner in which two or more Aryan cases are included in the uses of a single case in Greek or Latin.

2. <i>Greek.</i>	<i>Aryan.</i>	<i>Latin.</i>
Nominative	Nominative	Nominative
Vocative	Vocative	Vocative
Accusative	Accusative	Accusative
Genitive	{ Genitive	Genitive
	{ Ablative	Ablative
	{ Dative	Dative
Dative	{ Locative	
	{ Instrumental }	Ablative

3. It will be well now to consider briefly the names of the cases and their meaning, and at the same time to show to what extent the name expresses, or falls short of expressing, the general use of each case.

4. The *Nominative Case*. The name nominative—ὀνομαστικὴ πτῶσις—means the case of **naming**, *i.e.* the case which names the subject of the sentence. With this explanation, the name is fairly adequate.

5. The *Vocative Case*. The name vocative—κλητική—of course signifies the case of **summoning**; *i.e.* its use is to call the attention of the person addressed. The name is therefore fully satisfactory, as there is no other use of the case. It is to be observed that most nouns possess no vocative case as distinct from the nominative, so that in the majority of nouns the nominative is used also as the vocative.

6. The *Accusative Case*. This name—αἰτιατική—so Varro (*L. L.* viii. 66) calls it ‘casum accusandi,’ expresses the person or thing **accused**; this name is obviously quite inadequate to the uses of the case. Perhaps the best general name would be the **Limitative Case**; for, as we shall find, the use of this case is invariably to limit the application of some verb, adjective, or substantive (rarely).

7. The *Genitive Case*. This name does not correspond with the Greek name γενική. The name Genitive, or case of **origin**, only covers a very small part of the uses of the case. The name γενική, *i.e.* generic, which gives the *genus*, is a much better name; for the use of the case is nearly always to classify a substantive as belonging to, or part of, something else. This will be more fully explained later on.

8. The *Ablative Case*. As Greek has no separate case corresponding to the Ablative, there is no corresponding term in Greek. The name expresses the case of **separation**, that from which something is removed. As applying to the true Ablative,—not the Latin Ablative—the name is satisfactory enough.

9. The *Dative Case*. This name—δοτική—expresses that to which **giving** takes place. The name is too narrow; the use of the case is really to express the **indirect object** of an action; of verbs requiring such an indirect object, verbs of giving constitute only a small fraction.

10. The *Locative Case*. This name, unlike the others, is of recent origin. It expresses sufficiently well the use of the case, which is to signify the **point of time or place** at which an action takes place.

11. The *Instrumental Case*. This, another newly-named case, signifies **that with which an action is performed**. The name strictly only applies to the instrument proper, but it

also covers the manner, cause, circumstances, etc., of the performance of an action. Another name also used for this case is the **Sociative Case**, or case of **Accompaniment**. It is preferable as being a wider term, but it does not so well mark what was probably the original use of the case, from which the other developments arose.

NOTE.—The older names of the cases are found in the early Greek and Latin grammarians; the two more recent names have been adopted into use generally by modern grammarians.

USES OF THE CASES

12. I purpose to review the uses of the cases in Latin and Greek as far as possible together, not separating the two languages from each other, but so arranging the different heads that illustrations may be given from both languages. Where either language possesses a case-idiom peculiar to itself, it will be treated and explained separately. I shall classify the uses of the cases under the heads of the Aryan cases, as in every instance the true method of explanation of any particular idiom is to trace its connection to the general meaning of the original Aryan case, to which the case in Greek or Latin corresponds, and not arbitrarily to distinguish the uses of any case in Greek or Latin by terms which cannot be properly applied to that case; *e.g.* the term dative of manner is no explanation. Manner cannot be expressed by the true dative case. The correct explanation is that the use is instrumental, but the instrumental case in Greek has coalesced in form with the dative. This method of explanation has the advantage of demanding fewer set terms, while at the same time it requires a logical connection to be made between the particular use in question, and the fundamental meaning of the case involved. Such an explanation is the better the simpler the words used in it are.

THE NOMINATIVE CASE

13. The regular use of the nominative as subject hardly calls for illustration, and we may say the same of its use as vocative. In Greek the nominative is occasionally found

without any predicate. The explanation of this is that it stands in apposition to the logical subject, though not to the grammatical subject of the sentence; *e.g.*:—

Στάσις δ' ἐν ἀλλήλοισιν ὠροθύνητο,
οἱ μὲν θέλοντες ἐκβαλεῖν ἔδρας Κρόνον
. οἱ δὲ τοῦμπάλιν
σπεύδοντες, κ.τ.λ. (Aesch. P. V. 200.)

'And strife was stirred up between them, some desiring to cast Kronos from his seat . . ; but the others pressing for the opposite end,' etc.

Here στάσις is the grammatical, but οἱ θεοί the logical subject; for στάσις ἐν ἀλλήλοισιν ὠροθύνητο = στάσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις οἱ θεοὶ ὠρόθυνον.

Similarly—

'Υπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἐπολεμεῖτο, Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περιπλέοντες . .
Πελοποννήσιοι δέ, κ.τ.λ. (Thuc. iv. 23.)

'War was waged by both sides, the Athenians sailing round . . but the Peloponnesians,' etc.

Here ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἐπολεμεῖτο = ἀμφοτέροι ἐπολέμονν.
Διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι. (Plat. Apol. 21 c.)

'As I talked to him, I thought.'

Here ἔδοξέ μοι = ἐνόμισα.

Generally it may be said that whenever the nominative stands without a verb, the form of the sentence has undergone a change, so that the nominative, originally intended by the writer to be subject, or in apposition to or agreement with the subject, is left without a construction.

14. In Latin the most noticeable nominative use is that in which this case is retained instead of the accusative, when it is the subject of an infinitive in *oratio obliqua*. This only occurs when the subject of the infinitive verb is also the subject of the verb of saying. This use is most likely an imitation of the Greek construction; *e.g.*:—

Uxor invicti Iovis esse nescis. (Hor. Od. iii. 27. 73.)

'Thou knowest not that thou art the consort of unconquered Jove.'

So in Greek :—

Οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνον στρατηγεῖν. (Thuc. iv. 28.)

'He said that not he himself (Kleon) but he (Nikias) was general.'

THE VOCATIVE CASE

15. In most nouns the forms of the nominative and vocative cases are identical. The shorter vocative form is found in Greek in masculine -a nouns, -o nouns, -i nouns, and certain nouns with consonant stems; in Latin only in -o nouns. But even in the case of such nouns, the nominative is occasionally used as vocative in Greek; as *e.g.*:—

᾽Ω φίλος, εἰπέ. ᾽Ω πόλις πόλις.

Οἱ Θράκες ἴτε δεῦρο.

'Come here, Thracians.'

Ave, mi Gai, meus asellus iucundissimus.

'How do you do, Gaius, my most delightful donkey.'

16. There is in both Greek and in Latin a noticeable use, most frequently found in Virgil, by which the vocative is made to stand in apposition to the subject of the verb, when a nominative would be regular. A vocative usually precedes, and the irregular vocative may be said to be attracted to it; *e.g.*:—

Quibus, Hector, ab oris

Expectate venis? (Verg. *Aen.* ii. 282.)

'From what shores, Hector, comest thou, long looked for?'

Tunc hinc spoliis indute meorum

Eripiare mihi? (*Ibid.* xii. 947.)

'Shalt thou, arrayed in the spoils of my loved ones, be torn from my hands?'

Ὀλβιε, κῶρε, γένοιο. (Theocr. xvii. 66.)

'Mayst thou be happy, boy.'

᾽Ω φίλτατ' ἐμοὶ πολὺν πρεσβυτῶν ἐξ ἐχθίστου μεταπίπτων.
(Arist. *Av.* 626.)

'O thou who from my deadliest foe changest to be far my dearest friend of all old men.'

THE ACCUSATIVE CASE

17. As it has been remarked, the name accusative is very inadequate to express the force and usage of this case. Its function is to limit the application of some word, usually a verb, to a certain definite area or object. Thus it is most commonly used with transitive verbs, to limit their action to the object which they affect. It is also used with verbs of motion, limiting their action by giving the end of it; and generally with all verbs, substantives, or adjectives, the application of which needs to be confined in extent to some definite space. Thus the accusative naturally expresses extension in space, and duration of time. A similar accusative, usually a neuter adjective or pronoun, limits the action of the verb within itself, and is accordingly known as the internal accusative, in opposition to the external accusative, *i.e.* the ordinary accusative of the object, which limits the action of the verb to some object outside itself. *e.g.* in 'I strike a blow,' 'a blow' is an internal accusative; in 'I strike my enemy,' 'my enemy' is an external accusative.

18. All these uses of the accusative were probably found in the Indo-European language, and they are common to both Greek and Latin, though the Latin usages, in prose at least, are more restricted than the Greek. They may be considered under three main heads: I. The accusative of the direct object; II. The accusative of the end of motion; III. The accusative of extent.

19. I. *The Accusative of the Direct Object.* The direct object of a transitive verb is put in the accusative case; *i.e.* the use of this case shows that the action of the verb is limited to the person or thing mentioned. It is unnecessary to give examples of this ordinary use, but the following variations must be observed:—

(a) **A verb, not properly speaking transitive, may yet take an object by a stretch of its meaning, or by the same means may take an object in a sense which is not its natural meaning; *e.g.* :—**

Τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένους. (Thuc. iii. 82.)

Lit., 'panic-stricken,' and so = φοβούμενος, 'fearing.'

Τρίχας ἀπάρχειν, (Od. iii. 445.)

Lit., 'to begin with,' so to offer as a sacrifice, as the hairs of a victim were first plucked.

Legitimumque sonum digitis callemus et aure.

(Hor. A. P. 274.)

Lit., 'we have a hard skin,' i.e. 'are practised to,' and so 'know the right sound by finger and ear.'

Iura fidelemque supplicis erubuit. (Verg. A. 2. 541.)

Lit., 'blushed at,' and so, 'reverenced.'

20. (β) A verb which already has a direct object, forming with it a single verbal expression, may have a second direct object. This is a rare use, poetical in Greek, and in Latin chiefly found with the phrase *animum advertere*.

Εἰ δέ μ' ὦδ' ἀεὶ λόγους ἐξῆρχες.

(Soph. El. 556.)

'Hadst thou always thus begun thy speeches to me.'

(λόγους ἐξῆρχες = προσηύδας, addressed.)

Animum advertit Gracchus in contione Pisonem stantem.

(Cic. Tusc. iii. 20.)

'Gracchus observed Piso standing in the assembly.'

(*animum advertit* = *conspexit*.)

21. (γ) Certain verbs in both Greek and Latin of **teaching**, **asking**, and **concealing**, and in Greek also of **depriving**, take a double accusative, one of the person, the other of the thing; both are external accusatives; e.g. :—

Οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτῶ σε. (Ar. Nub. 641.)

'I'm not asking you that.'

Ἦκει καὶ τὰ πάππου χρήμαθ' ἡμᾶς ἀποστερήσων.

(Isaeus 73. 46.)

'He has come to rob us of our grandfather's property too.'

Nec te celavi sermonem T. Ampii. (Cic. Fam. ii. 16.)

'I did not hide from you the speech of T. Ampius.'

Tribunus me primum sententiam rogavit. (Cic. Q. Fr. ii. 1.)

'The tribune asked me my opinion first.'

The accusative of the thing remains when the verb is passive; *e.g.* :—

Διδάσκω καὶ διδάσκομαι λόγους. (Eur. *Andr.* 739.)

‘I teach and am taught words.’

Latinae legiones longa societate militiam Romanam edoctae. (Liv. vi. 32.)

‘The Latin legions had been taught Roman discipline by their long association.’

22. (δ) The so-called accusative of the **whole and part**, which is found in Greek, is a conjunction of an object accusative of the person, with a limiting accusative of extent; *e.g.* :—

Τρῶας δὲ τρόμος αἰνὸς ὑπήλυθε γνῖα ἕκαστον.

(Hom. *Il.* vii. 215.)

‘Terrible trembling seized each of the Trojans in his limbs.’

23. (ε) In Greek the accusative is found frequently with **middle** and **passive** verbs, and in Latin with **passive** verbs. The accusative is that of a direct object, but there is an important distinction to be made. The accusative with the middle verb is exactly similar to the object accusative; but the accusative with the passive verb is not properly speaking an object to the passive verb, but would be the direct object to the active verb if the sentence were expressed in the active voice, while the subject of the passive verb would be an indirect object in the active form of expression, and would be put in the dative, or with a prepositional phrase. In Greek the distinction is usually evident, as the middle and passive have to a large extent different forms; but in Latin the middle has disappeared, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that middle and passive have not been distinguished by different forms. Strictly speaking, all deponent verbs are middle verbs.

Accusative with Middle Verbs.

Παρασκευάζεσθαι ὄπλα ἐς τὰς γεφύρας. (Hdt. vii. 25.)

‘To prepare cables for the bridges.’

Inutile ferrum cingitur. (Verg. *Aen.* ii. 511.)

‘He girds on his, useless steel.’

Viridesque manu siccata capillos. (Ov. *Met.* v. 575.)

‘Drying her green hair with her hand.’

Accusative with Passive Verbs.

Ἐπιτετραμμένος τὴν ἀρχήν.

‘Entrusted with the government.’

Active: ἐπιτρέπειν τινὶ ἀρχήν.

Δέλτος ἐγγεγραμμένη ξυνθήματα. (Soph. *Tr.* 157.)

‘A tablet inscribed with tokens.’

Active: ἐγγράφειν δέλτῳ ξυνθήματα.

Flores inscripti nomina regum. (Verg. *Ecl.* iii. 106.)

‘Flowers inscribed with names of kings.’

Active: floribus inscribere nomina.

24. (ζ) An object accusative is found occasionally with **adjectives** and **substantives** derived from verbs, instead of the more usual genitive; *e.g.* :—

Πόλεμος ἄπορα πόριμος. (Aesch. *P. V.* 904.)

‘War providing things for which there is no provision.’

Quid tibi hanc digito tactio est? (Plaut. *Poen.* v. 5. 29.)

‘What means your touching her with your finger?’

25. (η) An object accusative is found in **exclamations**. It is the object of some verb understood, which, however, is not distinctly conceived. In Greek it is only found in oaths, and in the use of the infinitive with the article, which might be a nominative; *e.g.* :—

Νῆ τὸν Δία.

‘By Zeus.’

Τῆς μωρίας· τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὄντα τηλικοντονί. (Ar. *Nub.* 819.)

‘What madness! to believe in Zeus at your age!’

Me caecum, qui haec non ante viderim! (Cic. *Ad Att.* x. 10.)

‘Blind that I was, not to have seen this before!’

O miseras hominum mentes, O pectora caeca! (Lucr. ii. 14.)

‘Ah the unhappy minds of men, ah their blind hearts!’

26. II. The *Accusative of the End of Motion*. This accusative limits the action of a verb by marking the **end to which it reaches**. In Greek it is only in poetry that it is found without a preposition; in Latin only regularly so in the names of towns and small islands, and in *domum*, *foras*, and *rus*. But it must be remembered that the preposition merely makes the expression more exact. It is the use of the accusative case that marks the limiting of the verbal action; e.g. :—

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἦλθον πατρὸς ἀρχαῖον τάφον. (Soph. *El.* 793.)

‘When I came to my father’s ancient tomb.’

Tua me imago haec limina tendere aedit.

(Verg. *Aen.* vi. 696.)

‘The vision of thee forced me to journey to these portals.’

Galli domos abierunt. (Liv. xlv. 34.)

‘The Gauls went home.’

27. In Latin the accusative of a verbal noun—the so-called supine in -um—expresses **action as the end of motion**; so do the words *infitias*, denial, *exsequias*, funeral rites, *suppetias*, assistance, mostly with *ire*; and *venum*, sale, and *pessum*, ruin, with *ire* and *dare*; e.g. :—

Exclusi eos, quos tu ad me salutatum miseras. (Cic. *Cat.* i. 4.)

‘I refused to admit the visitors, whom you had sent to call on me.’

Horum alterum neque nego neque infitias eo. (Liv. vi. 20.)

‘The second of these points I neither contradict nor deny.’

28. III. The *Accusative of Extent*. This use of the accusative perhaps shows most clearly the original idea of the case, which was to limit and restrict the application of a verb or noun to a certain space or time. The accusative expresses how far the verb or noun applies. We may subdivide this use as follows :—

29. (a) *Accusative of the Space over which*.—Here the meaning of the verb or other word is restricted to a certain area in space; e.g. :—

Τρία στάδια ἀπείχον.

Fossa centum pedes lata.

Πηδῶντα πέδια ξὺν νεορράντῳ ξίφεϊ. (Soph. *At.* 30.)

'Leaping over the plains with his new-sprinkled sword.'

Τὴν ὁδὸν, ἣν Ἑλένην περ ἀνήγαγεν. (Hom. *Il.* vi. 292.)

'That journey, on which he brought Helen.'

A recta conscientia transversum unguem non oportet discedere. (Cic. *Att.* xiii. 30.)

'One ought not to depart from a right conscience the breadth of a finger-nail.'

Caedit totidem nigrantes terga iuvenco. (Verg. *A.* v. 97.)

'He slays as many bullocks with black backs.'

30. (β) *Accusative of the Time throughout which.*—

This usage limits the action of the verb to a certain time. Observe that the use of the accusative implies that the action occupies the **whole** time; *e.g.* :—

Τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡμέα πάντα. (Od. vi. 46.)

'The blessed gods take their joy throughout all their days.'

Annum iam aulis Cratippum. (Cic. *Off.* i. 1.)

'You have already heard Cratippus for a year.'

31. (γ) *The Internal Limiting Accusative.*—This accusative is so called because by it the action of the verb is limited from within itself, whereas by the accusative of the object, of motion to, of space, and of time, it is limited **externally**. Observe the difference between 'I strike a blow,' internal, and 'I strike a man,' external accusative.

It is exceedingly common both in Greek and Latin with neuter pronouns, and adjectives of quantity. In Greek it is found also with ordinary adjectives and substantives; but in Latin only poetical and later writers use it with ordinary adjectives, and rarely with substantives.

In both Greek and Latin this accusative is common in substantives of the same meaning as the verb. This is called the **cognate accusative**; but it is a mistake to regard the ordinary internal accusative as an extension of the cognate accusative. *E.g.* :—

Τί με ταῦτα ποεῖς; Γάμους ἐστιᾶν.

Quid me ista laedunt?

Τὴν ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους.
(Thuc. i. 32.)

'In the sea-fight we ourselves unaided repulsed the
Corinthians.'

Πόλις . . . αὐταρκῇ θέσιν κειμένη. (Thuc. i. 37.)

'A city placed in an independent position.'

Ἀτίμους ἐπόησαν ἀτιμίαν τοίανδε. (Thuc. v. 34.)

'They disfranchised them with the following disabilities.'

Unum sentitis omnes, unum studetis. (Cic. Phil. vi. 7.)

'You all have one feeling, one enthusiasm.'

Hunc, oro, sine me furere ante furorem. (Verg. Aen. xii. 680.)

'First, I pray, let me be mad with this frenzy.'

Tiberius torvus aut falsum renidens voltu. (Tac. Ann. iv. 60.)

'Tiberius was stern, or showed a false brightness in his look.'

Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.

(Verg. Ecl. i. 5.)

'Thou teachest the woods to re-echo "beauteous Amaryllis."'

32. This Internal Accusative is so wide a use that it is advisable to distinguish some developments of it, which may be classified as follows:—

(1) The *Accusative in Apposition with the Sentence*, which is an internal accusative qualifying sometimes the verb alone, sometimes the whole idea of the sentence; e.g.:—

Ρίψει ἀπὸ πύργου λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον. (Hom. Il. xxiv. 735.)

'He shall cast thee from a tower, a piteous death.'

Λεύσσω γὰρ αὐτὴν ὄψιν οὐκ εὐδαίμονα. (Eur. Bacch. 1232.)

'I behold her, no happy sight.'

Pars ingenti subiere feretro

Triste ministerium. (Verg. Aen. vi. 222.)

'Part bent beneath the mighty bier, a mournful service.'

Proinde tona eloquio, solitum tibi. (Ib. xi. 383.)

'Then thunder with thine eloquence, in thy wonted way.'

From these examples it is seen that these accusatives limit the action of the verb internally; in the last, for example, 'thunder thy wonted way' is obviously an extension of such a phrase as *tona grave*, or *magnum*.

33. (2) The *Accusative of the Way or Manner*.—This is common in Greek, particularly in such phrases as τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, τὴν ταχίστην, ἀρχήν (= 'to begin with,' 'at all,') δίκην ('after the manner of'); but in Latin only *partem, vicem* (= δίκην sometimes, also = 'instead of'), *cetera*: this is equally an internal accusative, as expressing the manner of an action limits that action within itself. This accusative of manner should be contrasted with the instrumental dative in Greek, and ablative in Latin, which originates in a quite different idea; *e.g.* :—

Τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι.

(Plat. *Rep.* 416B.)

'Prepared with the greatest caution.'

Ὅντινα τρόπον ἀκοὴν κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσασαί τοις.

(Plat. *Lach.* 190A.)

'In what way one may best acquire the faculty of hearing.

Maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt. (Caes. *B.G.* iv. 1.)

'They live mostly on milk and meat.'

Sardanapali vicem in suo lectulo mori. (Cic. *Att.* x. 8. 7.)

'To die on his own bed, like Sardanapalus.

34. (3) The *Adverbial Accusative* found with adjectives, commonly in Greek, though only poetically in Latin, and then of parts of the body, in some cases corresponds most nearly to an internal accusative, in others to the accusative of the space over which; *e.g.* :—

Φιλάνθρωποι τοὺς τρόπους.

Ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἅπερ σοφὸς, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθὴς,

ταῦτα κακός. (Plat. *Lach.* 194D.)

'Each of us is good in those points in which he is skilled, but bad in those in which he is ignorant.'

Statque latus praejixa veru, stat saucia pectus.

(Tib. i. 6. 49.)

'She stands with her side pierced with a dart, wounded in her breast.'

(The acc. *pectus* is the example of what is here referred to; *latus* exemplifies acc. after a passive verb, I (ε) above.)

Feminae . . . nulae brachia et lacertos. (Tac. *Germ.* 17.)

'Women . . . with naked arms and shoulders.'

35. (δ) A remarkable *Limiting Accusative* is found in Latin in the words *genus* (*hoc, id, omne*), and *secus* = 'sex' (*virile, muliebre*); it qualifies substantives. This cannot be regarded as an internal accusative; it expresses extent in a particular sense; *e.g.* :—

Pascuntur omne genus obiecto frumento.

(Varro, *R. R.* iii. 6.)

'They feed on food of every kind placed before them.'

Liberorum capitum virile secus. (Liv. xxvi. 47.)

'Of free persons of the male sex.'

[The usual construction in Latin would be a genitive of quality. This accusative Roby (*L. G.* vol. ii. § 1104) calls the accusative of description.]

36. (ε) The *Accusative Absolute* in Greek is perhaps best regarded as derived from the accusative of extent, particularly as expressing duration of time. It will be seen that the genitive absolute is best connected with the genitive expressing the time within which an event occurs. The accusative absolute then expresses the conditions during the permanence of which another event occurs; *e.g.* :—

Φόνῳ φόνον πάλιν λύοντας, ὥς τόδ' αἶμα χείμαζον πόλιν.

(Soph. *O. T.* 100, 101.)

'By atoning for blood with blood, as it is this murder that makes our city storm-tossed.'

Δόξαν αὐτοῖς ὥστε ναυμαχεῖν . . . ἔπλεον. (Thuc. viii. 79.)

'In the resolution to engage at sea, they sailed.'

This accusative is rare, except in the impersonals

δέον, πρέπον, προσήκον, εἰρημένον, δόξαν, κ.τ.λ.

THE GENITIVE CASE.

37. As the proper use of the accusative case is to qualify a verb, so the genitive case is properly used to qualify a noun. It does so by assigning it to a particular class or description, or by distinguishing it as a part of a whole. It is used as the object of verbal nouns, and also of certain verbs, whose action affects only a part of their objects. It will be classified under the following heads: I. Possessive, II. Partitive Genitive, III. Genitive of Definition, IV. of Quality, V. of the Object, VI. with Verbs.

38. I. *Possessive Genitive*. Here the genitive classifies a noun by naming its possessor. It is the commonest use, and needs little comment; *e.g.* :—

Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους.

Horti Caesaris.

Οὐ γάμων

ἔμπειρος, ἀλλὰ τοῦπιόντος ἀρπάσαι. (Soph. *O. C.* 752.)

‘She has no knowledge of wedlock, but is for the first-comer to seize.’

Carthaginienses tutelae nostrae duximus. (Liv. xxi. 41.)

‘We have considered the Carthaginians as under our guardianship.’

In some cases this genitive needs to be clearly distinguished from the objective genitive; *e.g.* :—

τὸ τῶν Θεβαίων μῖσος may mean ‘the hatred felt by’ or ‘for the Thebans’; *ira deorum*, ‘the anger of’ or ‘against the gods.’ The former meanings belong to the possessive genitive, which in this use is often called **subjective**, as expressing what would be the subject if the same meaning were expressed in a sentence with a verb.

39. II. The *Partitive Genitive* expresses the whole within which the word qualified by it falls as a part, and to which it belongs, but as a part to a whole. There are several subdivisions of this use, as follows :—

(α) *Partitive Genitive Proper*.—The common use giving the whole of which the word qualified forms a part; *e.g.* :—

Λακεδαιμόνιοί εἰσι τῶν περιοίκων. (Thuc. iv. 53.)

‘(The inhabitants) are Lacedaemonians, of the class of the perioeci.’

Οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅποι γῆς οὐδ’ ὅποι γνώμης φέρει. (Soph. *El.* 922.)

‘Thou knowest not whither on earth nor whither in thy mind thou wanderest.’

Fortissimus Graecorum.

Eo miseriarum venturus eram.

‘To such a point of wretchedness was I destined to come.’

40. (β) *Partitive Genitive of Place* expressing the area within which an action takes place. It approximates closely to a possessive genitive in some instances; it is

obvious that position within a locality may be also expressed as the belonging to that locality. This use is only found in Greek, and chiefly in Homer; *e.g.* :—

Ἐλκόμεναι νειοῖο βαθείης πηκτὸν ἄροτρον. (*Il.* x. 253.)

‘To draw in the deep fallow land the jointed plough.’

Ἐσχάτης ὁρῶ πυρᾶς βόστρυχον. (*Soph. El.* 900, 901.)

‘At the edge of the tomb I see a lock of hair.’

41. (γ) Partitive Genitive of Time. Here the genitive gives the range of time within which the action falls. The corresponding construction in Sanskrit and Zend shows that this is the true genitive (cf. Monro, *H. G.* § 150); in Latin this use is not distinguished from the locative ablative of time. As contrasted with the accusative of time, expressing the period throughout the whole of which the action lasts, the genitive of time expresses a period at any point of which the action may take place; *e.g.* :—

Τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος ἐλεύσεται. (*Hom. Od.* xiv. 161.)

‘This very year will he come.’

Ἀλλ' οὔτι μὲν ἔγωγε τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ξύνοικος εἴσειμι.

(*Soph. El.* 817.)

‘But never in all time to come will I go in to share their home.’

42. (δ) The Genitive Absolute in Greek is no doubt derived from the use of the partitive genitive as expressing the time within which an action takes place; it was only a small extension of the use to make it express in addition the circumstances of the action, such as cause, condition, etc. It is to be observed that the origin of the Latin ablative absolute is entirely different (see § 85); *e.g.* :—

Οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος σοὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει.

(*Hom. Il.* i. 88.)

‘While I live, no man shall lay heavy hands on thee.’

Ταῦτ' ἐπράχθη Κόνωνος στρατηγοῦντος. (*Isocr.* ix. 56.)

‘This was done while Konon was general.’

43. (ε) Partitive Genitive as Object to a Verb.

Subdivide thus :—

(1) In Greek a partitive genitive is used as object to verbs which regularly take an accusative, when it is expressed

that the action of the verb affects only a **part** of the object;
e.g. :—

Τῆς γῆς ἔτεμον.

'They ravaged part of the land' (but τὴν γῆν, the whole land).

Ἐγὼ δ' ἐν τοσοῦτῳ τῶν κρεῶν ἔκλεπτον. (Ar. El. 420.)

'But in this brief space I used to steal some of the meat.'

44. (2) In both Greek and Latin a partitive genitive is found with verbs which by their meaning require such a genitive, because their action naturally affects only a part of their objects: notice especially in Greek, ἔχεσθαι, λαμβάνεσθαι, μεθίεσθαι, τυγχάνειν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, μεμνήσθαι, ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι, θιγγάνειν, γέυεσθαι, ἔδεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.; and in Latin, *reminisci*, *meminisse*, *oblivisci*, etc.; e.g. :—

Μήπω τις λώτοιο φαγὼν νόστοιο λάθηται.

(Hom. Od. ix. 102.)

'Lest one may eat of the lotus, and forget his journey home.'

Ὅποῖα κισσὸς δρυὸς ὅπως τῇσδ' ἔξομαι. (Eur. Hec. 398.)

'As the ivy to the oak, so will I cling to her.'

Venit mihi Platonis in mentem. (Cic. Fin. v. 1.)

'A remembrance of Plato comes into my mind.'

Catilina admonebat alium egestatis, alium cupiditatis suae.

(Sall. Cat. 21.)

'Catiline reminded one of his poverty, another of his ambition.'

The Latin construction with verbs of mental emotion, *misereor*, and the impersonals, *miseret*, *paenitet*, *pudet*, *piget*, *taedet*, may be considered to be similar to this. *Miseret me tui*, for example, means 'pity moves me in reference to, connected with you'; e.g. :—

Pudet me deorum hominumque. (Liv. iii. 19.)

'I am ashamed of gods and men.'

45. (3) A partitive genitive of the **material**, or **stock drawn upon** (cf. Monro, *H. G.* § 151 c.), is found with verbs of filling and lacking in both Greek and Latin; with other verbs, only in Greek, and chiefly in Homer; e.g. :—

Πάσσε δ' ἁλὸς θείοιο. (Il. ix. 210.)

'He sprinkled it with sacred salt.'

Φοινία δὲ χεὶρ στάζει θνηλῆς Ἀρεος. (Soph. *El.* 1423.)

'And their blood-stained hand drips with the sacrifice to Ares.'

Implentur veteris Bacchi pinguisque ferinae.

(Verg. *Aen.* i. 215.)

'They are filled with old wine and rich venison.'

Virtus plurimae commentationis indiget.

(Cic. *Fin.* iii. 15, 56.)

'Virtue needs very much study.'

46. III. *Genitive of Definition.* This genitive expresses that of or in which a thing consists, or of which it is made. It has the following subdivisions:—

(a) It expresses the whole contents; *e.g.*:—

Τὸ παρθένιον πτερὸν οὐρεῖον τέρας . . . Σφιγγὸς.

(Eur. *Phoen.* 82.)

'The winged monster of the mountain . . . the Sphinx.'

Μέγιστον σῶμα δειλαίας σποδοῦ. (Soph. *El.* 758.)

'His mighty frame, now wretched dust.'

Ausoniae tellus. (Verg. *Aen.* iii. 476.)

'The land of Ausonia.'

Duo sunt genera liberalitatis; unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi. (Cic. *Off.* i. 15.)

'There are two kinds of liberality; one consists in conferring, the other in returning a benefit.'

47. (β) It expresses the head under which a thing comes, the material of which it consists, etc., but does not mean that the thing is the only one which comes under that head, nor that it exhausts all the material expressed; *e.g.*:—

Μέλαινά τ' ἄστρων ἐκλέλοιπεν εὐφρόνη. (Soph. *El.* 19.)

'And the black night of stars has passed.'

Ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἀργυρίου.

'A hundred talents of silver.'

Praedae hominum pecudumque actae. (Liv. xxiv. 20.)

'Booty of men and cattle was brought.'

Saepe lapidum, sanguinis non numquam, terrae interdum, quondam etiam lactis imber defluxit. (Cic. *Div.* i. 43.)

'Often a shower of stones, occasionally of blood, at times of earth, even in some instances of milk, has fallen.'

48. (γ) Under the head of (α) is to be classed the genitive which both in Greek and Latin follows many words of accusing and condemning; e.g. γράφομαι, διώκω, εἰσάγω, αἰρῶ, ἀλίσκομαι, κατακρίνω, τιμωροῦμαι, *accuso, arguo, damno*, etc.; for the genitive most probably depends on a word such as γραφή, δίκη, κρίσει, or the like in Greek, and *crimine* or *iudicio* in Latin, which is omitted by an ellipse natural in a common formula. The genitive then defines this omitted word; e.g. :—

Μέλητος Σωκράτην ἐγράψατο ἀσεβείας.

‘Meletus accused Socrates of impiety.’

Οἱ πρέσβεις δώρων ἐκρίθησαν.

‘The ambassadors were condemned for corruption.’

Ambitus alterum accusavit. (Cic. *de Am.* 7.)

‘He accused the other of using undue influence.’

Senatus nec liberavit eius culpæ regem neque arguit.

(Liv. xli. 19.)

‘The senate neither acquitted the king of that fault, nor accused him of it.’

49. (δ) The *Genitive of Value* both in Greek and Latin is best explained as a variety of the genitive of definition, closely allied to (β). It expresses the head under which a thing comes, from the particular aspect of its value. Originally it may have been used only with nouns, as for example: οἰκία μεγάλης τιμῆς, *vas magni pretii*; but the use was easily extended to verbs expressing valuing, and from them to verbs of selling and buying. The Latin genitive *magni, parvi*, etc., has been often explained as a locative;* but the existence of *pluris, maioris, assis, minoris*, etc., the analogy of expressions like *lucri facere* to count as gain, *pensi habere* to consider as of weight, *boni consulere* to take in good part, and also the analogy of the Greek, confirm, if they do not necessitate its explanation as a true genitive; e.g. :—

Τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους τοσούτων χρημάτων λύεσθαι.

(Dem. *F. L.* 222.)

‘To ransom the captives at so high a price.’

* This is the explanation of Roby; cf. *Lat. Gram.* vol. ii. §§ 1186, 7.

Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. (Plat. *Apol.* 36B.)
 'The man assesses my penalty at death.'

Non putavit esse tanti hereditatem. (Cic. *Caec.* 7.)
 'He thought his inheritance was not worth so much.'

Nulla pestis humano generi pluris stetit ira. (Sen. *Ir.* i. 7.)
 'No curse has cost the human race more than anger.'

In Greek price, **not value**, is expressed by the dative, and in Latin by the ablative case; both these uses are instrumental in origin. (See § 81.)

50. (ε) Under this head (of definition) may be classed the so-called **Genitives of Purpose** both in Greek and Latin; the construction in Greek is τοῦ with the infinitive, in Latin the genitive of the gerundive with a substantive. (Roby, § 1288, regards the Latin use as coming under the head of 'Possessive,' and it might be regarded also as a Genitive of Quality.) The genitive in both Greek and Latin defines not a single word, but the idea of the whole sentence. This use in Greek is found chiefly in Thucydides, in Latin exclusively in Tacitus; *e.g.* :—

Τὸ ληστικὸν καθήρει, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἵέναι αὐτῷ.
 (Thuc. i. 4.)

'He put down piracy, in order that his revenues might come in better.'

Μίκρ' ἀναλῶσαι τοῦ μὴ τὰ δίκαια ποεῖν ἐθέλουσιν οἱ πλούσιοι.
 (Dem. xviii. 107.)

'The rich are willing to incur a small expense to avoid doing their duty.'

Germanicus Aegyptum proficiscitur cognoscendae antiquitatis. (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 59.)

'Germanicus travelled to Egypt to study antiquity.'

51. IV. The *Genitive of Quality*. This genitive expresses the quality of a thing by referring it to a class possessed of the attributes described. It is much commoner in Latin than in Greek, being almost confined in the latter language to expressions with numeral adjectives; the genitive is never found without an adjective; *e.g.* :—

Παῖς δέκα ἐτῶν.

Ἐνόμισαν τοῦτο πολλῆς σπουδῆς καὶ πολλῆς
πραγματείας εἶναι.

‘They thought this a matter for much energy and trouble.’

Eodem anno Q. Fabius moritur exactae aetatis.

(Liv. xxx. 26.)

‘In the same year Quintus Fabius died at a ripe age.’

Ingenui voltus puer ingenuique pudoris. (Juv. xi. 154.)

‘A boy of ingenuous look and ingenuous modesty.’

52. V. The *Objective Genitive*. This genitive, used with verbal nouns, corresponds to the accusative after verbs; it classifies the verbal noun by referring its action to a particular object; *e.g.* :—

Τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων μῖσος.

Ἀήθης γ’ εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. (Plat. *Lach.* 194A.)

‘I am unaccustomed to such speeches.’

Iustum et tenacem propositi virum. (Hor. *Od.* iii. 8, 1.)

‘A man just and tenacious of his purpose.’

Macima inlecebra est peccandi impunitatis spes.

(Cic. *Mil.* 16.)

‘The greatest allurements to sin is the hope of impunity.’

Note that in the last example the objective genitive corresponds not to an accusative after the verb, but to a phrase with a preposition—*ad peccandum*; in other cases it may correspond to a dative, but much less often than to an accusative.

53. There is a certain use of the genitive in Latin, found in poetical and later writers, especially Tacitus, which is perhaps best explained as an extension of the objective genitive; though it may have been imitated from the Greek genitive (ablative) of cause. It differs in the point that the adjectives to which it is subjoined are not verbal; *e.g.* :—

Aevi maturus Acestes. (Verg. *Aen.* v. 73)

‘Acestes ripe in years.’

Ambiguus pudoris ac metus. (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 40.)

‘Doubting between shame and fear.’

54. VI. The *Genitive with Verbs*. It has been remarked that the partitive genitive is used with certain verbs; but there are other uses in which the use with verbs cannot be explained as being partitive; they fall into two divisions.

55. (α) *With Verbs of Ruling*. In Greek all verbs of ruling, and in Latin *potior*, take a genitive case. This may be explained as an ordinary genitive qualifying the noun, the idea of which is inherent in the verb; e.g.: βασιλεύω = be king, *potior* = become *potis*, powerful over; e.g.:—

Τενέδοιό τε ἱφι ἀνάσσεις. (Hom. *Il.* i. 38.)

‘Thou mightily rulest Tenedos.’

Ἦγεῖτο τῆς ἐξόδου. (Thuc. ii. 10.)

‘He led the expedition.’

Excessisse Augustum et rerum potiri Neronem.

(Tac. *Ann.* i. 5.)

‘That Augustus was dead, and (Tiberius) Nero master of the empire.’

56. (β) In Greek only verbs of **speaking, hearing, etc.**, sometimes are constructed with a genitive of the person spoken about, or of the sound heard. (The genitive of the person or object heard is more probably ablative (see § 60), as expressing ‘the **source** from which the perception comes,’ as Monro says, *H. G.* § 151, note 2.) This is a true genitive; in reality it qualifies not so much the verb itself, as the thing heard or known of the person. In the case of the sound heard the genitive is partitive; the verbal action does not affect the whole of the object; but the accusative is oftener used; e.g.:—

Τοῦ κασιγνήτου τί φής; (Soph. *El.* 317.)

‘What sayest thou of thy brother?’

Εἰ δέ κε τεθνηῶτος ἀκούω. (Hom. *Od.* ii. 220.)

‘But if I hear of him as dead.’

THE ABLATIVE CASE

57. The ablative case properly expresses the point from which a thing is separated or removed, or the source from which it is derived, and the standard from which an estimate

is taken in comparison. In Greek, as before said, the place of the ablative is taken by the genitive.

58. I. The *Point, Place, or Thing from which Motion or Separation takes place*. In prose, in both Latin and Greek, the meaning of the case with names of places is usually assisted by prepositions, such as: ἀπὸ, ἐκ, ὑπὸ, παρὰ, πρὸς, κατὰ, μετὰ, ἀνεν, *ab, ex, absque, sine*, and the like. This remark, as to the use of prepositions, applies equally to some of the other uses. In Greek the genitive alone is found in poetry, and governed by verbs compounded with the prepositions named; in Latin in the names of towns, small islands, and *domo, rure, humo*; e.g.:—

Βάθρων ἵστασθε. (Soph. O. T. 142.)

‘Arise from the steps.’

Μέσης ἀπὸ ἡνιχῆς εὐθὺς ἐκκινῶνται. (Ibid. 812.)

‘He is rolled right out of the chariot.’

Crebri cecidere caelo lapides. (Liv. i. 31.)

‘Showers of stones fell from the sky.’

Damaratus fugit Tarquinius Corintho. (Cic. T. D. v. 37.)

‘Damaratus fled from Corinth to Tarquinii.’

59. The following Latin genitives, imitated from and representing ablative genitives in Greek, are particularly worthy of notice:—

Abstineti irarum calidaeque rixae. (Hor. Od. iii. 27, 69.)

‘Abstain from anger and hot strife.’

Desine mollium tandem querelarum. (Ibid. ii. 9, 18.)

‘Cease at length from tender complaints.’

Dulci laborum decipitur sono. (Ibid. ii. 13, 38.)

‘He is beguiled of his toils by the pleasant sound.’

(Laborum in this last example might also be explained as a direct imitation of the Greek partitive genitive after λανθάνεσθαι. λανθάνω is often translated by *fallo*, and *decipio* is a synonym of *fallo*; so we have λανθάνεται = *fallitur* = *decipitur*.)

60. II. *Ablative of Origin*. This use differs from the foregoing in expressing the point of separation as the origin of the action described. It is particularly used to denote parentage, and in Greek the ablative genitive is used with

verbs of sense-perception, giving the source of the sensation; *e.g.* :—

Δεινὸς χαρακτήρ καπίσσημος ἐν βροτοῖς
ἐσθλῶν γενέσθαι. (Eur. *Hec.* 379.)

‘It is a strange and glorious mark among men to be born of noble lineage.’

Κρομμύων ὀσφραίνομαι. (Ar. *Ran.* 654.)

‘I smell onions.’

ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν ἀκροᾷ τούτων τῶν σοφῶν;

(Plat. *Euthyd.* 304D.)

‘Krito, don’t you give any hearing to these learned people?’

Matre satus terra taurus. (Ov. *Fast.* iii. 799.)

‘A bull born of mother earth.’

Herculis stirpe generatus. (Cic. *R. P.* ii. 12.)

‘Descended from the stock of Hercules.’

61. III. *Ablative of the Agent.* In both Greek and Latin the ablative (ablative genitive in Greek) expresses the agent as the source of the action, almost invariably with prepositions; ὑπό regularly, but also ἀπὸ, παρὰ, πρὸς, ἐξ, in Greek; *a* or *ab* in Latin; *e.g.* :—

Σᾶς ἀλόχου σφαγείς. (Eur. *El.* 123.)

‘Slain by thy wife.’

Μηνύεται ἀπὸ μετοίκων. (Thuc. vi. 28.)

‘Information is given by resident aliens.’

Ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι.

(Plat. *Symp.* 202B.)

‘He is allowed by all to be a great god.’

Adsiduo ruptae lectore columnae. (Juv. i. 13.)

‘The columns broken by the constant reciter.’

[Explained as abl. abs. by Mayor; see note *ad loc.*]

Scriberis Vario fortis et hostium

Victor Maeonii carminis alite. (Hor. *Od.* i. 6. 1.)

‘Thou shalt be written of as valiant and conqueror of thy foes by Varius, winged in Maeonian song.’

62. IV. *Ablative of Cause.* The ablative also naturally expresses cause, as the source from which an action arises, or its point of departure. In Greek this is clearly the correct explanation of the use of the genitive as expressing

cause; and on the ground of analogy, we might explain the Latin ablative of cause similarly; but that use appears to adhere more closely to the ablatives of manner and of attendant circumstances, which are instrumental, and it will be considered under that head. The poets, however, use the genitive occasionally in imitation of the Greek. *E.g.* :—

Ζηλῶ σε τοῦ νοῦ, τῆς δὲ δειλίας στυγῶ. (Soph. *El.* 1027.)

‘I admire thee for thy prudence, but hate thee for thy cowardice.’

Ὡ μῶρε τῆς ἀνοίας. (Ar. *Eq.* 350.)

‘You madman, what folly!’

Iustitiaene prius mirer, belline laborum? (Aen. xi. 126.)

‘Am I first to marvel at his justice, or his toils in war?’

Neque ille

Sepositi ciceris nec longae invidit avenae. (Hor. *Sat.* ii. 6. 64.)

‘Nor did he grudge the store of pea, or the long-eared oats.’

(*Invideo* here follows the construction of *φθονῶ*; but the genitive in Greek may also be explained as partitive.)

63. V. *Ablative of the Standard of Comparison.*

In this use the ablative expresses the point from which the comparison starts; the ablative genitive is, of course, used in Greek; *e.g.* :—

Σιγὴ ποτ' ἐστὶν αἰρετωτέρα λόγον.

‘At times silence is preferable to speech.’

Σιγησόμεσθα κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι. (Eur. *Med.* 315.)

‘We will be silent, being overcome by mightier men.’

(Note that *νικώμενοι* = a comparative; *ἡττώμαι* is similarly used.)

Quid magis est saxo durum quid mollius unda?

(Ov. *A. A.* i. 473.)

‘What is harder than stone, what softer than water?’

Neve putes alium sapiente bonoque beatum.

(Hor. *Ep.* i. 16. 20.)

‘Nor think any other than a wise and good man happy.’

64. VI. The genitive in Greek, and ablative in Latin, which follows verbs and adjectives expressing **deficiency**, **deprivation**, and **want**, is the true ablative of separation; it expresses the object from which the person or thing spoken of is removed, so as to need it, etc. In Latin the genitive is sometimes used with verbs of lacking; it is the true genitive. (See § 45.)

EXAMPLES.

Δυοῖν ἀδελφοῖν ἐστερήθημεν δύο. (Soph. Ant. 13.)

'We two were bereft of our two brothers.'

Ὀλίγου δέω εἰπεῖν.

'I am almost inclined to say.'

This genitive ὀλίγου is also frequently used alone; e.g.:—

Ὀλίγου σε κύνες διεδηλήσαντο. (Hom. Od. xiv. 37.)

'The dogs nearly destroyed thee.'

Magnum opus est, egetque exercitatione non parva.

(Cic. de Am. 5.)

'It is a great work, and needs no little practice.'

Huic tradita urbs est nuda praesidio. (Cic. Att. vii. 13.)

'To him was surrendered the city, bare of defence.'

THE DATIVE CASE

65. The true dative case has two main uses: first to express the remoter object of a transitive verb, or an object indirectly affected by the action of any verb; and secondly, to express purpose or result. (These two uses may be considered as one, if we say that the case expresses the indirect object of a verb, whether that object is a person, a thing, or an **action**; action as indirect object is the dative of purpose.) The Latin dative retains both these uses, without including any other uses belonging to other cases. The Greek dative has only the former use (except in one or two unusual constructions), so far as it is a true dative; but it also covers the uses of the lost locative and instrumental cases. These uses of the Greek dative will be considered under those cases.

66. I. *Dative of the Indirect Object.* This dative may be considered under several heads, according to the relation expressed by the case.

67. (α) *Indirect Object Proper*.—This use is found with transitive verbs, which by their meaning require an indirect object as well as a direct one to limit their action; *e.g.*, especially words of giving, trusting, telling, comparing, and the like; and also with intransitive verbs, whose action only affects their object indirectly. Their meanings are very various; and often a transitive English verb will be found to be intransitive, requiring a dative, in Latin or Greek. It stands also with many adjectives and substantives, the meaning of which may be defined by a dative expressing the person or thing in relation to which they stand. In Greek the dative of the indirect object is rare except with names of persons. Uses of the infinitive (itself really a dative of a verbal noun) are found instead in many cases. *E.g.*:—

Τοῦθ' ὑμῖν Αἴας τοῦπος ὕστατον θροεῖ. (Soph. *Ai.* 864.)

'This last word Aias utters to you.'

Σωτήρ γενοῦ μοι ξύμμαχος τ' αἰτουμένω. (Aesch. *Eum.* 2.)

'Be my saviour and ally in my prayer.'

Scriptitavit orationes multis Aelius. (Cic. *Brut.* 46.)

'Aelius wrote speeches for many people.'

Nec nostris praebere vacat tibi cantibus aures.

(Ov. *Met.* v. 344.)

'Nor hast thou leisure to lend thy ears to our songs.'

(N.B.—That in Greek verbs of speaking only take a dative when they mean speaking for the **interest** of the person spoken to; *πρός τινα* is used to express a mere addressing of the person.)

68. (β) This dative of the indirect object is sometimes used with a **local relation**, of the person or place to which motion is made, chiefly in poetry. It is still a true dative of the person or thing indirectly affected; *e.g.*:—

Ἐπειγομένοισι δ' ἵκοντο. (Hom. *Il.* xii. 374.)

'They came to them hastening.'

Τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους θυμῷ βαλέ. (Aesch. *P.* V. 705.)

'Put my words in thy heart.'

Τὴν ἄτην ὁρῶν στείχουσιν ἄστροις. (Soph. *Ant.* 186.)

'Seeing destruction coming to his countrymen.'

Nos onera quibusdam bestiis, nos iuga imponimus.

(Cic. *N. D.* 2, 60.)

'We put burdens and yokes on some beasts.'

Hinc alii spolia occisis derepta Latinis

Coniciunt igni. (Verg. *Aen.* xi. 193.)

'Here others cast on the fire spoils torn from the slain Latins.'

69. (γ) *Dative of the Person Indirectly Affected, or Interested in a Statement.*—This use includes all those datives which express that the person is in some way affected by the verbal action. Note especially the so-called ethic dative, the dative of the agent (the use of which with perfect tenses and verbal adjectives shows that the person is considered rather as the one **for whom** the action exists, rather than as the instrument with which it is done) and the dative of the person judging. All these datives are so closely related, and at times so hard to distinguish, that they are best classed together; *e.g.*:—

Ὀρέστην ἐξεδεξάμην πατρί. (Aesch. *Choeph.* 762.)

'I received Orestes from his father.'

Μή μοι τοῦνεκ' ἀμύμονα νείκεε κόρυην. (Hom. *Od.* vii. 303.)

'Do not, I pray thee, for this chide the noble maiden.'

Τρωσὶν δαμναμένους. Πηλεΐωνι δαμείς. (Hom.)

'Slain by the Trojans. Slain by the son of Peleus.'

Quid mihi Celsus agit? (Hor. *Ep.* i. 3. 15.)

'What, I wonder, is Celsus doing?'

Carmina quae scribuntur aquae potoribus. (*Ib.* i. 19. 3.)

'Poems which are written by water-drinkers.'

Verum confitentibus, latifundia perdidere Italiam.

(Plin. 18. 35.)

'In the judgment of those who admit the truth, the system of large estates was the ruin of Italy.'

70. (δ) *Possessive Dative.*—This dative is practically the same as the foregoing, but may be separately classified, as it is easily distinguished; but *e.g.*:—

Ὀνομα τῷ μειρακίῳ ἦν Πλάτων.

'The lad's name was Plato.'

Semper in civitate, quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invident.
(Sallust. *Cat.* 37.)

‘In a state the class who possess no property always envy the respectable classes.’

Olli dura quies oculos et ferreus urget somnus.
(Verg. *Aen.* x. 745.)

‘His eyes stern rest and iron sleep hold fast.’

71. II. The dative which expresses the **purpose** or **result** of an action is best considered apart from the dative of the indirect object, though it may be said that it only differs in expressing one action as the indirect object of another. In Greek the use of this dative only occurs in one or two cases from ordinary nouns; but it is really found in the constant use of the infinitive, to express purpose, consequence, limitation, and generally to explain the action of the main verb by reference to another action in which it results (the epexegetical infinitive). The Greek infinitive is simply a verbal substantive in the dative or locative case, from an etymological point of view, though it is always treated as a dative in construction. In Latin this use of the infinitive is very rare (see § 120); but other verbal substantives, particularly the so-called gerund and gerundive, and those formed in *-tio* and *-us*, are regularly found in this dative use. The **predicative dative** in Latin appears to be closely allied to this use, and yet it has certain peculiarities which make it require separate treatment.

72. (1) *Dative of Purpose.* In this use the dative of a substantive, usually derived from a verb, expresses the purpose of an action, or its result. In Greek the use appears to be extremely rare, possibly because the dative case forms have ceased to be true datives. As they stand for the locative and instrumental as well, confusion might have arisen; but *e.g.*:—

Τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ ἐπορίζοντο.
(Thuc. iii. 82.)

‘This external assistance was obtained for the annoyance of their opponents.’

Hunc sibi domicilio locum legerunt. (Caes. *B. G.* ii. 29.)
 'They chose this place for their abode.'

Dies composita gerendae rei est. (Liv. xxv. 16.)
 'A day was fixed for the transaction of the business.'

73. (2) *Predicative Dative.* In this use the dative case expresses 'that which a thing serves as, or occasions.' (Roby, *L. G.* ii. § 1158.) Its main characteristics are that 'it is the dative of a semi-abstract substantive, in the singular number, used predicatively, most frequently with *est*. It is not qualified by any adjectives except the simplest adjectives of quantity, nor by a genitive or prepositional phrase, though a personal dative, as indirect object, is a very frequent accompaniment. The usage is not very frequent anywhere, except in the case of a few words, and there is . . . a noticeable capriciousness shewn in the use of some words in this case and the non-use of others.' (Roby, ii. Preface, p. xxvi. The whole account should be studied to obtain a complete conception of the use.) It is, however, doubtful whether the use is essentially distinct from the dative of purpose. Other authorities (*e.g.*, Gildersleeve and Lodge, *Latin Grammar*, § 356, and Giles, *Comparative Philology*, § 336) group both constructions together. The latter points out that the predicative dative may be due to attraction, *est mihi cura* becoming *est mihi curae*, comparing such sentences as *Iuventus nomen fecit Peniculo mihi* (Plaut. *Men.* i. 1. 1), where *Peniculo* is no doubt attracted to *mihi*. In Plautus the nominative is as common as the dative; in later Latin the dative abounds.

It should be added that the dative is only found with *esse*, *habere*, *ducere*, *dare*, *vertere*, and one or two other verbs less commonly, except in the case of *praesidio*, *subsidio*, *auxilio*, which are used with verbs of motion; *e.g.*:—

Nec tamen id impedimento rebus gerendis fuit.
 (Liv. xxvi. 24.)

'Yet that was no hindrance to business.'

Paupertas probro haberi coepit. (Sallust. *Cat.* 12.)

'Poverty began to be considered a reproach.'

Equitatum auxilio Caesari miserant. (Caes. *B. G.* i. 18.)

'They had sent the cavalry to assist Caesar.'

THE LOCATIVE CASE

74. A separate form for this case is only found in a few words in Greek and Latin; *e.g.*, οἶκοι, χαμαί, Ἀθήνησιν, *domi, humi*. In Greek the dative supplies the want, in Latin the ablative and (in proper nouns of the 1st and 2nd declension in the singular) the genitive. In prose prepositions, *e.g.*, ἐν, ἐπὶ, παρὰ, πρὸς, ὑπὸ, *in, sub, subter, supra*, are used to assist the meaning of the case, though in Latin names of towns, small islands, *domi, rure, humi, animi* (apparently), *militiae, parte, regione, loco, dextra, laeva, medio, terra marique*, and phrases with *totus* or *medius* as attribute, can dispense with the preposition. These remarks apply to the use as expressing the **place** at which; as expressing **time when** prepositions are not used in Latin, though they usually are in Greek. We may take the following heads:—

75. I. (1) *Place Where*. (Greek dative, Latin genitive or ablative.)

Ἐμπύρων ἐγευόμην βωμοῖσι παμφλέκτοισι.

(Soph. *Ant.* 1006.)

‘I tasted the victims at the altars of burnt-offering.’

Νῦν ἄγρουσι τυγχάνει. (Soph. *El.* 313.)

‘Now he is in the fields.’

Θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι ἀνάσσει. (Hom. *Il.* ii. 669.)

‘He rules among gods and men.’

Atrox discordia domi forisque. (Liv. ii. 60.)

‘Vehement discord at home and abroad.’

Totis trepidatur castris. (Caes. *B. G.* vi. 37.)

‘There is a panic in the whole camp.’

Fulva moribundum extendit arena. (Verg. *Aen.* v. 374.)

‘He lays him dying on the yellow sand.’

76. (2) *Place to Which*. This meaning is regularly expressed by the accusative case; but place where and place to which seem to have been at times confused, and expressed in the same way; *e.g.*:—

Κλῆρον κυνέη βάλε. (Hom. *Il.* vii. 187.)

‘He cast the lot in the helmet.’

Procumbit humi bos. (Verg. *Aen.* v. 481.)
 'The ox crashes on the ground.'

77. II. *Time When.* The preposition is omitted in Greek only when the date is that of the particular day, month, or year of its occurrence, or the name of a festival. In such cases the word for day, etc., must have an attribute. In Latin a preposition is not used; *e.g.*:—

Τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ. Τῇ πεμπτῇ καὶ δεκατῇ ἔτει.

Ἰππάρχος ἐφονεύθη Παναθηναίοις.

'Hipparchus was murdered at the Panathenaic feast.'

Ἐν νυκτὶ βουλὴ τοῖς σοφοῖσι γίγνεται.

'At night counsel comes to the wise.'

Arabes campos hieme et aestate peragrant. (Cic. *Div.* i. 42.)

'The Arabs wander over the plains in summer and winter.'

Eorum adventu equos Germanis distribuit.

(Caes. *B. G.* vii. 65.)

'At their approach he gave horses to the Germans.'

78. In Latin this case also expresses 'time **within** which,' which in Greek is expressed by the partitive genitive.

Ergo his annis quadringentis Romae rex erat?

(Cic. *R. P.* i. 37.)

'So was there a king at Rome within these four hundred years?'

Tribus horis venire potestis. (Caes. *B. G.* vi. 35.)

'You can come in three hours.'

79. N.B.—Besides the locative forms mentioned above, the adverbs and prepositions ἀεί, πέρυσι (last year), ἀντί, ἀμφί, περί, πρὸς, ante, penes, are really locatives; so too ποῖ, and qui in old Latin. (Cp. Giles, *Comparative Philology*, § 337.)

THE INSTRUMENTAL CASE

80. Neither Greek nor Latin has any separate form for this case; in Greek the dative supplies the want, in Latin the ablative. The name **instrumental** implies that all the uses classed under this head may be regarded as expressing the instrument with which an action is done, or extensions of the idea of instrument. The name **sociative** is also used,

and denotes that the case expresses the accompaniment of any action. On the ground that this name has a wider meaning, it is perhaps preferable. It may be observed that the English preposition 'with' covers most of the uses of this case. The uses may be classed as follows:—

81. I. *Instrument or Means* with which an action is performed. Dative alone in Greek, ablative alone in Latin, without prepositions. *E.g.*:—

Οὐδείς ἔπαινον ἡδοναῖς ἐκτήσατο.

'No one has won praise by enjoyment.'

Πρίατο κτέατεσσιν ἐοῖσιν. (Hom. *Od.* xv 483.)

'He bought with his possessions.'

(N.B.—That in this example the dative expresses **price as means**.)

Britanni lacte et carne vivunt. (Caes. *B. G.* v. 14.)

'The Britons live on milk and meat.'

Hi iaculis, illi certant defendere saxis. (Verg. *Aen.* x. 130.)

'These strive to defend with darts, those with stones.'

(The ablatives which in Latin follow *utor, fruor, fungor, vescor, potior, nitor*—all reflexive, meaning 'I do something to myself with'—*constare, contentus, fretus*, are instrumental.)

82. II. *Instrumental of Association*. This is the sociative use proper; it expresses the persons or things which accompany the action of the verb. In Greek the dative alone is used in many cases (with names of persons usually μετά c. gen. in prose, rarely σύν c. dat.); in Latin the ablative alone occasionally, but regularly with **cum**.

In Greek this dative is especially used with verbs of consorting with, *e.g.* ὁμιλῶ, ἔπομαι, ἀκολουθῶ, and with the dative of αὐτός to qualify it; *e.g.*:—

Σοφοῖς ὁμιλῶν αὐτὸς ἐκβήσῃ σοφός.

'By consorting with the wise, thou thyself wilt turn out wise.'

Ἰπποισι καὶ ἄρμασι πέμπε. (Hom. *Od.* iv. 8.)

'He sent him with horses and a chariot.'

Αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμ' αὐτῇ δὲ θαλάσση. (Hom. *Il.* viii. 24.)

'I would draw up earth and sea and all.'

Ἀπεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπ' οἴκου. (Thuc. vi. 7.)

'They retired home with their force.'

(This last is called the *military* dative in some books.)

Ipse uno graditur comitatus Achate. (Verg. *Aen.* i. 312.)

'He walks, attended by Achates alone.'

Marcello, quibus consul rem gesserat, legiones decretae.

(Liv. xxvii. 7.)

'The legions, with which the consul had carried on the war, were voted to Marcellus.'

83. III. Instrumental of Cause. It will easily be seen that the idea of the means with which an action is performed is not far removed from that of its cause; so we find the instrumental case—Greek dative, Latin ablative—expressing the efficient cause of an action or event. In neither language is a preposition used with the case in this sense; but in Greek prose *διά* with accusative is more common, and in Latin *ob*, *propter*, with accusative are frequent in the same sense; *e.g.*:—

Φιλότητι ἔπονται. (Hom. *Od.* iii. 363.)

'They followed from friendship.'

Τὸ γὰρ σὸν ὄμμα δεινὸν ἀνδρὶ δημότῃ

λόγοις τοιούτοις. (Soph. *Ant.* 690, 691.)

'Thy countenance is terrible to a man of the people, at such words.'

Τοῖς πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

(Thuc. iii. 98.)

'Fearing the Athenians because of his performances.'

Animi vitio id evenit. (Cic. *Fin.* v. 12.)

'That results from a defect of mind.'

Macte virtute, milites Romani, este. (Liv. vii. 36.)

'Be glorious in your valour, Roman soldiers.'

84. IV. Instrumental of Manner or Description. Here too we can easily understand that the same case which expresses the means may express the manner of an action. In both Latin and Greek, except with certain common words, a preposition *μετά* or *cum* is used, unless the substantive is qualified by an adjective; even so the preposition is often found, though never with some common phrases such as, *e.g.*, παντὶ τρόπῳ, τῷδε τῷ τρόπῳ. In Latin this in-

strumental ablative is used to qualify substantives, giving their description, just as is the genitive of description, and it is difficult to distinguish in any way between the uses. *E.g.*:—

Μεγάλη κραυγὴ προήσαν.

'They advanced with a loud shout.'

Ὑπτίους κάτω

στρέψας τὸ λοιπὸν σέλμασιν ναυτίλλεται. (Soph. *Ant.* 716.)

'Thenceforward, having upset his boat, he voyages with benches upside down.'

Ἀλλ' ὦδέ μ' αἰεὶ ζῶσαν ἀβλαβεὶ βίῳ. (Soph. *El.* 650.)

'But living ever thus with life unharmed.'

Hinc toto praeceps se corpore ad undas misit.

(Verg. *Aen.* iv. 253.)

'Hence he cast himself headlong with all his body.'

Senex promissa barba, madidisque capillis.

'An old man with flowing beard, and anointed hair.'

85. V. Instrumental of Attendant Circumstances.

This is the use so common in Latin, and usually called the ablative absolute. As a rule in Greek the genitive absolute (of different origin) corresponds to the Latin ablative absolute; but there are a few instances of instrumental datives which may be compared to the Latin use. This use adheres closely to that expressing cause. *E.g.*:—

Ἀλλ' ὀλολύξατε φαινόμεναισιν ταῖς ἀρχαίαισιν Ἀθήναις.

(Ar. *Eq.* 1327.)

'But raise a cry of joy at ancient Athens appearing.'

Στρατοπέδῳ ἐκ νεῶν ἰδρυθέντι . . . οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐξιόντες.

(Thuc. vi. 37. 2.)

'With their camp established in dependence on their ships . . . not advancing far.'

Quid hoc populo obtineri potest? (Cic. *Leg.* iii. 16.)

'What can be held with a people like this?'

Haec dicente consule, equites circumfunduntur. (Liv. x. 36.)

'As the consul said this, the cavalry swarm around.'

Tranquillo, ut aiunt, quilibet gubernator est.

(Sen. *Ep.* 95, § 34.)

'In calm weather, as they say, any man is a steersman.'

Notice especially this ablative of the perfect participle standing alone, as in *auspicato, nec opinato, consulto, tripertito, improvise*, etc.

86. VI. *Instrumental of the Point* in which a term is applied. This use is often called the dative (in Greek) or ablative (in Latin) of **respect**. It resembles most closely the instrumental of manner; it qualifies chiefly intransitive verbs and nouns. It is rarer in Greek than in Latin, as the accusative (limiting) takes its place. *E.g.*:—

Εἰ γὰρ δὴ τά γ' ἐγγενῇ φύσει
ἄκοσμα θρέψω. (Soph. *Ant.* 659.)

'For if I train those that are my kin in birth to be disorderly.'

Capti auribus et oculis metu omnes torpere. (Liv. xxi. 58.)

'Bereft of hearing and seeing all were numbed with fear.'

Illi honoribus et rerum gestarum gloria florebant.

(Cic. *Or.* i. 1.)

'They were flourishing with honours and the fame of their deeds.'

87. VII. *Instrumental of Measure*, or amount of difference. This use is found both with the Greek dative and Latin ablative, with comparatives and superlatives, and verbs expressing distance. It is best regarded as instrumental, and akin to the use expressing manner; but it resembles the locative use to some extent, in so far as it expresses the point rather than the manner of the difference; *e.g.*:—

Τέχνη δ' ἀνάγκης ἀσθενεστέρα μακρῇ.

'Art is far weaker than necessity.'

Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπερρώσθησαν.

(Thuc. vi. 93.)

'The Spartans were much more encouraged.'

Multis partibus sol maior est quam terra.

(Cic. *Acad.* ii. 56.)

'The sun is many times larger than the earth.'

Dente si nigro fieres vel uno

Turpior ungui., (Hor. *Od.* ii. 8. 3.)

'If thou wert made less fair by a black tooth or a single nail.'

88. **Note.**—The classification of case-usages must to a certain extent be arbitrary. There is a number of well-defined uses, whose explanation is a matter of certainty; but it is to be remembered that neither in Latin nor Greek, nor yet in the parent language, the Aryan, was there ever a definite and logical apportionment of uses to various cases. Linguistic usages are natural growths, not scientific classifications. There is of course a prevailing tendency to express any given idea in a certain way; but at different moments the same idea may be regarded from different points of view, and so expressed by different case-usages. The essential point is never to explain any case-usage by a conception of the meaning of that case which is incompatible with its general signification, and to attach every explanation by logical steps to what is assumed as the general idea of the case in question.

THE VERB

89. The first necessity in considering verbal uses is to define the meaning of the various tenses; the meaning of the moods can be considered in connection with each individual mood, but the tenses are common to all the moods, and therefore a knowledge of their meaning is indispensable to a right consideration of the meaning of the moods.

90. The temporal distinctions expressed by the tenses are not the same for Latin and Greek. It is easily seen that time is to be distinguished as **present**, **past**, and **future**; while action in time may be regarded as (1) **incomplete**, **continuous** or **progressive**; (2) **complete**; and (3) **complete with effects remaining**. The tenses both in Latin and Greek are distinguished on both these principles; the former being more prominent in Latin, the latter in Greek. A perfect scheme of tense distinctions would

combine the two principles, and exhibit three kinds each of past, present, and future tense; as, for example, an incomplete, a complete, and complete with effects remaining present, and so too with the past and future tenses. But, as a matter of fact, the ordinary needs of language do not demand this exactness of tense distinction. We can in English, by the use of auxiliaries, express all the different tense meanings; but neither in Latin or Greek was this felt to be necessary. For example, in both Latin and Greek the present tense is the progressive present, equivalent to our 'I am doing'; for the reason that present action is almost inevitably regarded as progressive. But it may be said, with tolerable accuracy, that in their tense distinctions the Greeks preferred to consider the completeness or the reverse of an action, while the Romans divided their tenses by the simpler idea of mere time. This idea, of difference of time, is mostly absent from the imperative, subjunctive, and optative, and frequently from the infinitive and participle in Greek.

91. We may now consider the names given to the tenses. They are in Greek, the **Present, Imperfect, Aorist, Perfect, Pluperfect, Future, and Future Perfect**; in Latin, the **Present, Imperfect, Perfect** (in two senses), **Pluperfect, Future, and Future Perfect**. In both languages the uses of the Present, Imperfect, and Future are practically identical; they are as follows:—

92. The *Present Tense*. The present tense expresses an incomplete action in present time: ἐρῶ = *amo* = 'I am loving.' The so-called aorist present, expressing a complete or single action in present time, as the English 'I love,' has no separate form in Greek or Latin; though considerations of word formation make it probable that presents formed directly from the verb-stem, such as λέγω, φημί, *rego, curro*, were really aorist presents; while reduplicated presents, such as δίδωμι, τίθημι, *gigno, sisto*, presents formed by lengthening the stem-vowel, as φεύγω, *dūco*, presents formed by the insertion of a nasal, as τέμνω, *fīndo*, and especially those formed by the insertion of the letters *sc*, as φάσκω, γηράσκω, *irascor, albesco*, properly represented the incomplete present tense. The present of complete action with effects remaining

or present-perfect is in Greek represented by the perfect tense; and so too in Latin, as far as it can be represented. We shall consider this in reference to the perfect tense itself.

93. The *Imperfect Tense*. The imperfect tense expresses incomplete action in past time. 'It is thus a present transferred to the past.' (Goodwin, *M. T.* § 35.) The incomplete action may be either continuous, repeated, customary, or tentative.

It is the view of Brugmann that this tense in the Indo-Germanic language was the tense used for narration, and was only gradually displaced by the aorist. (Cp. Jebb's Appendix on Soph. *El.* 680. The line referred to is—

Κάπεμπόμην πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πᾶν φράσω.)

Similar instances may be found in Hom. *Il.* ii. 106, *Od.* xi. 174, Soph. *Trach.* 76. It is certainly constantly found in vivid narration, representing the action as rather in progress than in its mere occurrence. It gives a picture, not a simple statement. (Cf. Thuc. vii. 70, οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐφύλασσον . . . καὶ ὁ πεζὸς παρεβόηθει, and the whole chapter.)

In both Greek and Latin the imperfect may express a fact previously unknown or disregarded, and just recognised; *e.g.*:—

‘Ὁδ’ ἦν ἄρα ὁ ξυλλαβὼν με. (Soph. *Ph.* 978.)

‘This then is the man who seized me.’

Nunc Saliaribus ornare pulvinar deorum

Tempus erat dapibus, sodales. (Hor. *Od.* i. 37. 2-4.)

‘Now ’tis the time to deck the couches of the gods with Saliarian feasts.’

Similarly the imperfect may express the result of a previous discussion, which, however, still holds good. This is called the *philosophic imperfect*; *e.g.*:—

Καὶ δίκαιον δὴ φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ

τρόπῳ, ὅπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία. (Plat. *Rep.* 441D.)

‘And we will assert that a man is just in precisely the same way as we found a city is.’

In Latin the imperfect tense is often, though not always, used in letters to denote an action which occurs at the time

of writing, but which is past when the receiver of the letter reads it. It is commonest at the beginning and end of letters, as it is in those portions of them that the writer has the time of his writing most in mind. Cicero is most regular in this use; *e.g.*:—

Ante diem viii. Kal. haec ego scribebam hora nona. Milo campum iam tenebat; Marcellus candidatus ita stertebat, ut ego vicinus audirem. (Cic. Att. iv. 3. 25.)

‘I am writing this on the 24th at 3 o’clock. Milo already holds the field; the candidate Marcellus is snoring so loud, that I his neighbour hear.’

94. The *Future Tense*. The future tense expresses equally incomplete or continuous, and complete or single action in future time. Thus φιλήσω = *amabo* = ‘I shall love, or be loving.’

95. With regard to the remaining tenses, the usages of Greek are different from those of Latin. The Greeks distinguished the aorist, as expressing simply complete action (frequently, but not necessarily, single or momentary action) from the perfect and pluperfect, which express complete action, with the effects remaining. The Latin perfect and pluperfect express past (and so complete) action, and the future perfect expresses past action in future time, that is, past as contrasted with other still future actions. The perfect, however, has two different meanings; *amavi* = ‘I have loved,’ or, ‘I loved.’ In the latter meaning it corresponds fairly with the Greek aorist, but the former meaning is quite distinct from that of the Greek perfect. We may, however, consider the uses in both languages under the head of Perfect, Pluperfect, Future Perfect, and Aorist Tenses. The contrast will help to illustrate the different meanings in the two languages.

96. The *Perfect*. In Greek the perfect tense expresses an action **complete, with effects remaining**; that is, an action to which, when complete, the relation of the agent remains unchanged. Thus τεθαύμακα = ‘I have wondered, and still am wondering’; κέκλῃκα τὴν θύραν = ‘I have shut the door, and still am in the position of having shut it’;

τέθαμμαι, 'I have been buried, and am in the grave.' Naturally this tense is rarely used in the active, as the need does not often arise to describe an **active** action to which the relation of the agent remains unchanged, and so many Greek verbs have no active perfect tense, or none in use; but in the case of a **passive** action, the relation of the agent, or rather patient, often does remain unchanged, and so perfect passives are common. But it will nearly always be found most correct to translate a Greek perfect tense by an English present, especially in the passive; e.g. γέγραπται ἡ ἐπιστολή = 'the letter is written,' not, 'has been written.'

97. The Latin perfect (*i.e.* the perfect translated 'have') expresses an action **just completed**. Accordingly it is used as a primary tense; but there is no necessary idea of the effects remaining. Indeed, it is used to express what is absolutely finished and done with, as *fuit Ilium*, 'Troy has existed (but does so no longer)'; *vixi*, 'I have lived my life (but it is over now).' This Latin perfect must be translated by the Greek aorist, for the Greeks did not distinguish between action recently and more remotely complete. All complete action was expressed by the same aorist tense.

In Greek notice should be taken of the construction of the aorist participle active with ἔχω, which is practically equivalent to our perfect with 'have' in many cases. The first instance is Hesiod, *Op.* 42:—

Κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισι.
'For the gods have hidden life from men.'

Cp. also:—

Τοὺς δὲ πρόσθεν εὖσεβεῖς . . . ἐκβαλοῦσ' ἔχεις.
(Soph. *El.* 590.)

'Thou hast cast out the righteous elder-born.'

Εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν ἐλθὼν ἔχει καταλαβών. (Dem. ix. 12.)

'He has gone to Thessaly, and has seized it.'

(Or, perhaps, 'has seized it, and is keeping it.')

In Latin the past participle passive with *habeo* is similarly used. From this construction of course the perfect tenses of the Romance languages have been derived, though

in classical Latin the sense is generally more than that of a simple perfect; *i.e.* has done, and keeps or possesses so, not simply has done; *e.g.*:—

Romulus habuit plebem in clientelas principum descriptam.
(Cic. *de Rep.* ii. 9.)

‘Romulus kept the plebs divided into bodies of dependents on leading men.’

Domitas habere libidines. (Cic. *de Or.* i. 43.)

‘To have tamed one’s passions.’

98. The *Pluperfect Tense*. In both Latin and Greek the pluperfect tense stands in the same relation to the perfect; that is, it expresses the perfect meaning in past time. Thus the Greek pluperfect expresses complete action with effects remaining in past time; *e.g.* ἐβεβουλεύμην = ‘I had resolved, and was so.’ The Latin perfect expresses action previously completed as compared with more recent action in past time; *e.g.* *hoc scripseram ubi advenit amicus* = ‘I had written this when my friend came.’ This in Greek would be τοῦτο ἔγραψα, ὅτε ἦλθεν ὁ φίλος. Again no distinction is made as to priority in time of two equally complete actions. Thus the English and Latin pluperfect are to be translated by the Greek aorist. The Greek pluperfect active is even rarer than the perfect, as there is still less occasion for its use.

99. The *Future Perfect Tense*. In Greek there is no separate form for the future perfect in the active voice; it is supplied by a periphrasis of the perfect participle with the future of εἶμι. It differs from the Latin future perfect exactly as do the Greek perfect and pluperfect from the Latin. Thus δεδωκὼς ἔσομαι = ‘I shall be in the position of having given’; τεθάψομαι = ‘I shall be in the grave.’ The Latin future perfect expresses an action **complete in the future** as contrasted with another future action; as *cum venero, tibi dicam*, ‘When I have come, I will tell you.’ In Greek this would be ὅταν ἔλθω, ἐρῶ σοι; and it will be generally found advisable to translate the Latin future perfect (which is almost invariably found in dependent clauses) by the Greek aorist subjunctive, in dependence on temporal and other adverbs.

From what has been said it will be seen that the force of the Greek perfect, pluperfect, and future perfect can scarcely be rendered in Latin; and if at all, by the present imperfect and future tenses, at any rate in the active voice. In later Greek the use of the perfect approximates to the Latin use. Even in later Attic many perfects may be translated by the English perfect; *e.g.* :—

Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δ' οὐ.

(*Plat. Theat.* 144B.)

'I have heard the name, but do not remember it.'

100. The Aorist. The aorist in Greek, and the Latin perfect translated by the English past tense, or with 'I did'—*e.g.* *amavi*, 'I loved, or did love'—expresses **complete action in past time**. Thus ἐφίλησα = *amavi* = 'I loved.' But the Greek usage lays more emphasis on the **completeness** than on the **pastness** of the action; and so the aorist is used in Greek, when in Latin (and English) a present or some kind of periphrasis may be necessary. For example: ἐνόσησα, 'I fell ill,' *aegrotare coepi*; πῶς εἶπας, 'What do you mean?' *quid vis dicere?* In this latter example the Greek usage emphasizes the completeness of the action, though it is all but present. Especially noticeable is the so-called **gnomic** use of the aorist in Greek; *e.g.* :—

Ἦν ἄρα σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν
χρείαν. (*Thuc.* i. 70.)

'If they meet with any repulses, they make good the deficiency with new hopes.'

This use may be explained either (1) on the ground that a complete action is taken as a type of all other present or future actions, or (2) that the aorist use here is a survival of the once existing present aorist. In Latin and English the present must be used; though Horace copies the Greek use in *Ep.* i. 2. 48 :—

*Non aeris acervus et auri aegroto domini deduxit corpore
febres.*

'Piles of gold and copper do not take fevers from their owner's sick frame.'

The meaning of the Latin aorist perfect is simply to express past action; e.g. *veni, vidi, vici*, 'I came, I saw, I conquered.'

The aorist in Greek is often said to express particularly momentary or single action, and no doubt a complete action is usually regarded as such. But in many uses, particularly in negative prohibitions, in which $\mu\eta$ with the present imperative and aorist subjunctive are identical in meaning, and occasionally used side by side, this distinction can scarcely be upheld; and the distinction here laid down, of completeness or incompleteness of action, will be found to afford a better explanation of the uses in question.

101. Primary and Historic Tenses. Perhaps it may here be mentioned that in both Greek and Latin the present, future, future perfect, and the perfect tenses are classed together as **primary**; the imperfect, aorist (aorist perfect in Latin), and pluperfect as **historic**.

THE MOODS

102. The moods in Greek are the **indicative**, the **imperative**, the **subjunctive**, the **optative**, the **infinitive**, and the **participial**. Latin has no **optative** mood, as its **subjunctive** serves for the uses of both Greek moods. The **infinitive** and **participial** are not really moods at all, but **verbal nouns**; the **infinitive** being a **verbal substantive** expressing action, the **participial** a **verbal adjective** expressing action, which is used as an attribute to substantives. But as their constructions are **adverbial**, i.e. they govern the same cases as the verbs to which they correspond, and are qualified by adverbs, and not by adjectives, they are best considered as verbal moods.

103. In Greek all the tenses are found in each of the moods, except that the present covers both present and imperfect, and the perfect both perfect and pluperfect, in all moods except the indicative, and that the future is wanting to the imperative and subjunctive; but few verbs have all their possible tenses in use, the perfect especially being rare. In Latin again the present covers the uses of both present and imperfect in all moods except the indica-

tive and subjunctive; the subjunctive has no future or future perfect; the infinitive no future perfect or pluperfect; the imperative no perfect, pluperfect, or future perfect; and active verbs have no perfect or aorist participle, passive verbs no present or future participle. Deponent verbs alone possess both a present and perfect or aorist participle, as well as a future. In addition Latin possesses a gerund, or verbal substantive, active in meaning; and a gerundive, or verbal adjective, passive in meaning. (The distinction between the gerund and gerundive is superfluous; see post, § 123.) The so-called supines are merely the accusative and ablative (usually instrumental ablative) of a verbal substantive used in a special way.

104. In Greek the tense distinctions in the imperative, subjunctive, and optative express only the completeness, completeness with effects remaining, or incompleteness of the action; and this is often the case with the infinitive and participial tenses also; the aorist and perfect imply no idea of pastness. In Latin, however, the tenses retain their usual distinctions in the subjunctive and infinitive mood. Accordingly, the indicative mood has to be used in Greek in various constructions in which it is essential to express the idea of pastness.

105. It will be most convenient briefly to state the general difference of meaning given by the use of different moods; and then to consider, side by side, the manner in which various constructions are expressed in Greek and Latin, showing the force of the moods used in each case. The constructions to be considered are the Jussive, Final, Conditional, Relative and Temporal, Consecutive, and Oratio Obliqua.

106. The *Indicative Mood*. The indicative mood in all its tenses states an action as a fact; its use does not of course imply that the action is really a fact, but merely that it is so regarded by the speaker or writer. This statement applies both to Greek and Latin; but in the former language the historic tenses of the indicative are used in past wishes, past purpose and conditional clauses, as there is (as has been already mentioned) no distinction as regards pastness between

the tenses of the subjunctive and optative moods. These uses will be considered later.

107. The *Subjunctive and Optative Moods*. Greek is the only language which retains a separate form and meaning for both the subjunctive and optative moods; in the other Indo-Germanic languages one or the other mood disappears, or else the forms are confused together. This is the case in Latin, for what we are accustomed to call the subjunctive mood contains forms which are both subjunctive and optative. For example, *feram feras ferat* corresponds to *φέρω φέρῃς φέρῃ*, and is subjunctive; but *sim* (older form *siem*) corresponds to *εἶην*, and is optative; similarly *viderim* corresponds to *εἶδεῖην*. The derivation and formation of the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive forms is a question which is still undecided.

108. The question of the respective meaning of each of these moods is one of great difficulty and uncertainty. We may begin by pointing out that the names which they bear—subjunctive = *ὑποτακτική* or subordinate, and optative = *ἐὐκτική* or wishing—are by no means adequate to express either the fundamental meaning or the general use of these moods, for the subjunctive is often used in independent sentences, and the optative certainly expresses other ideas than that of wishing, though some authorities contend that that is its original meaning.

109. The most generally accepted view as to the meaning of these moods is that expressed by Delbrück, that the subjunctive expresses **will**, the optative **wish**. There are several objections to this view, of which perhaps the most obvious is that there is no essential distinction between willing and wishing, as both are forms of **desire**. But a more serious objection is that this explanation does not suit some of the uses of both these moods, and those apparently the most primitive; namely, those in which the subjunctive expresses a simple future event, and the optative (without the addition of *ἄν* or *κέν*) a possibility, as in:—

Οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὐδὲ ἰδωμαι.

(Hom. *Il.* i. 262.)

‘Never yet have I seen such men, nor shall I see.’

Οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι. (*Il.* xix. 321.)

‘For I cannot suffer aught worse.’

In the first example the subjunctive certainly does not express will, as the speaker would not refuse to see such men; on the contrary, he would will to do so, if it were possible. In the second example the use of οὐ, not μή, proves that the expression is not a wish. Οὐκ ἴδωμαι cannot be derived from μὴ ἴδωμαι, nor οὐ πάθοιμι from μὴ πάθοιμι.

In conditional clauses, again, it is impossible to take the subjunctive as expressing will, or the optative as expressing wish invariably. Such an expression as ἦν δὲ νῆας ἔλωσι may be used by either side, the defenders or attackers of the ships; and, as regards the optative form of condition, Goodwin (*M. T.* p. 381) shows that in 78 proper optative conditional sentences in Homer only 27 express suppositions desired by the speaker. Accordingly we must turn to some other explanation of the fundamental meaning of the moods.

110. The explanation given by Goodwin (*M. & T.* Appendix I., which should be carefully read) is that “the subjunctive was originally and essentially a form for expressing future time, which the Greek inherited with its subdivision into an absolute future negatived by οὐ, and a hortatory future negatived by μή, and used in independent sentences”; and that “the primitive optative, before it came into the Greek language, was a weak future form, like **he may go** and **may he go**, from which on one side came its potential and future conditional use, and on the other side its use in exhortations and wishes.” This view is supported by the considerations advanced before, as objections to Delbrück’s theory: by the impossibility of explaining the subjunctive in final sentences after historic verbs (as constantly used by Thucydides) as expressing will, while the optative, as used by other writers in exactly similar sentences, is to express wish; by the absurdity of looking for wish in the optative in *oratio obliqua*; and by the fact that in all dependent constructions the optative merely represents the subjunctive or indicative when they are “transferred to the past by depending on a verb of past

time." Goodwin also refers to the fact that where Greek has οὐ with the subjunctive and optative, Sanscrit has *ná*, while where Greek has μή, Sanscrit has *má'*, the equivalent of μή. He considers this a proof of the antiquity of the merely future use of these moods. But the fact that *ná* does not correspond to οὐ, of which no sure etymology has been discovered, weakens this argument. (Cp. Giles, *Comparative Philology*, § 557 (2).) Other objections to Goodwin's theory are that it does not clearly distinguish between the moods, and that it does not account for the use of secondary endings in the optative mood, which show it to be a kind of past tense.

111. Perhaps the simplest explanation of the meaning of the moods, at any rate as they are actually used, is to consider that they both primarily represent an action as **other than a fact**; that is, as a **possibility** or **contingency**, the subjunctive expressing an action as a **nearer**, the optative as a **remoter** possibility. Possibly this idea of **remoteness** may have been derived from that of pastness, which the forms of the optative tend to show it originally possessed. Similarly, 'I might' is properly the past tense of 'I may,' though it is used more often now to express a more distant possibility. Then the subjunctive ἔλθω, on this view, would be translated 'I may go,' the optative ἔλθοιμι, 'I might go.' The hortatory use of the subjunctive may be supposed to have been derived from a difference of tone in enunciation, and so too its use in commands and prohibitions. Similarly the use of the optative as expressing wish would be derived from a possibility put as a question; e.g. 'might I go?' and in all likelihood wishes were originally prayers to some god or other, which would account for the interrogative form. The use in dependent clauses, especially in final and conditional clauses, is easily explained on the same lines: πέμψω ἴνα ἴδῃ = 'I send him where he may see,' in its most literal translation; εἰ γένηται = 'if it may be,' εἰ γένοιτο, 'if it might be.' Of course it must always be remembered that all subordinate clauses were to begin with principal, and so really need no separate explanation.

112. This explanation is no doubt open to the same objections as that of Goodwin; but it has the advantage of

distinguishing between the subjunctive and future indicative, which expresses a future event as a fact; and it also suits with most of the subjunctive uses in Latin, though it must be carefully remembered that the expression of past time by the tenses of the Latin subjunctive often make their use quite different from that of the Greek subjunctive and optative. In many uses, especially in final clauses and *oratio obliqua*, the Greek optative is represented by the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in Latin (with some exceptions). In other constructions, especially in conditions, the Greek optative is paralleled by the Latin present subjunctive. Yet, on the whole, the constructions of the two languages with reference to these moods are much best considered side by side, as their divergences are no less illustrative than their similarities.

113. The *Imperative Mood*. The imperative mood is etymologically in origin the stem of the verb without any suffix. Practically it is a shortened form of the indicative—contrast λέγεις, λέγε, *amas*, *ama*—and expresses a command assumed as a fact; *i.e.* it assumes that the person addressed is already doing what he is ordered to do. Thus it is in Latin often superseded by the subjunctive, which expresses the command as a **contingency**, so suggesting, not assuming, its performance. In Latin also negative commands or prohibitions are, at least in prose, always expressed in the subjunctive or by a periphrasis, as *noli facere*, *parce facere*. In Greek the **present imperative** may be used in a prohibition, but not the **aorist**; while the **aorist**, and not the **present, subjunctive** is used in prohibitions. It is difficult to explain this usage satisfactorily; but we may point out that μή λέγῃς would mean (as the present expresses incomplete action) ‘don’t go on speaking,’ assuming that the prohibition is already being transgressed, which may have been felt to be impolite; while μή λέξῃς simply means ‘don’t speak,’ involving no such assumption. The preference for the present imperative, however, still remains unexplained, though it has been suggested that the aorist imperative, being a later form, only came into existence after the use with the aorist subjunctive was stereotyped in the language.

114. The *Infinitive Mood*, and the *Verbal Nouns*. The infinitive has been already explained to be rather a verbal substantive than a mood; it is only in the construction of *oratio obliqua* that it really serves as a mood, and is thoroughly verbal in nature. In both Latin and Greek it is constantly used as a substantive, both in the nominative and accusative, but most commonly in the dative case. In Greek also, when used with the article, it may be a genitive case. The most noticeable uses are as follows:—

115. I. As *Nominative Case*. The article usual in Greek; *e.g.*:—

Ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν.

Humanum est errare.

This use is common.

116. II. As *Accusative Case*. In this use it is usually the object to a verb of saying or thinking; *e.g.*:—

Ἀνθρώπινον ἡγοῦμαι τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν.

Humanum puto errare.

With the article it may be commonly used in Greek after prepositions. In Latin this use is very rare, the gerund usually taking its place; *e.g.*:—

Διὰ τὸ μὴ παρῆναι ἐς καιρὸν, ἐσφάλη.

‘Owing to not arriving in time, he failed.’

Inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicunt interesse. (Cic. *Fin.* ii. 13.)

‘They say there is absolutely no difference between being in the best of health and the most serious illness.’

Breve tempus satis longum est ad bene vivendum.

(Cic. *de Sen.* 19.)

‘A short time is long enough to live well.’

117. III. As *Dative Case*. This is by far the commonest use of the infinitive, as is natural; for by its form it is obvious that it is, properly speaking, a dative: if we write a dative like *μούσα* with the *ι* not subscript, but written in the line (as it ought to be, and was written by the ancient Greeks), thus *μούσαι*, we see at once that the termination is

the same as that of εἶναι or any middle or passive or 1st aorist active infinitive; and in Homer we find that the present future and second aorist active infinitive ends in -μεναι; e.g. εἰπέμεναι. The Latin infinitive probably is of the same formation, but the termination has been weakened.

This dative infinitive is used:—

118. (1) After all verbs of **wishing, power, duty, purpose, custom, commencement**, and the like, both in Greek and Latin: thus ἐθέλω δοῦναι, *volo dare* = 'I am willing for giving'; the dative being akin to that classed as work contemplated, and to the predicative dative in Latin. The infinitive which follows verbs of **commanding, teaching, preventing**, both in Latin and Greek, is of the same nature; thus διδάσκω γράφειν τινά, *doceo scribere aliquem* = 'I teach a man for writing'; and so too command him for doing, prevent him for doing. In Greek the **consecutive infinitive** proper and its extensions, the **explanatory** and **limiting** infinitive, are identical: τοσοῦτος ὥστε ποιεῖν = 'so great as for doing'; ὡς εἰπεῖν, 'as for speaking,' etc.

Examples of these uses are so numerous that quotation is superfluous.

119. (2) *After Nouns.* In Greek this use is equally common with (1); in Latin it is rare, and poetical; the gerund or gerundive again taking its place; e.g. :—

Ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν ἡ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἂ ἔγνωτε. (Thuc. ii. 61.)
'Your spirit is feeble for persevering in your resolutions.'

Piger scribendi ferre laborem. (Hor. Sat. i. 4. 12.)

'Lazy at bearing the toil of writing.'

Tempus est iam maiora conari. (Liv. vi. 18.)

'It is now time for attempting greater things.'

120. (3) *Infinitive of Purpose.* This use again corresponds to the dative of work contemplated; it is fairly common in Greek, after verbs meaning to **choose, appoint, send, give, take or bring**; but not after verbs of motion, except in poetry. In Latin it is very rare, but being found in Plautus, is probably not a Grecism, but a real survival. In ordinary Latin the gerund or gerundive construction takes its place; e.g. :—

Τοὺς ἄρχοντας, οὓς εἰλεσθε ἄρχειν μου. (Plat. *Apol.* 28E.)
 'The magistrates, whom you elected to govern me.'

Τοῦτον ἀφίετε τοῖς θεοῖς κολάζειν. (Dem. xix. 71.)
 'Leave him to the gods to punish.'

Μανθάνειν γὰρ ἤκομεν. (Soph. *O. C.* 12.)
 'We have come to learn.'

Reddere hoc, non perdere, erus me misit. (Plaut. *Ps.* 642.)
 'My master sent me to return this, not to lose it.'

Non nos Libycos populare Penates venimus.
 (Verg. *Aen.* i. 527.)

'We have not come to plunder Libyan households.'

Loricam donat habere viro. (*Ibid.* v. 262.)
 'He gave a breastplate to the man to have.'

Credebat Voleronem vexant'is prioris anni consulibus permissurum tribunatum. (Liv. ii. 56.)

He believed that Volero, to harass the consuls of the previous year, would give free play to the office of tribune.'

121. (4) *Infinitive of Wish or Command.* In this Greek use the infinitive takes the place of the 2nd or 3rd person imperative or optative. As it is used, it apparently is rather verbal than substantival, but more probably it really retains its substantival nature. Thus φάσθαι ἔπος, 'speak a word' = 'be for speaking,' there being an easy, perhaps unconscious, ellipse of some verb. This is especially evident when the infinitive equals the 3rd person imperative, for then its subject is in the accusative, and must be governed by some suppressed verb, such as δός, 'grant,' in which case the use is parallel to (3). Examples:—

Σὺ δὲ τὰς πύλας ἀνοίξας ὑπεκθεῖν. (Thuc. v. 9.)
 'When you have opened the gates, charge out.'

Τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαίως γνῶναι. (Dem. viii. 39.)
 'Grasp this firmly in your own minds.'

Τεύχεα συλῆσας φερέτω . . . σῶμα δὲ οἰκάδ' ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν. (Hom. *Il.* vii. 78.)

'Let him make spoil of the arms and take them . . . but give me my body back home again.'

Θεοὶ πολῖται, μή με δουλείας τυχεῖν. (Aesch. Sept. 253.)

‘Gods of my country, let me not be doomed to bondage.’

(N.B.—That the imperative infinitive always expresses a courteous command, put rather as a suggestion than an order. We may compare the Italian method of prohibition with the infinitive: *non amare* = ‘do not love.’)

122. (5) *Infinitive with Article*. This use again is only found in Greek; it is not found in Homer, or indeed before Pindar. It first becomes common in Thucydides, especially in his speeches, and is commonest in the orators. Demosthenes uses it with the greatest frequency. It can be used in any case, and with prepositions. In Latin the use of the gerund or gerundive and supines most nearly corresponds to the Greek articular infinitive. From the frequency of the use examples are hardly necessary, but compare:—

Ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν.

(Thuc. vii. 33.)

‘They refrained from an immediate attack on the Athenians.’

(τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν is a limiting accusative.)

The Latin might be:—

Abstinebant oppugnando, etc.

Ζηλῶ σε μᾶλλον ἢ ᾧ μὲ τοῦ μηδὲν φρονεῖν. (Eur. I. A. 677.)

‘I admire thee more than myself for lack of wisdom.’

(τοῦ φρονεῖν is an ablative genitive of cause.)

The Latin might be:—

Te admiror magis quam me ipsum nihil sapiendo.

123. The *Verbal Nouns*. The verbal nouns which particularly require consideration here are the **verbal adjectives** in -τέος and -τέον in Greek, which correspond to the **gerund** and **gerundive** in Latin, and the **supines** (so called) in Latin.

124. I. The *Verbal Adjectives* in -τέος and τέον; the **gerund** and **gerundive**.

Before discussing the uses of these forms it is necessary to consider the question of the relation of the gerund to the gerundive. It is usually said that the gerundive is

found only from transitive, the gerund usually from intransitive verbs; that the gerundive is passive, and the gerund active in sense; and the gerundive is an adjective, while the gerund is a substantive. It seems simpler, however, to consider the gerund as the neuter singular of the gerundive used substantively, as the neuter of other participles (see § 131) and all adjectives may be used; and the analogy of the Greek verbals in *-τέος* and *-τέον* confirms this. A further argument in support of this view is obtained from the consideration that the gerundive and gerund only differ as the passive of a transitive and intransitive verb differ; that is, in the first case the passive is personal, in the second impersonal. *Amatur* = 'he is loved'; *amandus est* = 'he is to be loved'; *curritur* = 'it is run'; *currendum est* = 'it must be run.' The occasional use of the gerund from transitive verbs occurs just as their passive may occasionally be used impersonally. The conclusion then is that both gerundive and gerund are passive verbal adjectives, the one personal, the other impersonal. Exactly the same difference exists between the Greek verbal adjectives in *-τέος* and those in *-τέον*, but the latter are found equally from transitive and intransitive verbs.

125. In Greek the construction is found only in the **nominative** (and **accusative** in *oratio obliqua*); it expresses, as in Latin in similar case, **obligation** or **necessity**. But in Latin any case may be used, then expressing simply passive **verbal action**; the rule of the construction is that the gerundive has its own case, attracting its substantive to it, but itself being attracted to the gender and number of its substantive, as a rule. Exceptions to this rule exist as, *e.g.*:—

Facultas agrorum suis latronibus condonandi.

(Cic. *Phil.* v. 3.)

'The power of giving land to his brigands.'

Here the attraction is only half complete. Possibly the heavy genitive plural of the gerund is avoided; or it may be that the substantive itself is directly governed by the leading word, the gerund being added to explain more fully the meaning. (See Roby, *L. G.* ii. p. lxxviii.)

126. The sense of obligation found in the nominative use of these adjectives must be explained as derived from the sense of **possession** or **connection** of the action with an agent expressed by the verb εἶμι, or *sum*, and a dative case. Thus ποιητέον ἐστὶ μοι = *faciendum est mihi* = 'doing belongs to me' necessarily means 'I must do.' The most noticeable point about the Greek use is that the agent may be in the **accusative**, no doubt owing to a feeling that the force of the construction was equal to that of δεῖ or χρῆ with an infinitive. In Latin the accusative after the gerund from a **transitive verb** should be particularly observed; *e.g.*:—

* Ἀλλας ναῦς ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων μεταπεμπτέας εἶναι.

(Thuc. vi. 25.)

'(He said) Other ships must be sent for from their allies.'

Οὔτε μισθοφορητέον ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατιωτικούς.

(Id. viii. 65.)

'Nor must any others except the military receive pay.'

Aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum est.

(Lucr. i. 112.)

'Since we must fear everlasting punishments in death.'

Viam, quam nobis quoque ingrediundum sit.

(Cic. de Sen. 2.)

'The way, on which we too must enter.'

127. In Latin these uses of the gerundive should also be noted:—

(1) In negative and quasi-negative sentences it practically expresses **possibility**; *e.g.*:—

Votaque pro domina vix numeranda facit. (Tib. iv. 4. 12.)

'And he makes prayers for his mistress, scarce to be counted.'

(2) It may equal a **present passive participle**; *e.g.*:—

Ante conditam condendamve urbem. (Liv. i. 1.)

'Before the city was founded, or was being founded.'

Volvenda dies. (Verg. Aen. ix. 8.)

'Time as it rolls along.'

Note.—Roby considers the gerundive to have been formed from the gerund, which is "a neuter verbal substantive expressing action (or state)"; see his *Latin Grammar*, vol. ii. pp. lxi. *sqq.*

128. II. The *Supines*. The so-called supines are simply the **accusative** and **ablative** (locative or instrumental) of a verbal substantive in *-us*. The common distinction between the one in *-um* as active, and the other in *-u* as passive, is quite unnecessary. The **accusative** is an accusative of **action** as the end of motion; it is commonest in military terms, such as: *pabulatum*, 'to forage'; *lignatum*, 'to collect wood'; *aquatum*, 'to get water.' Cf. also:—

Vidimus . . . Tiberim . . . ire deiectum monumenta regis.
(Hor. *Od.* i. 2. 13–15.)

'We saw Tiber go to cast down the monuments of the king.'

The **ablative** is used as a locative or instrumental of the point in which a term is applied; as: *horrendum*, *mirabile*, etc., *dictu*, 'in the saying,' *i.e.* 'to say.'

129. The *Participle*. The participle is used as an attribute of substantives or personal pronouns; it differs from an ordinary adjective in expressing distinctions of time, and in governing an object in the case appropriate to its verb, not an objective genitive. As we have said, Latin is deficient in participles as compared with Greek. The most noticeable uses of the participle are:—

130. (i.) In Greek, the **accusative** and **genitive absolute**, and in Latin, **ablative absolute**; both uses have been considered under the cases.

131. (ii.) *Expressing Purpose* in the future participle in both languages; in Greek usually with ὥς.

Παρελήλυθα συμβουλεύσων. (Isocr. vi. 11.)

'I have come forward to advise.'

Consul Larisam est profectus, ibi de summa belli consultaturus. (Liv. xxxvi. 14.)

'The consul set out to Larissa to take counsel there about the whole war.'

132. (iii.) The *neuter participle* (with the article in Greek) is sometimes used as a **verbal substantive**, where the infinitive with the article would be expected, chiefly in Thucydides and the poets in Greek: and also in Livy in Latin; *e.g.*:—

Τοῦ ὑπαπίεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσ
(Thuc. v. 9.)

‘They have their minds set rather on retreating than on standing firm.’

Τὸ γὰρ ποθοῦν ἕκαστος ἐκμαθεῖν θέλων. (Soph. Tr. 196.)

‘Each man wishing to learn his desire.’

Auditum modo in acie . . . haud dubiam victoriam facturum. (Liv. xxvii. 45.)

‘The hearing only in line of battle . . . would make victory certain.’

This use is the same use as the common use of the neuter of an ordinary adjective, instead of the corresponding abstract substantive, as τὸ καλὸν = τὸ κάλλος.

133. (iv.) In Latin commonly, and less freely in Greek, the participle is used in conjunction with a substantive, with the same meaning as (in Greek) an articular infinitive with its subject, where in English we use the verbal substantive governing the other substantives; *e.g.* :—

Ἐτει πέμπτῳ μετὰ τὰς Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας. (Thuc. v. 3.)

‘In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse.’

Ἐς ἥλιον καταδύντα. (Hom. Il. i. 601.)

‘To the setting of the sun.’

Nec terra mutata mutavit mores. (Liv. xxxvii. 54.)

‘Change of land made no change of character.’

134. (v.) In a few instances in Greek the aorist or perfect participle active is used with ἔχω, in a sense practically equivalent to that of the English perfect. In Latin there is a somewhat similar use, in which *habeo* is used, with the perfect participle passive agreeing with the object (see also above, § 98). Both uses point to the use of auxiliaries, as found in Modern Greek and the Romance languages. *E.g.* :—

Τὸν μὲν προτίσας, τὸν δ' ἀτιμάσας ἔχει. (Soph. Ant. 22.)

‘The one he has honoured, the other disgraced.’

Ἐγκλήσας ἔχει τὰ σίτια. (Arist. Eccl. 355.)

‘She has shut up the food.’

Elephantos quos haberent domitos. (Liv. xxx. 35.)

‘The elephants which they possessed tamed.’

135. (vi.) The participle in Greek is regularly used with *εἰμί* to form future perfects active, and perfects and pluperfects passive; and in Latin the future participle active is used with **sum** to express intention, and the perfect participle passive with **sum** to form all perfect-derived tenses.

THE JUSSIVE CONSTRUCTION

136. The term **jussive** is here used in a wide sense, including all expressions of **command** and **wish**, such as ordinary commands and wishes, deliberative, hortatory, prohibitive, and concessive (*i.e.* rhetorical suppositions) expressions, which are regularly expressed by the **imperative**, **subjunctive**, and **optative** moods in Greek, and by the **imperative** and **subjunctive** in Latin, though in **past wishes** Greek makes use of the **historic tenses** of the **indicative**, while both languages in **rhetorical expressions** may signify commands and assumptions by the **indicative** mood.

137. The jussive use of the subjunctive and optative moods may be explained as follows. We have said that both moods express a possibility or contingency, more or less remote. Thus the subjunctive present in both Latin and Greek means (considering the second person, which is most usual in commands), 'you may do something,' as a possibility; and the optative in Greek, 'you might do something.' A mere change of tone could alter such an expression of possibility into a hint or suggestion, exactly as the English 'you may,' or 'might go,' can signify a command or request. Thus we get the jussive use of the subjunctive, expressing commands. In Greek this use has only survived in the **first person in affirmative sentences**. Latin expresses wishes in the same way; but Greek, with its greater subtlety, distinguishes between a command and the more remote wish, and expresses the latter by the optative. But in both languages it seems probable that a wish is merely the expression of a possibility stated interrogatively, just as the English 'may I see' is interrogative in form. Besides, a wish is probably in origin a prayer, and so would naturally be a question. Thus *ὁρῶν* = *videam* = 'I may or might see,'

put interrogatively = 'may or might I see?' and so at once expresses wish.

138. We will consider the various subdivisions of the jussive construction under the following heads: I. Command; II. Prohibition; III. Wish; IV. Deliberation; V. Concession, or Rhetorical Supposition.

139. I. *Command*. Affirmative commands are regularly expressed in Greek by the imperative mood, and by the 1st person of the subjunctive tenses (*i.e.* **hortatory commands**, addressed by the speaker or speakers to himself or themselves), and in Latin by both the imperative and subjunctive moods; *e.g.*:—

Ζεῦ Ζεῦ θεωρὸς τῶνδε πραγμάτων γενοῦ.

(Aesch. *Choeph.* 246.)

'Zeus, Zeus, be thou a witness of these deeds.'

Λέγε δὴ ἴδω. (Plat. *Rep.* 610B.)

'Tell me, let me see.'

Ἔα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα. (*Ibid.* 239.)

'Stay now, let us consider it in relation to you.'

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.

(Verg. *Aen.* vi. 851.)

'Do thou, Roman, remember to rule the nations with thy sway.'

Quamobrem hic nobis sit exceptus. (Cic. *Or.* i. 45.)

'Therefore let him be an exception in our view.'

140. Notice especially the expression in Latin by the **imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive**, of commands referring to **past time**: 'you should have been doing,' or 'have done'; Greek would use ἔδει or ἐχρῆν with infinitive; *e.g.*:—

At tu dictis, Albane, maneres. (Verg. *Aen.* viii. 643.)

'But thou, man of Alba, shouldst have stood by thy words.'

Quid facere debuisti? frumentum ne emissis, sumpsisses id nummorum. (Cic. *Verr.* iii. 84.)

'What ought you to have done? you ought not to have bought the corn, you ought to have taken that amount of money.'

141. In both Greek and Latin the **future indicative** can express command. It treats the action enjoined as a **mere future event**, not as a possibility, and so is rhetorically emphatic. Cp. our 'you shall do it'; in Greek this is commonest with ὅπως; the use is connected with that in object clauses. *E.g.*:—

Πρὸς ταῦτα πράξεις οἷον ἂν θέλῃς. (Soph. *O. C.* 956.)

'Therefore thou shalt do whatever thou wilt.'

Πάντως δὲ τοῦτο δράσεις. (Ar. *Nub.* 1352.)

'In anywise thou shalt do this.'

Ὅπως οὖν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσσεσθε. (Xen. *An.* i. 7. 3.)

Tu nihil dices. (Hor. *A. P.* 385.)

Cum volet, accedes; cum te vitabit, abibis.

(Ov. *A. A.* ii. 529.)

'When she wishes, thou shalt draw near; when she shuns thee, thou shalt depart.'

142. II. *Prohibition.* In Greek prohibitions in the **second and third persons** are regularly expressed by the **present imperative**, or the **aurist subjunctive**, with μή. (See § 113 for the difference between these two constructions.) In Latin a prohibition in the **third person** may be expressed in legal language by the **imperative**, ordinarily by **any tense of the subjunctive** with *ne*. A prohibition in the **second person** is regularly expressed by a periphrasis with *noli*, *nolite*, and infinitive, *cave*, *cave ne*, and subjunctive. The formerly established rule of the **perfect subjunctive** with *ne* in the **second person** has been discredited; it has been proved to be a rare use in elevated prose. (Cp. Gildersleeve and Lodge, *Lat. Gr.* § 275.) There are only seven instances in good prose from the beginning of the Ciceronian to the end of the Augustan period.

In poetry the **imperative** may be used with *ne* in its first form, *e.g. ne audi*; in legal language in its second form, *e.g. ne audito*; in commands addressed to an imaginary person the **present subjunctive** with *ne*; in familiar language the **future indicative** with *non*. In both Greek and Latin prohibitions in the **first person** may be in any tense of the subjunctive; *e.g.*:—

Μὴ βοηθήσητε τῇ πεπονθότι δεινᾷ· μὴ εὐορκεῖτε.

(Dem. xxi. 211.)

‘Give no redress to the injured party; do not keep your oaths.’

Μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔατε μείζους γίγνεσθαι, μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδῶμεν. (Thuc. i. 86.)

‘Neither continue to permit the aggrandisement of the Athenians, nor let us go on betraying our allies.’

Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito.

(Verg. *Aen.* vi. 95.)

‘Yield not to thy woes, but go more boldly to face them.’

Hominem mortuum in urbe ne sepelito neve urito.

(Cic. *Leg.* ii. 23, 58.)

‘Thou shalt not bury or burn a dead man in the city.’

Isto bono utare, dum adsit; cum absit, ne requiras.

(Cic. *Sen.* 33.)

‘Use that blessing when it is here; when it is gone do not pine after it.’

Nō transieris Hebrum. (Liv. xxi. 44.)

‘Do not cross the Hebrus.’

Non me appellabis, si sapis. (Plaut. *Most.* 515.)

‘Don’t address me, if you are wise.’

Cave festines. (Cic. *Fam.* xvi. 12. 6.)

‘Don’t be in a hurry.’

(*Vide ne, curato ne* also are used with the subjunctive; and in poetry *parce, mitte, omitte, fuge, absiste*. The three former words are also used in later prose.)

In Greek Ὅπως μὴ with the **second person** of the future indicative may express a **prohibition**; e.g. :—

Ὅπως τοῖνυν περὶ τοῦ πολέμου μηδὲν ἔρεῖς. (Dem. xix. 94.)

‘See you say nothing about the war.’

143. In the Greek dramatic poets οὐ μὴ with the **second person** singular of the **future indicative**, and rarely with the same person of the **aorist subjunctive**, expresses a strong prohibition. (The explanation of the οὐ μὴ construction will be given later in § 242.)

EXAMPLES.

Τί ποεῖς ; οὐ μὴ καταβήσει. (Ar. *Vesp.* 307.)

'What are you doing? you must not come down.'

Ποῖος Ζεὺς ; οὐ μὴ ληρήσης. (Id. *Nub.* 367.)

'Zeus indeed! don't talk nonsense.'

144. III. Wish. A wish is expressed (1) if referring to the future, by the **optative** (with or without εἴθε or εἰ γὰρ or εἰ) in Greek, and by the **present subjunctive** (with or without *utinam* or *o si*) in Latin; (2) if not attained in the present or past, by the **historic tenses** of the indicative (with εἴθε or εἰ γὰρ), or by ὤφελον (= 'I owed, I ought') with an **infinitive**, in Greek, and by the **historic tenses** of the **subjunctive** (with or without *utinam* or *o si*) in Latin. A wish, as has been before explained, is really the interrogative statement of a contingency. For past wishes Greek must use the indicative historic tenses, as the aorist and perfect tenses of the optative convey no time distinctions. Neither the optative in Greek nor the subjunctive in Latin express that the wish is impossible. In expressing an impossible wish, the past tense gives the idea of its impossibility, as what was merely possible, not actual, in present or past time is *ipso facto* impossible.

EXAMPLES.

(1) **Future wishes.** Negative μὴ in Greek, *ne* in Latin.

Οὐτ' ἂν δυναίμην μῆτ' ἐπισταίμην λέγειν. (Soph. *Ant.* 686.)

'I could not, and may I never know how to say.'

Ἐννεύεγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς βουλόμεθα. (Thuc. vi. 20.)

'May this profit us as we desire.'

Εἴθε γράψειν ὡς χρῆ. (Plat. *Phaedr.* 227c.)

'Would that he would write properly.'

O si praeteritos referat mihi Iuppiter annos.

(Verg. *Aen.* viii. 560.)

'O that Jove would restore me the years that are past.'

(2) **Wishes not attained in the present or past.** The imperfect is used if the wish is unattained in present time, the aorist and pluperfect if in past time.

Εἴθ' ἦσθα δυνατὸς ὁρᾶν. (Eur. *Her.* 731.)

'Would that thou hadst been able to see.'

Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον οἱοί τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ. (Plat. Crit. 44D.)
'Would that the many had been able,' etc.

Παθόντων ἃ μήποτ' ὤφελον. (Dem. xviii. 288.)
'They having suffered what I would they never had.'

(Observe that the μή negatives really not ὤφελον, but the infinitive παθεῖν understood.)

Di facerent, sine patre forem. (Ov. Met. viii. 72.)
'Would that the gods had granted me to be fatherless.'

Utinam vidisses.

145. IV. Deliberation. Deliberative sentences are expressed in Greek by the **subjunctive mood**, and occasionally by the **optative**, when the **remoteness** of the contingency in question is emphasized; in Latin by the **subjunctive mood**. In Latin past deliberatives can be expressed by the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive; in Greek they must be expressed by the infinitive with ἔδει, ἐχρήην, and the like. A deliberative question is merely an interrogative statement of a contingency; thus τί ποιῶ, *quid faciam* = 'what am I to do?' = 'what is there a chance of my doing?'

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Μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω; (Plat. Rep. 337B.)
'Am I not to answer, but to say something different?'

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί λέξω; ποῖ φρενῶν ἔλθω, πάτερ; (Soph. O.C. 310.)
'O Zeus, what am I to say? to what thought must I turn, father?'

Ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι;
(Aesch. Cho. 594.)
'But who can tell the overdaring spirit of man?'

Often in Greek loosely subjoined to βούλει, βούλεσθε; e.g. :

Βούλεσθ' ἐπεισπέσωμεν; (Eur. Hec. 1042.)
'Do you wish us to break in?'

Quid enumerem artium multitudinem? (Cic. Off. ii. 4.)
'Why should I enumerate the multitude of arts?'

N.B.—The remote deliberative optative is also rarely found in subordinate clauses in Greek. Many authorities would correct the optative in these passages to the subjunc-

tive, and others would regard them as anomalies from the potential optative construction (cp. Goodwin, *M. T.* § 242): but they have been proved to be a survival of an ancient construction (see A. Sidgwick, *Appendices to the Agamemnon and Choephori*, and the *Classical Review*, vii. p. 97). The optative has its true force of expressing a remoter possibility than the subjunctive, and so is naturally used in despairing questions; e.g. :—

Ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἀλκῆστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι; (Eur. *Alc.* 52.)

‘May it be in anywise that Alkestes may reach old age?’

146. V. *Concession.* In concessive sentences, i.e. sentences in which a statement is rhetorically assumed to be true for the sake of argument, the **imperative** is regular in Greek; the subjunctive cannot be used without some particle, such as *κἄν* = καὶ ἐάν. In Latin the **imperative** may be used, but the **subjunctive** is more common, usually with *ut*, *quamvis*, *licet*, or some such word. E.g. :—

Πλούτει τε γὰρ κατ' οἶκον, εἰ βούλει, μέγα,
καὶ ζῇ τυράννου σχῆμ' ἔχων. (Soph. *Ant.* 1168.)

‘Be greatly wealthy in thine home, if thou wilt, and live with royal pomp.’

Translated in Latin :—

ut enim sis dives, etc., vivasque, etc
ἀληθὲς ἔστω τοῦτο.

Ne sint in senectute vires. (Cic. *de Sen.* 11.)

‘Granted there is no strength in old age.’

Modo permaneat studium. (*Ibid.* 7.)

‘Provided that enthusiasm remains.’

More often in Greek a **verb of assuming** is used with an acc. and inf. construction; as

Θῶμεν τοῦτο ἀληθὲς εἶναι.

‘Let us assume this to be true.’

THE FINAL CONSTRUCTION.

147. Under this head will be discussed all sentences expressing **purpose** or **object**, though object clauses need to be separately considered in Greek; in Latin their construction is identical with that of final sentences.

The moods used in the ordinary final construction in Greek are the **subjunctive** and **optative**, and the **indicative** in its **historic tenses** when a **past unattained** purpose has to be expressed; the subjunctive in Latin. Connecting particles such as *ἵνα*, *ὅπως*, *ὥς*, *ὅφρα* (in epic poetry), are regularly used in Greek; and *ut*, *quo*, *ne*, and *ut ne*, and relative adjectives in Latin. Of the Greek particles, *ἵνα* is the regular one in Attic; *ὅπως* is fairly common; *ὥς* scarcely found in prose, except in Xenophon, who uses it freely, as do the dramatists. By the use of these particles the verb in the final clause is subordinated to that in the principal clause; but, as we see from a few examples in Homer and in Virgil, both verbs were originally co-ordinate, the verb in the final clause being exactly of the same nature as that in a jussive sentence; thus

ἀλλ' ἐπίμεινον, ἀρήϊα τεύχεα δύω (Hom. *Il.* vi. 340)

= 'wait for me to put on my armour' (final subj.) is expressed by Homer, 'Wait, let me put on,' etc. (jussive subj.).

Aeneas levia improbus arma

Praemisit, quaterent campos. (Verg. *Aen.* xi. 513.)

'Relentless Aeneas sent forth the light-armed troops to scour the plains.'

148. Of these particles *ὥς*, *ὅπως*, and *ut*, mean 'how,' 'in which way.' Thus *ποεῖ τοῦτο ὅπως νικᾷ*, *hoc facit ut vincat*, = 'he does this in the way in which he may conquer'; the nature of the subjunctive as expressing a contingency being still evident. *ἵνα* means 'where' when it is not final; its use may be due to a confusion of manner and place, or from being used in sentences where the idea of place was appropriate, e.g. *πέμπω σ' ἵνα ἴδῃς*, 'I send you where you may see,' it may have been extended to all sentences. *ὅφρα* has a temporal meaning 'until'; so *dum* and *donec*, *antequam* and *prius quam*, in Latin can be followed by subjunctives of contemplated contingencies. *Quo* is used in sentences in which a comparative is found, and = 'by which amount,' the instr. abl. of measure or degree.

149. The construction which follows **verbs of fearing** is also best considered in this connection. The event feared is

expressed by a verb with $\mu\eta$ in Greek, *ne* in Latin, if its **occurrence** is feared; by a verb with $\mu\eta$ οὐ in Greek, *ne non* or *ut* in Latin, if its **non-occurrence** is feared. Originally in this construction too the verbs in the two clauses were co-ordinate; thus $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omega$ $\mu\eta$ $\nu\eta\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\lambda\omega\sigma\iota$ = *timeo ne naves capiant* = 'I fear; let them not take the ships.' In Homer an independent subjunctive is not uncommon, thus expressing an apprehension; the use is also found in Euripides and Plato; the latter, however, commonly, Herodotus once, and Demosthenes a few times, use this independent subjunctive as expressing a cautious assertion. In origin the uses are identical: $\nu\eta\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\lambda\omega\sigma\iota$ (according to the fundamental meaning of the subjunctive) means 'they may take the ships'; $\mu\eta$ puts this idea aside; 'they may not,' or, 'let them not take the ships,' expressing the contingency as one not desired by the speaker; and from a feeling of courtesy a hesitating assertion is made in the same form, as being a fact about the truth of which apprehension is felt. This is the construction from which the οὐ $\mu\eta$ construction is most successfully explained. To account for this construction expressive of apprehension or cautious assertion by the ellipse of a verb of fearing entirely disregards the natural development of the expression of thought in language; for **independent, co-ordinate sentences precede compound and subordinated sentences.**

EXAMPLES.

$M\eta$ δὲ $\nu\eta\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\lambda\omega\sigma\iota$. (Hom. *Il.* xvi. 128.)

'Perchance they may take the ships.'

$M\eta$ $\tau\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\xi\omega\sigma\iota$. (Id. *Od.* xvi. 381.)

'Perchance they may do some ill.'

$M\eta$ σοὺς $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\eta$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. (Eur. *Alc.* 315.)

'He may mar thy bridal.'

$M\eta$ οὖν $\tau\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{o}\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$. (Plat. *Euthyd.* 272c.)

'Someone may revile us.'

$M\eta$ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\rho\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ η $\tau\acute{o}$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$. (Plat. *Gorg.* 462c.)

'It may be rather impolite to speak the truth.'

150. In Latin expressions of fear are always put in the subjunctive; but in Greek, if what is feared is the **present** or **past** occurrence of the event, the indicative tenses are

used, and an independent indicative with $\mu\eta$ is found expressing such present or past apprehensions; *e.g.*:—

$\text{Μ}\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu\ \upsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \sigma\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\eta\nu\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\sigma\iota\nu\ \epsilon\sigma\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota.$
(*Plat. Prot.* 312A.)

‘Perhaps you do not imagine that your learning will be of this kind.’

$\text{Τ}\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\omega}\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu.$ (*Id. Men.* 89a.)

‘Perhaps we have improperly conceded this.’

[In the use of $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon$ in these and all other cases when it is used, the fact that $\sigma\upsilon$ is used is most reasonably explained on the ground that it negatives some one word, and not the sentence as a whole, $\mu\eta$ being the proper negative of the whole statement expressed as a contingency, and not as a fact. So *ne non* is used in Latin.]

151. Object Clauses differ from final clauses in Greek in the point that they follow after verbs of **striving, taking precaution, etc.**, while final clauses denote the **end or purpose of any verb**. Object clauses stand in apposition to an expressed or understood direct object of the verb, such as $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$, while a final clause would stand in apposition to $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\epsilon\grave{\nu}\epsilon\kappa\alpha$. The regular construction of object clauses is $\acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\varsigma$ or $\acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\varsigma\ \mu\eta$ with the future indicative or optative (after a historic principal verb), though the subjunctive is at times found. Thus:—

$\sigma\acute{\kappa}\omicron\pi\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\varsigma\ \mu\eta\ \sigma\epsilon\ \acute{\omicron}\psi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ is an object clause;

$\acute{\alpha}\pi\iota\theta\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\grave{\nu}\epsilon\kappa\alpha,\ \acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\varsigma\ \mu\eta\ \sigma\epsilon\ \iota\delta\eta$ a final clause.

In Latin *ne te videat* would translate both clauses.

152. Sequence of Moods and Tenses in final clauses, object clauses, clauses after verbs of fearing.

In **final clauses, and clauses expressing fear, a primary tense in the principal clause** is followed in Greek by a **subjunctive** mood (the tense varying according to the completeness, etc., of the action), in Latin by a **present or perfect subjunctive**; a **historic tense in the principal clause** by an **optative** mood in Greek (the tense varying as before), and by the **imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive** in Latin. The tense in Latin depends on the **time of the action**.

In object clauses in Greek the future indicative is found after a primary principal verb, the future optative after a historic principal verb.

153. In Greek the subjunctive or future indicative is not infrequently found, even after a historic principal verb, to express the purpose or object vividly, which it does by expressing it as it appeared to the agent; thus ἔπραξε τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ ληφθῇ = 'he did this that he may not be taken'; the agent said to himself, 'that I may not be taken.' This is especially common in Thucydides. Ὅπως and ὥς frequently take ἄν with the subjunctive in final clauses; but an optative with ἄν after either of these particles is potential. In Attic Greek ὅπως ἄν, not ὅπως alone, is proved by the use in inscriptions to be regular.

EXAMPLES.

154. (1) *Final Clauses.*

(a) *Primary Principal Verb.*

Εἶπω τι δῆτα καὶ ἄλλ', ἵν' ὀργίξῃ πλέον. (Soph. O. T. 364.)
'Am I to tell more too, that thou mayest be more wroth?'

Εἰς καιρὸν ἦκεις, ὅπως τῆς δίκης ἀκούσῃς.

(Xen. Cyr. iii. 1. 8.)

'You have come in good time, to hear the case.'

Translated into Latin—

Cetera vero dicam, quo magis irascaris?

In tempore venisti, ut causam audias.

155. (β) *Historic Principal Verb.*

Καί σ' ἐξέπεμπον, ὥς μόνη κλύεις. (Soph. Ant. 16.)

'And I called thee forth, that thou mightst hear alone.'

Ἐπρεσβεύοντο ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως πρόφασις εἴη.

(Thuc. i. 126.)

'They sent an embassy making complaints, that there might be a pretext.'

Translated into Latin—

Atque te emisi, ut sola audires.

Legatos mittebant criminantes, ut esset excusatio.

Τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο γράφω, ἵν' οὕτω γίγνοιθ' οἱ ὅρκοι.
(Dem. xviii. 27.)

'I propose this resolution, that the oaths might thus be taken.'

Here γράφω is an historic present; or rather perhaps it implies ἔγραψα, 'I drew up with the purpose, and now propose.' So τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὁ νόμος, ἵνα μὴ γένοιτο (Dem. xx. 11), where 'has this form' = 'was so framed.'

156. Vivid Construction.

Παρανίσχον δὲ φρυκτοὺς ὅπως ἀσαφῇ τὰ σημεῖα γ' καὶ μὴ βοηθοῖεν οἱ πολέμιοι. (Thuc. iii. 22.)

'They showed lights, that the signals might be uncertain, and the enemy might not come to their support.'

Ἐξακοσίους λογάδας ἐξέκριναν ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἴησαν φύλακες, καὶ, ἣν ἄλλο τι δέη, ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγίγνωνται. (Id. vi. 96.)

'They chose 600 picked men, to guard Epipolae, and in case of any other necessity, to concentrate speedily, and march to the place.'

These two examples show that the use of subj. or opt. is merely optional; the subj. does not necessarily express the nearer purpose. In Virgil there is a similar construction:—

*Haec ait, et Maiae genitum demittit ab alto
Ut terrae, utque novae pateant Karthaginis arces
Hospitio Teucris, ne fati nescia Dido
Finibus arceret.* (Aen. i. 299.)

'This he says, and sends Maia's son from on high, that the land and towers of new Karthage might be opened to welcome the Teucrians, lest Dido, ignorant of destiny, might bar them from her shores.'

157. In Greek, where the purpose expressed was past at the moment of its enunciation, *i.e.* when it is said that things should have happened differently that a different end to the one actually existing, or that did exist, might have been attained, the historic tenses of the indicative are used; *e.g.*:—

Χρῆν νόμον εἶναι μὴ ἐρᾶν, ἵνα μὴ πολλὰ σπουδὴ ἀνῆλίσκετο.
(Plat. *Symp.* 181D.)

Latin : *Oportuit legem esse ut ne amarent homines, ne labor multus consumeretur.*

‘There ought to have been a law against loving, that much trouble should not have been wasted.’

Ἀξίον ἦν παρῆναι, ἵνα ἤκουσας. (Plat. *Euthy.* 304E.)

Latin : *Operae pretium erat adesse, ut audisses.*

It was worth while to be there, that you might have heard.’

158. In Greek the future indicative with ὅπως, rarely with ὥς, ὅφρα, and μὴ, never with ἵνα, is occasionally used in a true final sense ; e.g. :—

᾽Ωστ’ εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς μὴ βραδύνειν ἐστὶ, μὴ καὶ τις ὄψεται.
(Ar. *Eccl.* 495.)

‘So we should not delay, lest someone see us.’

Ὡς τί ῥέξομεν. (Soph. *O. C.* 1724.)

‘That we should do what!’

But with **relative adjectives** and **adverbs** (excepting ὅπως and ὥς) this use is regular, and corresponds to the Latin use of the final subjunctive with relatives ; after a historic principal verb the future optative is regular, but the vivid use of the future indicative is more common. In Homer a final subjunctive and optative are found, usually with κέ ; e.g. :—

Πρεσβείαν δὲ πέμψαι, ἣτις ταῦτ’ ἐρεῖ. (Dem. i. 2.)

‘To send an embassy, to deliver this message.’

Οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅπόθεν ἐκτίσω. (Plat. *Apol.* 37C.)

‘I have no money, with which to pay.’

Ἐφευγον, ἔνθα μήποτ’ ὀψοίμην. (Soph. *O. T.* 796.)

‘I strove to flee, where I might never see.’

The Latin of these three sentences would be—

Legationem mittere, quae dicat.

Non est mihi pecunia, qua solvam.

Fugiebam, ubi numquam viderem.

Αὐτίκα μάντις ἐλείσεται, ὃς κέν τοι εἴησιν ὁδόν.

(Hom. *Od.* x. 533.)

‘Straightway a seer will come, to tell thee the way.’

159. The subjunctive is used in Attic Greek in a few expressions, in which it is really deliberative; *e.g.*:—

Ἐὰν μόνον ἔχῃ ὅτῳ διαλέγεται. (Plat. *Symp.* 194D.)

‘If he only has someone to converse with.’

Ἀπορεῖς ὅ τι λέγῃς. Εὐπορεῖς ὅ τι λέγῃς. (Id. *Ion* 536B.)

(These last two examples show how the use is extended from a true deliberative.)

But the **present or aorist optative** is occasionally found after relatives in a final sense in Attic Greek; *e.g.*:—

Κρύψασ' ἐμαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι. (Soph. *Tr.* 903.)

‘Hiding myself, where none may see.’

Εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα θέλῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθεῖν. (Plat. *Rep.* 578E.)

‘If a god put a man in a desert, where no one was likely to help him.’

(Here, however, the opt. may be conditional or due to attraction.)

160. (β) *Clauses after a Verb expressing fear.* Particles μή, μὴ οὐ in Greek; *ne, ne non, ut*, in Latin. The same rules as to sequence of moods and tenses hold as in final clauses proper; but in Greek, when the event feared is regarded as actually happening in **present** time, or as having happened in the **past**, tenses of the **indicative** are used, and with **future** events, μή and ὅπως μή, and the **future indicative** may be used. The use of the subjunctive and optative implies that the event feared is regarded as future by the person fearing. In Latin **present** fears are expressed by the **present** subjunctive, or **imperfect** in historic time; **past** fears by the **perfect** and **pluperfect** subjunctive.

EXAMPLES.

(α) *Subjunctive and Optative.*

Ὅκνῶ μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῇ. (Plat. *Phaedr.* 257a.)

‘I am apprehensive lest Lysias appear mean.’

Ἔδεισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες μὴ προσάγοιεν, κ.τ.λ.

(Xen. *An.* i. 10. 9.)

‘The Greeks feared that they would lead up,’ etc.

Timeo ne non impetrem. (Cic. *Att.* ix. 6.)

'I fear I may not obtain.'

*Vidit periculum esse, ne exutum impedimentis exercitum
... traduxisset.* (Liv. xli. 53.)

'He saw there was a danger, that he might have brought
his army across without its baggage.'

(β) *Indicative.*

Δέδοικα μὴ πληγῶν δέει. (Ar. *Nub.* 493.)

Latin: *Vereor ne verberibus egeas.*

Φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν. (Thuc. iii. 53.)

Latin: *Timemus ne simul ambobus privati simus.*

Ἄλλ' ὅρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν. (Plat. *Theaet.* 145B.)

Latin: *Cave autem ne ludibrio dixerit.*

Δέδοικα ὅπως μὴ ἀναγκὴ γενήσεται. (Dem. ix. 75.)

Latin: *Vereor ne necesse sit.*

161. (γ) *Object Clauses.*

The difference between object and final clauses has been explained. The verb introducing the clause has the meaning of **strive, care for, plan, effect**. After a **primary** verb, and in most cases after a **historic** verb, the **future indicative** is found, though the regular sequence is the **future optative**. Negative *μή*; e.g.:—

Χρὴ ὁρᾶν τοὺς Ἀργείους ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ Πελοπόννησος.
(Thuc. v. 27.)

'The Argives must see to the safety of the Peloponnese.'

Latin: *Videndum est Argivis ut salva sit Peloponnesus.*

Ἐπρασσον ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἥξει. (Thuc. iii. 4.)

'They planned that relief should come.'

Latin: *Id agebant, ut auxilium adveniret.*

Ἐπεμελεῖτο ὅπως μὴ ἄσιτοί ποτε ἔσονται.

(Xen. *Cysop.* viii. 1. 43.)

'He took care that they should never be without provisions.'

Latin: *Providebat ne frumento umquam egerent.*

In object clauses subjunctives with ὅπως ἄν are found in Attic Greek; e.g.:—

Μηχανητέον ὅπως ἄν διαφυγῇ. (Plat. *Gorg.* 481A.)

'Plans must be made for his escape.'

The construction of object clauses after verbs of asking, commanding, etc., being really oblique, will be considered under the head of *Oratio Obliqua*.

162. Here we may note the so-called **Canon Davesianus**, i.e. the rule laid down by Dawes more than a century ago, that the **first aorist subjunctive active** and **middle** after ὅπως μὴ and οὐ μὴ was simply a mistake, and that all passages in which they were found should be emended. But the rule cannot be upheld entirely. It arose from the fact that where a **second aorist** form existed, it was preferred in subjunctive constructions to a first aorist in -σω or -σωμαι, as the latter forms so closely resemble the future indicative.

First, in **final** clauses the aorist subjunctive is certainly to be preferred to the future indicative, which in them is exceptional. (See § 157.) Secondly, **prohibitions** with ὅπως μὴ and the aorist subjunctive are supported by the analogy of μὴ and the aorist subjunctive, which is regular; e.g., ὅπως δὲ τοῦτο μὴ διδάξης μηδένα (Ar. Nub. 824), 'see you teach nobody this.' Thirdly, with οὐ μὴ, if both constructions (denials and prohibitions) are to be explained on the same principles, the subjunctive cannot reasonably be excluded from either. (See on οὐ μὴ, § 242.) Fourthly, in **object** clauses with ὅπως the future is so much more common than the subjunctive, that here the canon may be considered to hold good, and emendations to the future are allowable, though some passages resist emendation; e.g., Dem. i. 2, παρασκευάσασθαι ὅπως βοηθήσητε καὶ μὴ πάθητε, 'to prepare to give help and not to allow,' where to correct βοηθήσητε to βοηθήσετε, leaving πάθητε, is unreasonable; and Xen. An. v. 6. 21, προστατεῦσαι ὅπως ἐκπλεύσῃ ἡ στρατία, 'to arrange the sailing of the expedition,' when ἐκπλεύσῃ cannot be corrected to ἐκπλεύσει, for the future is ἐκπλεύσεται. For **object** clauses alone, then, the canon holds good. (This is taken from Goodwin, *M. T.* 364, which should be consulted.)

163. Other Final Constructions.

(i.) As we have seen, the **infinitive** occasionally in Greek, and very rarely in Latin expresses purpose.

(ii.) Frequently in both languages purpose is expressed by the future participle; ὥς is often found with the participle in Greek.

EXAMPLES.

Προσβολὰς παρεσκευάζοντο τῷ τείχει ποιησόμενοι.
(Thuc. ii. 1Ε.)

‘They made preparations to attack the wall.’

Συλλαμβάνει Κῦρον ὥς ἀποκτενῶν. (Xen. An. i. 1. 3.)

‘He seizes Cyrus, with the purpose of killing him.’

Ipsæ mare inferum petit, Capuam oppugnaturus.
(Liv. xxxiii. 1.)

‘He sails for the lower sea, intending to attack Capua.’

THE CONDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION.

164. A normal conditional sentence consists of two clauses, the one expressing the condition, called the **protasis**, the other expressing what follows if the condition is realized, called the **apodosis**. Logically the **protasis** comes first; but it may follow the **apodosis** in expression, though even then the order of thought is unchanged.

165. Though it is simpler to class both **protasis** and **apodosis** as conditional sentences, it should be observed that they are really different in nature. The **protasis** always expresses an imagination or conception. Accordingly in Greek it is regularly negated by μή; (οὐ, however, is occasionally found as the negative of a **protasis**; generally when it is closely connected with a single word, and does not negative the sentence as a whole; e.g. :—

Εἰ μὴ Πρόξενον οὐχ ὑπεδέξαντο, ἐσώθησαν ἄν.
(Dem. xix. 74.)

Here οὐχ ὑπεδέξαντο = ἀπεώσαντο.

Ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἑάν τε φῆτε. (Plat. Apol. 25B.)

Here οὐ φῆτε = ἀπαρνήσθε.

Homer, however, has οὐ when it negatives the whole sentence several times; and this is possibly the original use when the verb of the **protasis** is indicative; for the mood of fact naturally would have the negative of fact; e.g. :—

Εἰ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐπέεσσ' ἐπιπείσεται. (Il. xv. 162.)

‘If he will not hearken to my words.’

The apodosis expresses an idea, which, if the protasis is granted to be true, is stated as a fact; hence in Greek it is always negated by οὐ. Roby (*Lat. Gr.* ii. ch. xx.) calls protasis clauses **conditional**, and apodosis clauses (whether there is an expressed protasis or not) **hypothetical**; but though the distinction is worth remembering, for the sake of simplicity it is better to use the one term **conditional** for both clauses. An apodosis without an expressed protasis will be called a **potential** clause.

166. In conditional sentences the **indicative**, **subjunctive**, and **optative** moods are all regularly used; and the **imperative** may be used in the apodosis.

167. The protasis is introduced in Greek by one of the particles εἰ, αἰ (Homeric); εἰν, ἦν, ἄν (all contractions of εἰ ἄν), εἴ or αἴ κε (Homeric); and in Latin by *si*, *nisi*, *ni*. The etymology of εἰ is uncertain. By some authorities it is identified with *si*, and both are explained as coming from the pronominal stem *sua*, so that their meaning would be 'at a certain place,' or, 'in a certain way'; and then, the demonstrative passing into this relative sense, 'in which way.' The analogy between conditional sentences and relative sentences supports this view. A different explanation of εἰ is that it is in its original nature exclamatory, comparing it with εἰα, and the Latin *eia*. This is supported by such expressions as εἰ δ' ἄγε, which are frequent in Homer. But the only certainty is that in all Greek εἰ, and in all Latin *si*, had simply the force of our word 'if.'

168. There are various ways of classing conditional sentences, as *e.g.* conditions regarded as facts, probabilities, possibilities, and impossibilities. But the most satisfactory classification is by time; thus: I. Present and Past Conditions, in which nothing is implied as to the fulfilment of the Condition; II. Present and Past Conditions, in which there is implied the non-fulfilment of the Condition; III. Future Conditions expressed vividly; IV. Future Conditions expressed less distinctly.

169. In Greek usually, but apparently never in Latin, an additional distinction is drawn between—I. Present and

Past Particular Conditions; II. Present and Past General Conditions.

This distinction will be considered later, as also will all variations from the normal mode of expressing the condition.

[For examples of normal conditions it will be most convenient to take simple sentences containing the same two verbs in different moods and tenses. Examples may be found abundantly in the authors.]

170. I. Present and Past Conditions, in which nothing is implied as to the fulfilment of the Condition. In stating such conditions the **indicative** mood in any of its tenses is used both in Latin and Greek. By the use of the indicative the condition may be said to be regarded as actual; *i.e.* the protasis is stated as a fact, given which the apodosis necessarily also is a fact; *e.g.*:—

εἰ γράφει τοῦτο, καλῶς ποιεῖ.

εἰ γέγραφε τοῦτο, καλῶς πεπόηκε.

εἰ ἔγραφε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἐποίει.

εἰ ἔγραψεν τοῦτο, καλῶς ἐποίησε.

εἰ ἐγγράφει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἐπεποήκει.

Si hoc scribit, bene facit.

Si hoc scripsit, bene fecit.

Si hoc scribebat, bene faciebat.

Si hoc scripserat, bene fecerat.

171. II. Present and Past Conditions, where the non-fulfilment of the Condition is implied. Such a **present** condition is in English of the form, 'if he were (now) writing this, he would be doing well'; or more accurately, 'if he had been writing this, he would have been doing well.' In Greek the protasis has the **imperfect indicative**, the apodosis the same tense **with** ἄν; in Latin both protasis and apodosis have the **imperfect subjunctive**.

Such a **past** condition is in English, 'if he had written this, he would have done well.' In Greek the protasis has the **aorist** or (rarely) the **pluperfect indicative**, the apodosis the same tenses **with** ἄν; in Latin both protasis and apodosis have the **pluperfect subjunctive**.

The use of the indicative in Greek in these purely imaginary conditions, in which it cannot be considered to express an action regarded as a fact, is due probably to the fact that the tenses of the optative mood have no real time-distinction; *e.g.* :—

εἰ ἔγραφε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν ἐπόει.

εἰ ἔγραψε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν ἐπόησεν.

εἰ ἐγεγράφει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν ἐπεποιέκει.

Si hoc scriberet, bene faceret.

Si hoc scripsisset, bene fecisset.

172. III. *Future Conditions, vividly expressed.* A future condition may be regarded as a future fact, in which case the future or future perfect indicative is used in the protasis, the future in the apodosis. This is regular in Latin, and occasionally used for particular vividness in Greek; or as a future contingency, in which case the protasis is in the subjunctive mood, though the apodosis is still in the future indicative—this is the regular construction in Greek. With the subjunctive εἰάν, ἤν, or ἂν must be used in Greek; *e.g.* :—

εἰάν τοῦτο γράφῃ (or γράψῃ), καλῶς ποιήσει.

εἰ τοῦτο γράψει, καλῶς ποιήσει.

*Si hoc { scribet
scripserit } bene faciet.*

173. IV. *Future Conditions, expressed less distinctly.* A future condition in this case is regarded as a remote contingency. In Greek both protasis and apodosis have the optative mood, the latter with ἂν; in Latin both have the present or perfect subjunctive.

εἰ τοῦτο { γράφοι, καλῶς ἂν } ποιοίη
 { γράψειε } ποιήσειε.

Si hoc scribat, bene faciat.

Si hoc scripserit, bene fecerit.

174. This is a full account of the varieties of ordinary conditional sentences. We must now consider the distinction between particular and general conditions in present and past tenses.

175. I. *Particular Conditions* refer to some definite act or acts supposed to occur at some definite time or times, as *e.g.* 'if he is writing now, or wrote then,' etc. Their constructions are as in the first class of conditions already discussed.

176. II. *General Conditions* refer indefinitely to any act or acts that may be supposed to occur or to have occurred at any time, as *e.g.* 'if ever he writes, he does well'; 'if ever he wrote, he did well.' The construction in Greek is usually and regularly for **present** general conditions, the **subjunctive** in the protasis, the **indicative** in the apodosis (usually **present**). Latin makes no distinction between general and particular conditions, and, like English, uses the **indicative** in both clauses. In **past** general conditions in Greek the **optative** is used in the protasis, and **imperfect tense** of the indicative in the apodosis; Latin again has the **imperfect indicative** in both clauses. Even in Greek the indicative is sometimes found in both clauses.

ἐὰν γράφῃ, καλῶς ποιεῖ.

εἰ γράφοι, καλῶς ἐπόει.

Si scribit, bene facit.

Si scribebat, bene faciebat.

EXAMPLES FROM CLASSICAL AUTHORS.

Ἄπας λόγος, ἣν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν. (Dem. ii. 12.)

'Every speech, if facts are wanting, seems vain and useless.'

Ἄλλ' εἴ τι μὴ φέρομεν ὧτρυνεν φέρειν. (Eur. Alc. 755.)

'But if anything we brought not, he bade us bring it.'

177. *Irregularities of Conditional Sentences.* Very frequently we find conditional sentences which do not exactly correspond to any of the regular forms which we have described and classified. Some of the most common varieties are due to the irregular expression or the suppression of either protasis or apodosis.

178. I. *Irregular Expression or Suppression of Protasis.* Thus the protasis may be not regularly expressed, but contained in a participle, an ablative or geni-

tive absolute, or implied in an adverb, a preposition with its case, or some other expression. When the protasis is suppressed entirely, as it may be with conditions of Classes II. and IV., the use of the historic tenses of the indicative and the optative with *ἄν* in Greek, and of the subjunctive mood in Latin, is called **potential**. It may be regarded as a use of the optative and subjunctive moods in their original sense, expressing possibility. In Homer it is found without *ἄν*.

EXAMPLES.

Potential Optative (Greek), Present and Perfect Subjunctive (Latin).

‘*Ἡδέως δ’ ἄν ἔγωγ’ ἐροίμην Λεπτίνην.* (Dem. xx. 129.)

‘I would gladly ask Leptines.’

Id velim mihi ignoscas. (Cic. Fam. 12. 7.)

‘I should be glad if you would excuse me that.’

N.B.—Especially the use of this optative in Greek as a mild command: ‘you might do this.’

Σὺ μὲν κομίσεις ἄν σεαυτὸν ἧ θέλεις. (Soph. Ant. 444.)

‘Thou mayst betake thyself where thou wilt.’

Occasionally, as being ironically spoken, the force is that of a peremptory command; e.g. :—

Χωροῖς ἄν εἴσω. (Soph. Electr. 1491.)

‘Begone within.’

Potential Indicative (Historic Tenses) in Greek, Subjunctive (Imperfect and Pluperfect) in Latin.

Τί γὰρ ἄν καὶ βουλόμενοι μεταπέμπεσθ’ ἄν αὐτοὺς ;
(Dem. xviii. 24.)

‘With what desire would you have sent for them?’

Ἐπερρώσθη δ’ ἄν τις ἰδών. (Xen. Hell. iii. 4. 18.)

‘Anyone would have been encouraged by seeing them.’

Cuperem vultum videre tuum cum haec legeres.

(Cic. Att. xiv. 27, § 4.)

‘I should have liked to see your looks when you read this.’

Cupissem itaque primis temporibus ad istam curationem accedere. (Sen. Dial. 6. 1.)

‘I should have liked on the first occasions to approach that charge.’

179. From this use of the potential indicative in Greek comes the use of the imperfect and aorist with ἄν, expressing iteration; e.g. :—

Πρὸς δὲ τοῦθ', ὃ μοι βάλοι
νευροσπαδῆς ἄτρακτος, αὐτὸς ἄν τάλας . . .
εἰλυόμεν. (Soph. Phil. 290.)

'To this, whatever it was that my shaft drawn on the bowstring smote, I wretched would crawl.'

Εἰ τινὲς πῇ ἴδοιεν τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσυσαν
ἄν. (Thuc. vii. 71.)

'If any saw their own side victorious anywhere, they would regain courage.'

[The explanation of this iterative use is that the potential expression 'he would have gone,' if attached to such an expression as 'whenever occasion offered,' naturally expresses repeated action.]

180. *Irregular Expression or Suppression of Apodosis.* The apodosis may be irregularly expressed

(i.) By a participle; e.g. :—

Ῥαδίως ἄν ἀφεθεῖς εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε,
προείλετο, κ.τ.λ. (Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4.)

'Though he would easily have been released if he had done any of these things to a moderate degree, he preferred,' etc.

Dedit mihi quantum potuit, daturus amplius, si potuisset.
(Plin. Ep. 3. 21.)

'He gave me as much as he could, and would have given more had he been able.'

181. (ii.) By a verbal noun :—

Ὡς ὄντ' ἀναστατῆρα Καδμείων χθονός
εἰ μὴ θεῶν τις ἐμποδὼν ἔστη δορί. (Aesch. Sept. 1015.)

'As being the destroyer of the Kadmeians' land, had not a god hindered his spear.'

Vir, nisi in libera civitate natus esset, memorabilis.

(Liv. vi. 20.)

'A man deserving fame, had he not been born in a free state.'

182. (iii.) The apodosis may be left to be understood, to gain rhetorical effect. This is called **aposiopesis**; *e.g.*:—

‘Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί—

εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώσωσιν, κ.τ.λ. (Hom. *Il.* i. 135.)

‘But if the great-hearted Achaeans give me the prize, well; but if they give it not,’ etc.

Καὶ ἦν μὲν ξυμβῇ ἡ πείρα,—

εἰ δέ μὴ, κ.τ.λ. (Thuc. iii. 3.)

‘And if the attempt succeeds, good; but if not,’ etc.

183. (iv.) In comparisons with ὥς εἰ, ὥσπερ εἰ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, in Greek, and *tamquam, velut si, quasi, ac si*, etc., in Latin, the verb of the apodosis is understood; *e.g.*:—

Καί με φίλησ’ ὥς εἴ τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ.

(*Il.* ix. 481.)

‘And he loved me, as a father would his son, if he loved him.’

Ἐφοβείτο ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς.

(Here the verb of the protasis—ἦν—as well as the verb of the apodosis—ἐφοβείτο—is understood.)

Parvi primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. (Cic. *de Fin.* v. 15.)

‘Infants immediately after their birth lie as they would if they were absolutely lifeless.’

Samnitem exercitus, velut haud ulla mora pugnae futura esset, aciem instruxit. (Liv. vii. 37.)

‘The Samnite army formed in line, as it would have done if there had been going to be no delay in fighting.’

184. (v.) In certain forms of protasis the protasis suggests the apodosis, especially with εἰ or εἰάν πως in Greek, and *si forte* in Latin = ‘if perchance.’ Such expressions practically convey the idea of purpose, as ‘if possibly they may do so-and-so’ = ‘to do so-and-so, if they may’; *e.g.*:—

Πέμψαντες παρ’ Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἴ πως πείσειαν.

(Thuc. i. 58.)

‘Sending envoys to the Athenians, to persuade them if possible.’

Ἀκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, εἰάν σοι ταῦτ’ ἀδοκῇ. (Plat. *Rep.* 358D.)

‘Hear my words too, in case you may form the same opinion.’

185. Combination of Different Forms of Protasis and Apodosis. Occasionally, and perhaps with greater frequency in Greek than in Latin, we find a protasis of one form followed by an apodosis of a different form. This is invariably due to a **change of mental attitude** on the part of the writer or speaker; there is no real irregularity. Indeed, the regular form would fail to convey exactly what is meant at the moment. Thus it is always a mistake to begin an explanation of such a variety by saying 'this ought to be so-and-so.' A correct explanation must always aim at making clear what the expression gains by its departure from the usual form.

The varieties of uses in Greek and Latin are not quite parallel, but they may be considered under the following heads:—

186. (i.) The Protasis a Remote Future Condition (Greek opt., Latin pres. subj.); the Apodosis Present or Future Indicative.

(a) **Apodosis in Present Indicative** expresses a truth which is not really dependent on the fulfilment of the condition, often a general truth; e.g.:—

Καίρῳ εἰ φθέγγαιο, μείων ἔπεται μῶμος ἀνθρώπων.

(Pind. *Pyth.* i. 81.)

'If thou shouldst speak in season, less reproach of men attends thee.'

Εἰ ῥαθυμία μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ. (Thuc. ii. 39.)

'If we should choose to face our dangers, living a life of ease, and not exercising ourselves in toils, we gain,' etc.

Multa me dehortantur a vobis, Quirites, ni studium rei publicae superet. (Sall. *Jug.* 31.)

'Many considerations urge me to keep from you, Romans, were not my patriotism supreme.'

Quod si ita sit, quid veneramur deos? (Cic. *N. D.* i. 44.)

'If this be so, why do we worship the gods?'

187. (β) Apodosis in Future Indicative expresses that the event which follows on the condition is absolutely

certain of realization. It expresses it as a future fact, not a contingency; *e.g.*:—

Εἴ τις τάδε παραβαίνει, ἐναγὴς ἔστω. (Aesch. iii. 110.)

(Here the imperat. = fut. indic.)

'If any man should transgress this, he shall be guilty.'

Εἴ τι κακτρεπόιτο, οὔτοι τὸν γε Λαίου φόνον φανεῖ

δικαίως ὀρθόν. (Soph. O. T. 851 sqq.)

'If he should change his story, he will not show that Laius' murder is rightly done.'

Si fractus illabatur orbis,

Impavidum ferient ruinae. (Hor. Od. iii. 3. 7.)

'If the shattered world should fall on him, the crash will smite him undismayed.'

188. (ii.) Protasis expressing a present or past unfulfilled condition (Greek historic indic., Latin impf. and pluperf. subj.), **Apodosis expressing an actual fact** (indic. past tenses usually).

Here the true apodosis to the condition is omitted, but it can easily be supplied. The apparent apodosis states what actually did occur, and leaves the hearer or reader to supply what would have occurred had the condition been fulfilled; the prevailing thought is of what did actually occur. It may be doubted whether any examples of this construction occur in Greek, as there would have been an inevitable confusion with conditional sentences of class I. *E.g.*:—

Memini numeros, si verba tenerem. (Verg. Ecl. ix. 45.)

'I remember the tune (and would know the whole song), if I had recollected the words.'

Quin labebam longius, nisi me retinuissem. (Cic. Leg. i. 19.)

'I was slipping further (and would have fallen), had I not stopped myself.'

Nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit?

(Cic. Fin. v. 29.)

'If he had not been doing that, why did Plato travel through Egypt?'

189. (iii.) Protasis expressing a past unfulfilled condition, apodosis rhetorically as a fact what would have happened (pluperf. indic.).

Here the indicative is used by a mere rhetorical exaggeration, with the effect of vividness. This use also for the same reason seems not to be found in Greek; *e.g.*:—

Praeclare viceramus, nisi Lepidus recepisset Antonium.

(*Cic. Fam.* 12. 10.)

‘We had gained a brilliant victory, if Lepidus had not received Antony.’

Nisi Latini sua sponte arma sumpsissent, capti eramus.

(*Liv.* iii. 19.)

‘If the Latins had not voluntarily taken up arms, we were ruined.’

190. (iv.) The protasis expressing a present or past condition of Class I., or a future condition of Class III.; the apodosis expressing a more remote result, as in Class IV., or a result depending on an unfulfilled condition, as in Class II. That is, the protasis is indicative or subjunctive; the apodosis optative or historic indicative with *ἄν* in Greek. In Latin, though this variety is not common, protases in the indicative are occasionally followed by apodoses in the subjunctive. In both languages the true protasis is omitted, but can usually be supplied from the apodosis itself. It would state the possibility on which the result expressed in the apodosis really depends; while the apparent protasis stands by itself, expressing a fact which has no necessary connection with the result expressed in the apodosis; *e.g.*:—

“ὦστ’ εἴ μοι . . . πολεμεῖν ἐπέισθητε, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροίμην. (*Thuc.* ii. 60.)

Accordingly, if you took my advice to engage in war, it would not be reasonable for me to be blamed for doing wrong (if blame were laid on anyone).’

Τὸν Ὑπερείδην, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ μου νῦν κατηγορεῖ, μᾶλλον ἂν εἰκότως ἢ τόνδ’ ἐδίωκεν. (*Dem.* xviii. 223.)

‘Granted his present charge against me is true, it would have been more reasonable for him to prosecute Hypereides than my client.’

Quod si meis commodis laetabantur, urbis tamen periculo commoverentur. (Cic. *Sest.* 24).

‘But granted they rejoiced at my gain, they would have been disturbed by the city’s peril.’

Sometimes in this construction in Greek the optative with *ἄν* is really potential, equivalent to a mild future; e.g. :—

‘*Ἀλλ’ ἦν ἐφῆς μοι, λέξαιμ’ ἄν ὀρθῶς.* (Soph. *El.* 554.)

‘But if thou grantest it, then will I tell.’

191. (v.) A protasis expressing an unfulfilled condition is followed by an indicative both in Latin and Greek (without *ἄν* in the latter) if it is expressed by a verb which of itself implies possibility, obligation, or propriety, followed by an infinitive; but only when it states that the action implied in the infinitive would possibly, necessarily, or properly have been done in the case supposed. When the stress is laid on the possibility, necessity, or propriety of the act, and not on the act itself, *ἄν* must be used in Greek, and the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in Latin.

Χρῆν σ’, εἴπερ ἦσθα μὴ κακὸς, πείσαντά με γαμεῖν γάμον τόνδ’. (Eur. *Med.* 586.)

‘Hadst thou not been vile, thou shouldst have won me over, and made this marriage.’

Εἰ ἐβούλετο δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ. (Lep. xxxii. 23.)

‘If he had chosen to be just, he could have,’ etc.

Si non pertaesum thalami taedaeque fuisset,

Huic uni forsán potui succumbere culpae.

(Verg. *Aen.* iv. 18, 19.)

‘Had I not grown weary of the marriage bed and torch, I might perchance have yielded to this one fault.’

But

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦν, κ.τ.λ., οὐδὲν ἄν σε ἔδει δεῦρο ἵέναι. (Plat. *Rep.* 328c.)

‘If I had been still strong, there would have been no necessity for you to go there.’

192. (vi.) In Greek a **potential optative or indicative** with $\alpha\upsilon$ is occasionally found in the **protasis** of a conditional sentence; it is then really the **apodosis** of **another condition expressed or understood**. The apodosis to such a condition is always in the indicative without $\alpha\upsilon$ (Class I.); for the real condition is, 'if it is, or was, the case that something could hereafter or now be, or have been, in a given case, it follows,' etc.; e.g. :—

Καὶ ἐγὼ, εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοίμην $\alpha\upsilon$, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. (Plat. Prot. 329B.)

'If I would listen to any other man, I do listen to you.'

Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτ' ἰσχυρὸν $\alpha\upsilon$ ἦν τούτῳ τεκμήριον, κάμοι γενέσθω τεκμήριον. (Dem. xlix. 58.)

'If this would have been a strong proof for him, let it be a proof for me too.'

RELATIVE AND TEMPORAL SENTENCES CONSTRUCTION

193. Logically, perhaps, this construction should have been considered before that of conditional sentences, as they may be regarded as a species of the genus of relative sentences. But the arrangement which we have followed is justified by the fact that the conditional particles have ceased to be used as ordinary relatives, and also because conditional sentences have formed a well-defined class of their own.

The classification of relative and temporal sentences turns in the first place on the question whether the antecedent to the relative, or the time referred to, is **definite** or **indefinite**.

194. I. *Definite Relative and Temporal Sentences*. In both Latin and Greek, where a relative has a definite antecedent, or an adverb of time refers to any definite point of time, with no other consideration than that of time implied, the relative or temporal sentence has its verb in the indicative, unless its construction is altered by subordination to some other construction, as in *Oratio Obliqua*. Negatives οὐ, non.

EXAMPLES.

‘Ὅθεν δ’ οὖν ῥῆστα μαθήσεσθε, ἐντεῦθεν πειράσομαι διδάσκειν.
(Dem. xxvii. 3.)

‘I will try to inform you from the source from which you will most easily learn.’

Μέμνησαι ὅτ’ ἐγώ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην. (Plat. Men. 79D.)

‘You remember the time when I answered you.’

Οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν, πρὶν ἐξημίωσαν.
(Thuc. ii. 65.)

‘They did not cease from their indignation against him, until they had fined him.’

Memini, cum mihi desipere videbare. (Cic. Fam. vii. 28.)

‘I remember the time when you seemed foolish to me.’

Quae tibi mandavi velim cures. (Cic. Att. i. 5.)

‘I wish you would attend to my commissions.’

Ut sementem feceris, ita metes. (Cic. Or. ii. 65.)

‘As you have sown, so shall you reap.’

195. II. *Indefinite Relative and Temporal Sentences.*

Here, as the varieties of usage are more numerous, it will be simpler to consider first indefinite relative sentences, and then temporal sentences.

196. (i.) **Indefinite Relative Sentences.** These sentences may again be subdivided into two classes, which we will call **generic** and **general**. **Generic** relative sentences refer to an antecedent which either is not a **definite** person or thing, or **definite** persons or things, but **indefinite**, and regarded as belonging to a **class** or **genus**; or which, if definite, is not considered by itself, but as a member of a **genus** or class. **General** relative sentences also refer to an **indefinite** antecedent; but, without classifying that antecedent by the action expressed in the verb, simply refer to any antecedent, person or thing, of which the action of the verb may be predicated at any time. The distinction is clearly marked both in Latin and Greek.

197. A. **Generic Relative Sentences.** These sentences in Greek are constructed exactly as are the four main forms of conditional sentence; that is (1), if the verb of the

principal sentence is **indicative** of any tense without *ἄν*, the verb of the **generic** sentence is **indicative**; (2) if the verb of the **principal** sentence is **historic indicative** with *ἄν* (implying a result dependent on an unfulfilled condition), the verb of the **generic** sentence is **historic indicative**; (3) if the verb of the **principal** sentence is **future**, the **generic** sentence has **subjunctive** with *ἄν*; (4) if the verb of the **principal** sentence is **optative** with *ἄν*, the **generic** sentence has **optative**. In every case *μή* is the negative of the generic sentence; and in division (1) it is only in **negative** sentences that generic and indefinite sentences can be clearly distinguished from definite relative sentences, the *μή* alone marking the generic sentence.

198. In Latin, whatever is the mood of the principal sentence, the verb of the **generic** sentence is in the **subjunctive**, its tense varying with the tense of the principal verb. It is in fact the use of the **subjunctive** mood which marks the **generic** nature of the sentence; not here implying that the action expressed is not a fact, but that **more than a mere fact is expressed**, namely, that the antecedent is regarded as **belonging to a class**. The negative in these sentences is always *non*.

EXAMPLES.

199. (1) "Α *μή οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι.* (Plat. *Apol.* 21D.)
'Things I do not know, I do not think I know.'

Ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρεν, ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο φθῆναι.

(Thuc. iii. 89.)

'He killed all the men, who were unable to escape.'

Peccasse mihi videor, qui a te discesserim.

(Cic. *Fam.* xvi. 1.)

'I think I have erred, in having left you.'

Hospes, qui omnia cuperet rite facta, descendit ad Tiberim.

(Liv. i. 45.)

'The stranger, since he desired everything to be duly performed, went down to the Tiber.'

200. (2) Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα. (Plat. *Charm.* 171E.)

'For we would not ourselves have attempted to do what we did not understand.'

Ἐβασάνιζον ἂν μεχρὶ οὗ αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει. (Dem. liii. 25.)

'They would have tortured him as long as they pleased.'

Viret (= vixisset), cui vitam deus aut sua dextra dedisset.
(Verg. *Aen* xi. 118.)

'He would have lived, to whom a god or his right hand had given life.'

201. (3) Οὐκοῦν, ὅταν δὴ μὴ σθένω, πεπαύσομαι.

(Soph. *Ant.* 91.)

'Well, when I fail in power, I will pause.'

Erit illud profecto tempus, cum tu desideres. (Cic. *Mil.* 26.)

'Surely that time will come, when you will long.'

202. (4) Πεινῶν φάγοι ἂν ὅποτε βούλοιτο.

(Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 18.)

'He would eat, if hungry, when he chose.'

Ὅ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπή, οὐδ' ἂν φιλοίη. (Plat. *Lys.* 215B.)

'What he did not like, he would not love either.'

Translated into Latin—

Esuriens edat ubi velit.

Quod non probet, non amet.

203. B. **General Relative Sentences.** These sentences simply refer to an **indefinite** antecedent. They do not express that the action in the verb is characteristic of that antecedent, but that it is predicated of any persons or things whatever of which it can be said. In Greek, if the **principal** verb is **primary**, the dependent verb has the **subjunctive** with ἂν, if **historic**, the **optative**. In Latin the **indicative** mood is used in these general sentences; for the subjunctive would imply some connection between the antecedent and the action of the verb other than mere indefinite frequency, though Livy and later writers often use the **subjunctive**. The verb of the antecedent clause expresses a repeated action or a general truth, the verb of the relative clause any act or acts which may be predicated of the antecedent at any time.

EXAMPLES.

Καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν πολεμῶσι, τὸν πάροντα πόλεμον αἰὲν μέγιστον κρινόντων. (Thuc. i. 21.)

'Although men always regard any war in which they happen to be engaged as the greatest.'

Ἡϋξέτο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἐκ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἔκεινοι ξυμφέρουεν.
(Id. i. 99.)

‘Their navy was increased from whatever sums they contributed.’

Quoscumque de te queri audivi, placavi. (Cic. *Q. Fr.* i. 2.)

‘I have appeased any men, whom I heard complaining of you.’

Nobis, qui imitamur quoscumque visum est. (Cic. *Off.* i. 32.)

‘To us, who copy any whom we please.’

(In Greek the relative clauses in these two sentences would be οὓς ἀκούσαιοι μεμφομένους, and οὓς ἂν δόξη.)

EXAMPLES OF SUBJUNCTIVES IN LATIN.

Quocumque se intulisset, victoriam secum haud dubiam trahebat. (Liv. vi. 8.)

‘Wherever he charged, he brought certain victory with him.’

Vescebatur, quocumque tempore stomachus desiderasset.

(Suet. *Oct.* 76.)

‘He used to take food, at any time when his stomach wanted it.’

204. (ii.) Indefinite Temporal Sentences. We have already said that in temporal sentences referring to a **definite** point of time the **indicative** is used both in Latin and Greek. Such sentences are usually past—that is, **past to the subject** of the action, as in the sentence, ‘when the enemy fled, he pursued’; whereas in the sentence, ‘he said he would pursue when the enemy fled,’ the temporal sentence is future to the subject of the action, though past to the narrator or hearer. This distinction must be clearly marked. Of future temporal sentences those only are definite (as a rule) which refer to **natural** or **fixed** divisions of time, as ‘when the sun rises,’ ‘when the clock strikes,’ etc. In such sentences the point of time is certainly known, and accordingly the indicative is used in them.

The temporal particles chiefly to be considered are in Greek, ὅτε, ἐπεὶ, ἐπειδὴ, ἕως, μέχρι, πρὶν; in Latin, *ubi, cum, postquam, dum, donec, quamdiu, ante, and priusquam*. In Greek the negative of the verb in these indefinite temporal sentences is always μή; in Latin, *non*.

205. In Greek the construction of indefinite temporal sentences with these particles (excluding the use of *πρίν* for the moment) is that the verb of the temporal sentence is **subjunctive** with *ἄν* if the principal verb is **primary**, **optative** if the principal verb is **historic**.

In Latin the statement of the case is not so simple. With *dum*, *donec*, *quandiu*, *quoad* (meaning 'whilst'), the **present indicative** is often used where the meaning is 'so long as,' even though the time is not definite. The mere fact is thus expressed. But when there is any idea of **purpose**, **expectation**, or generally of **interdependence** between the action of the principal verb and the verb in the temporal sentence, the latter is in the subjunctive; so too with *dum*, *donec*, *quoad* (meaning 'until'), and *ante*, *priusquam* (meaning 'before'), when there is any similar idea. But when the simple **future fact** is stated, the **future** or **future perfect indicative**, and even the **present**, are used. So too *cum*, *ubi*, *postquam* are used with the **future** or **future perfect** of future events, in which mere **futurity** is expressed.

206. In Greek *πρίν* demands a separate notice. After an **affirmative** principal verb it is usually* constructed with the infinitive, as a preposition: *πρίν ἐλθεῖν* = *πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν*. After a **negative** principal verb it has the same construction as the other temporal particles.

207.

EXAMPLES.

Ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴν περὶ τοῦ γένους εἶπω, τότε ἐρῶ.

(Dem. lvii. 16.)

'I will mention these facts when I speak on the question of race.'

Δεῖ μὴ περιμένειν ἕως ἄν ἐπιστῶσι. (Isocr. iv. 165.)

'We must not wait until they stop.'

* *Note*.—There are three exceptions only to this rule in prose. In all of them the continuance of the action up to the point of time expressed is insisted on, and the point of time is definite; e.g.:—

παραπλήσια ἔπασχον, πρίν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἔτρεψαν, κ.τ.λ.

(Thuc. vii. 71.)

πρίν here = until.

Περιεμένομεν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθεῖν τὸ δεσμωτήριον.

(Plat. *Phaed.* 59D)

'We always used to wait until the prison was opened.'

Μήπω γε, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρελθῇ. (Plat. *Phaedr.* 242A)

'Don't do so yet, until the heat has passed by.'

208. Occasionally the **subjunctive** is without ἄν, even in Attic prose (according to the MSS.; many editors insert the ἄν).

Ἔως τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μάθῃς. (Soph. *Ai.* 555.)

'Until thou learnest joy and grief.'

Σωφρονέστερον εἴη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας πρὶν διαγνώσι πέμπειν. (Thuc. vi. 29.)

'It would be wiser not to despatch him under such a charge until they had decided the case.'

Dum res maneant, verba fingant arbitrato suo.

(Cic. *Fin.* v. 29.)

'As long as facts abide, let them invent words as they please.'

(*dum* = 'so long as'; with an idea of condition.)

*Dum Latinae loquentur litterae, quercus huic loco non deerit.** (Cic. *Leg.* i. 1.)

'As long as Latin literature has a voice, an oak will not be absent from this place.'

(*dum* = 'as long as'; mere duration of time.)

Exspectate, dum consul aut dictator fiat. (Liv. iii. 11.)

'Wait until a consul or dictator is elected.'

(*dum* = 'until'; expected future event.)

Is antequam veniat in Pontum, litteras ad Cn. Pompeium mittet. (Cic. *Agr.* ii. 20.)

'Before he arrives at Pontus he will send a letter to Gnaeus Pompeius.'

(*antequam* = 'before'; intended future event.)

Antequam discedis, Othonem convenias velim.

(Cic. *Att.* xii. 37.)

'Before you go I wish you would meet Otho.'

(*antequam* = 'before'; simple future event.)

Cum haec leges, habebimus consules. (Cic. *Att.* v. 12.)

'When you read this we shall have our consuls elected.'

(*cum* = 'when'; simple future event.)

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

209. The treatment of sentences expressing **consequence** or **result** is markedly different in Greek and Latin. In Greek the result is usually expressed by the **infinitive**, but also, when an **emphasis** is laid on the **attainment** of the result, by the **indicative**; in Latin the **subjunctive** is always used. The use of the infinitive in Greek is due to its retaining its **dativ** character. It expresses the **result** as the **indirect object** of an action; it does not imply anything as to the attainment of this object, but merely that the object is the natural result of the action. Thus it expresses **actual** results frequently; indeed, the indicative is only used when a special stress is laid on the attainment of the result. In Latin the use of the **subjunctive** does not imply that the action expressed by it is **not a fact**, or that the result is not actual; it only implies that **more than a mere fact** is stated—that is, it implies a **causal connection** between the action of the principal verb and that of the verb in the consecutive sentence: the former is the cause, the latter the effect. Indeed, in Latin consecutive sentences are really a division of generic relative sentences, though for the sake of clearness it is best to consider them separately.

210. In both languages consecutive sentences are introduced by **relative adjectives** and **adverbs**—in Greek most often by *ὥστε*, but also by *οἷος*, *ὅσος*, *ἐφ' ᾧ*, *ἐφ' ᾧ τε*, and *ὥς* (not used in Attic prose more than two or three times); in Latin by *ut*, *quin*, *qui*, *qualis*, *quantus*, etc. In Latin the negative of these sentences is always *non*. In Greek the negative of the indicative (as expressing a fact) is *οὐ*, of the infinitive *μή*, except in certain passages where the infinitive is merely the *Oratio Obliqua* of an indicative consequence; e.g. :—

Οὕτω δὲ ἀτόπους τινὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι λοιδορουμένους αὐτῷ. (Dem. xix. 308.)

‘(I hear) that some people in the city are so extravagant as not to be ashamed of abusing him.’

There remain, however, a few passages in which οὐ is found with the infinitive where there is no *Oratio Obliqua*, but in all of them the indicative construction is equally possible, and there may have been a mixture of the two constructions (so Goodwin explains, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 229); e.g. :—

Οὕτω δ' ἀρχαίως εἶχον, μᾶλλον δὲ πολιτικῶς, ὥστε οὐδὲ χρημάτων ὠνεῖσθαι παρ' οὐδένος οὐδέν. (Dem. ix. 48.)

'So old-fashioned was their attitude, or rather so patriotic, that they bought nothing from anyone for money.'

In Latin, when emphasis is laid on the fact that the consequence **actually** occurred, the **perfect subjunctive** is used, though the use of other tenses does not imply its non-occurrence.

EXAMPLES.

Πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι. (Plat. *Gorg.* 479c.)

'They use every effort to avoid being punished.'

Οὕτως ἀγνωμόνως ἔχετε, ὥστε ἐλπίζετε. (Dem. ii. 26.)

'You are so stupid, that you hope.'

Translated in Latin—

Omnia faciunt ita ut poenas non dent.

Adeo stulti estis ut speraveritis.

Other Latin examples—

Reliquos ita perterritos egerunt, ut non prius fuga desisterent quam, etc. (Caes. *B. G.* iv. 12.)

'They drove the rest in such panic, that they did not cease from flight until,' etc.

Eo fuit habitu oris, ut . . . ridentis etiam speciem praeberit. (Liv. xxi. 2.)

'Such was the expression of his face, that he actually seemed like a man laughing.'

Tantus terror pavorque omnes occupavit, ut non modo alius quisquam arma caperet aut castris pellere hostem conaretur, sed etiam ipse rex . . . ad flumen navesque perfugerit (the last result is particularly emphasized).

(Liv. xxiv. 40.)

211. In both Latin and Greek consecutive sentences can express the **terms or conditions** on which the action in the main sentence takes place; ὥστε, ἐφ' ᾧ, or ἐφ' ᾗ τε, and *ita . . . ut* in Latin then being translated 'on condition that.' In Latin the consecutive sentence has a **subjunctive** verb; in Greek the **infinitive** is found, or, with ἐφ' ᾗ and ἐφ' ᾗ τε, a **future indicative**. In this latter case the sentence is simply an ordinary relative sentence.

EXAMPLES.

Ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς ὥστε μὴ ἀδικῆσαι. (Thuc. iii. 28.)

'He raised them up on condition of doing them no injury.'

Ἀφήσομέν σ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾗ τε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν.
(Plat. *Ap.* 29c.)

'We will release you on this condition, that you cease to devote yourself to philosophy.'

Σπονδὰς ποησάμενοι ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται.

(Thuc. i. 113.)

'Having made a truce on condition of recovering the captives.'

Quis est qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam, nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, in omnium rerum abundantia vivere?

(Cic. *Am.* 15.)

'Who is there who would desire to live in absolute abundance, on condition of loving no one, and being loved by none.'

212. The so-called **absolute** infinitive in Greek (also called **limiting**) is of the same nature as the consecutive infinitive; both express the **scope** of the action of the principal verb. The commonest of these in Greek are ὥς εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὀλίγον or μικροῦ and πολλοῦ δεῖν, ἐκὼν εἶναι. They are in fact **datives of purpose or work contemplated**, as are the infinitives of purpose and epexegetical infinitives previously discussed. This seems better than saying, as Goodwin does (*M. T.* 313) that they were felt as **limiting accusatives**. Certainly a limiting accusative such as γνώμην ἐμὴν can give the same force as ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν; but the strong datival character of the Greek infinitive demands that, where possible, every use of

it should be ascribed to a datival origin. In Latin such phrases are differently expressed in most cases; but *ut ita dicam* might be consecutive (more probably it is **jussive**, as in the negative we find *ne dicam*), and certainly most of them could be expressed by consecutive subjunctives; *e.g.*:—

Μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίον ἐστὶ τῇ ὀνειδίξειν. (Dem. xviii. 269.)

Translated in Latin—

Ita simile est convicio ut minimum desit.

‘It is almost (lit. so as to lack little) like abuse.’

ORATIO OBLIQUA

213. It is unnecessary here to give an exact scheme of the *Oratio Obliqua* constructions in Greek and Latin. Such a knowledge may fairly be assumed. It will be enough to indicate the principles underlying the constructions in both languages, and the chief points in which the usages of the two languages differ. Constructions in *Oratio Obliqua* may be divided into the following three kinds: I. **Indirect Statement**; II. **Indirect Question**; III. **Indirect Petition** (Command or Wish).

214. I. *Indirect Statement*. In comparing the usages of Latin and Greek with regard to indirect statement, we are at once met with the observation that, while in Latin there is only one possible construction for indirect statement, in Greek there are three such constructions; viz. **accusative and infinitive**, the construction with ὅτι, ὥς, etc., and after verbs of **perception**, the **participial construction**.

215. Thus the accusative and infinitive construction is common to both languages. The explanation of this construction is difficult. Most probably it originated from sentences in which the accusative had a grammatical construction as direct object with the verb of the principal sentence, the infinitive being explanatory; *e.g.*:—

Θαυμάζομεν Ἐκτορα δῖον αἰχμητὴν τ' ἔμεναι.

(Hom. *Il.* v. 601.)

‘We marvel at goodly Hector, that he is a warrior.’

A further stage in which the accusative cannot stand as object to the verb of the principal sentence without the explanatory infinitive is seen in such sentences as ἀκούει τείρεσθαι Τρῶας = 'he heard the Trojans were hard-pressed.'

Finally, we have the fully-developed accusative and infinitive construction, in which the infinitive assumes to the fullest extent a **verbal** character; its tenses represent the same differences of time as do those of the indicative to which they correspond, and it possesses a subject as well as an object.

216. The most noticeable difference between Greek and Latin usage is the so-called **nominative attraction**, by which the subject of the infinitive, if it is the same as the subject of the introducing verb, is kept in the nominative case. The name attraction rightly explains the principle on which the usage is based. It is found a few times in Latin, but only in poetry after verbs of saying or thinking in the active. In these instances it is most likely a conscious Grecism.

EXAMPLES.

Ἐφη οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ στρατηγεῖν. (Thuc. iv. 28.)

'He said that not he (Kleon), but he (Nikias) was general.'

Fieri studebam eius doctrina doctior. (Cic. Am. i.)

'I was eager to become more learned in his teaching.'

Uxor invicti Iovis esse nescis. (Hor. Od. iii. 27. 73.)

'Thou knowest not that thou art the wife of unconquered Jove.'

217. A second difference between Greek and Latin usage is that in Greek **all** sentences which were **principal** sentences in *Oratio Recta* have the verb in the **infinitive** in *Oratio Obliqua*, whereas in Latin **commands** and **questions** of the 2nd person have their verb in the **subjunctive**. The negative μή with an infinitive in Greek *Oratio Obliqua* marks a **negative command** in *Oratio Recta*. For clearness, δέιν or χρῆναι may, however, be added; e.g.:—

Oratio Recta.

Ἄπειμι· μή με κατάσχυς; διὰ τί οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖς;

Abibo; ne me sis moratus; cur non sequeris?

Oratio Obliqua.

(ἔφη). Ἀπιέναι· ἐκείνον μὴ κατασχεῖν αὐτὸν· διὰ τί οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκείνον;

(Dixit). *Se abiturum; ne ille moraretur ipsum; cur non sequeretur?*

218. Thirdly, in Greek **dependent** clauses may be attracted into the **accusative and infinitive** construction; in Latin the rule is for their verb to be **subjunctive**, unless introduced by a simple relative of connection; *i.e.* *qui* = *et is*, *cum* = *et tum*, etc.; *e.g.*:—

Ἐφη, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν.
(Plat. Rep. 614B.)

'He said, that when his soul had left his body, he journeyed with a great company.'

Fama est, aram esse . . . cuius cinerem nullo umquam moveri vento. (Liv. xxiv. 3.)

'The story is, that there is an altar . . . and its ashes are never stirred by any wind.'

219. Fourthly, it is regular in Latin that all **reported definitions** or **reasons**, expressed in clauses introduced by **relatives** or **relative adverbs**, should have their verbs in the subjunctive mood; in fact, it is simply the use of the subjunctive verb which shows that the definition, etc., is reported, and not the speaker's or writer's own. In Greek after a **primary principal** verb no such change of mood is made; and even after a **historic principal** verb, though it is usual in sentences expressing reported **reasons** to have the optative mood, yet in reported **definitions** and **relative sentences** generally the indicative is the rule, though the optative is occasionally found. With the indicative the use of a particle such as *ὅγ* or *ὅγηθεν* would show that the reason was not given as the speaker's or writer's own, or the relative sentence might be turned into a participial construction with *ὥς*. In Latin this construction is called **Sub-Oblique**; *e.g.*:—

Paetus omnes libros, quos frater suus reliquisset, mihi donavit. (Cic. Att. ii. 1.)

'Paetus gave me all the books, which (he said) his brother had left him.'

Laudat Panaetius Africanum, quod fuerit abstinent.

(Cic. Off. ii. 22.)

'Panaetius praises Africanus, because (he says) he was temperate.'

Ἐκάκιζον ὅτι σῖρατηγὸς ὢν οὐχ ὑπεξάγοι. (Thuc. ii. 21.)

'They abused him, because though he was general he did not lead them out.'

Τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξύμπερον ἔλεγεν ὁ ἡγούμενος ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ξυμφέρειν. (Plat. Rep. 340B.)

'He referred to the advantage of the stronger, which (he said) the stronger believed to be advantageous to him.'

The first Latin example might be rendered in Greek:—

Παῖτος ἅπαντα τὰ βιβλία, ὅσα δὴ ὁ ἀδελφὸς κατέλιπε, ἐμοὶ ἔδωρήσατο.

220. In Latin particular notice needs to be taken of some sentences in which a verb of saying is introduced with a definition or reason, and by **mistake** made subjunctive; the reason being that the ear naturally expected a subjunctive with reported definitions and reasons; e.g.:—

Rediit paulo post, quod se oblitum nescio quid diceret.

(Cic. Off. i. 13.)

'He returned soon afterwards, because he said he had forgotten something.'

Here there is a confusion between *quod oblitus esset nescio quid*, and *quod se oblitum nescio quid dicebat*.

221. In Latin reported conditions are also always found with a subjunctive verb, although they do not depend on any expressed word of saying; and it is the rule in Greek after a **historic** verb that in such conditions the verb should be **optative**; after a **primary** verb no change is made; e.g.:—

Praetor aedem Diovi vovit, si eo die hostes virisset.

(Liv. xxxi. 21.)

'The Praetor vowed a temple to Jove, if he conquered the foe that day.'

(His words were *si vicero*, 'If I conquer.')

Οὐδ' ἦν τοῦ πολέμου πέρας οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγὴ Φιλίππῳ, εἰ μὴ
 Θηβαίους καὶ Θετταλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ποιήσειε τῇ πόλει.
 (Dem. xviii. 145.)

'Philip could find no end or release from the war, unless
 he made the Thebans and Thessalians enemies of our
 city.'

(His thought was, εἰ μὴ ποιήσω, 'unless I make.')

The vivid construction is, however, common in Greek,
 retaining subjunctive or indicative even after a historic
 principal verb; *e.g.* :—

Τᾶλλα, ἣν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσ-
 κευάζοντο. (Thuc. vii. 59.)

'They made the rest of their preparations, in case the
 Athenians venture another sea-fight.'

222. Fifthly, in Latin an **indicative** is never found as a
 part of an *Oratio Obliqua*; any indicative in the middle of a
 reported speech is simply a **parenthetical** remark of the
 reporter or writer; *e.g.* :—

*Caesar per exploratores certior factus est, ex ea parte vici,
 quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse.*
 (Caes. B. G. iii. 2.)

'Caesar learnt from the scouts that all had left that part
 of the village, which he had assigned to the Gauls.'

But in Greek, in dependent sentences, if the verb of
 saying is **primary**, the **indicative tenses** of direct discourse
 are all retained; and if it is **historic**, they may all be
 retained, while **historic indicative tenses** of direct discourse
 are **invariably** retained: for if the corresponding optative
 tenses were used, it would not be clear what the form of the
 direct discourse was, as these optative tenses also represent
 the primary indicative tenses and subjunctive tenses of
 direct discourse.

Thus ἔφη εἰ ἔλθοι καλῶς πράξειν is the *Oratio Obliqua* of
 εἰ μὴ ἔλθῃ καλῶς πράξει;

but εἰ ἦλθεν καλῶς ἂν ἔπραξεν changes in *Oratio Obliqua*
 to ἔφη εἰ ἦλθεν καλῶς ἂν πράξειαι

EXAMPLE.

Λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλλθαι πω τὰς σπονδὰς ὅτ' ἐσέπεμψαν,
κ.τ.λ. (Thuc. v. 49.) (*Oratio Recta*, ὅτε ἐσεπέμψαμεν.)

'Saying that the truce had not been announced when they despatched,' etc.

223. In Greek there is a second form of *Oratio Obliqua* introduced by ὅτι or ὡς, more rarely and in poetry by ὅπως, οὐνεκα, and ὁθούνεκα, in which the infinitive is not used; but if the verb of saying is **primary** all the **moods** and **tenses** of the *Oratio Recta* are retained, while if it is **historic** all the **principal** verbs of the *Oratio Recta* are regularly changed into the corresponding tenses of the **optative**, though **past tenses** of the **indicative** with ἄν never change, and the **imperfect** and **pluperfect** without ἄν rarely do so, and all may be retained in the tenses of *Oratio Recta* for vividness, while the **dependent** verbs of the *Oratio Recta* (with the exceptions noted previously) are regularly changed into the corresponding tenses of the **optative**, or are retained in the tenses of *Oratio Recta* for vividness. Examples of these usages are scarcely necessary, as they are so frequent. But the following points should be noted with regard to this construction:—

(1) Occasionally a verb is found in the optative without ὅτι or any verb of saying, when the context shows that an expression or thought is being reported; e.g.:—

Ὑπέσχετο

τὸν ἄνδρ' Ἀχαιοῖς τόνδε δηλώσειν ἄγων·

οἷοιτο μὲν μάλισθ', κ.τ.λ. (Soph. *Philoc.* 617.)

'He promised to take and show this man to the Achaeans; he thought most likely (he said),' etc.

224. (2) Sometimes, as in English, a **historic** tense in *Oratio Obliqua* (after ὅτι or ὡς) represents a **primary** tense in *Oratio Recta*. This is especially the case in Homer, but is also found in Attic Greek; e.g.:—

Οὐδέ τι ᾗδῃ ὅττι δηϊόωντο λαοί. (*Il.* xiii. 674.)

Oratio Recta: δηϊόωνται.

'And he knew not that the host was harassed.'

Ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἐννοούμενοι μὲν ὅτι
ἐπὶ ταῖς βασιλέως θυραῖς ἦσαν, κ.τ.λ. (Xen. An. iii. 12.)

Oratio Recta: ἐσμέν.

‘The Greeks were in much perplexity, considering that they were at the king’s gates,’ etc.

Λέγων ὡς φιλαθηναῖος ἦν. (Ar. Vesp. 283.)

Oratio Recta: εἰμί.

‘Saying that he was a friend to the Athenians.’

225. Lastly, in Greek verbs of **perceiving and knowing**, which are followed by the usual accusative and infinitive construction in Latin, take a construction with the **accusative and participle**, or (if the subject of the principal verb is also the subject in the participial construction) the **nominative and participle** by attraction. This participial construction represents the action perceived or known as an **attribute of the object** of the principal verb, thus connecting it more closely with it; as is natural, for an action perceived or known of any person or thing is more closely connected with it than an action merely reported about it. In this construction the same tense of the participle is used as would have been used in the *Oratio Recta*; e.g. :—

Ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες. (Thuc. i. 32.)

Oratio Recta: ἀδύνατοί ἐσμεν.

‘We see that we are incapable.’

226. The verbs used with this construction are those meaning to **see, hear or learn, perceive, know, be ignorant of, remember, forget, show, prove, and announce** (ἀγγέλλω only). But they may have ὅτι or ὡς; and ἀκούω, πυνθάνομαι, αἰσθάνομαι, ἀγγέλλω, ὁμολογῶ, may have accusative and infinitive, and so too οἶδα, ἐπίσταμαι, and other verbs of knowing, but not in Attic prose; e.g. :—

Αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα δύνασθαι. (Thuc. vi. 59.)

Perceiving that they were powerful.’

Ἴσθι μή ποτ’ ἂν τυχεῖν. (Soph. Ph. 1329.)

‘Know thou wilt never win.’

Verbs of knowing, learning, remembering, and forgetting, have the infinitive in the sense of know, etc., to do anything; *e.g.* :—

Βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὐτ' οἶδεν οὐτ' ἐθέλει. (Dem. iv. 40.)

'He neither knows how to look one in the face nor chooses to.'

This participial construction may possibly be imitated in Latin occasionally, as in Vergil, *Aen.* ii. 377 :—

Sensit medios delapsus in hostes.

'He perceived he had fallen into the midst of his foes.'

Note.—In *Oratio Obliqua* generally it is to be observed that the **optative** in Greek corresponds to the **subjunctive** in Latin; the force of both is to express statements as other than facts in the sense that they are not given on the speaker's or writer's authority. The Greek **subjunctive** is never due to *Oratio Obliqua*.

227. II. *Indirect Questions.* Here we have to discuss **reported** questions, not introduced as part of a formal *Oratio Obliqua*, but depending directly on the verb of asking. In Latin the verb in reported questions is always in the **subjunctive** mood. In Greek, if the verb of asking is **primary**, the mood and tense of the direct question are retained, and may be retained even when the verb of asking is **historic**; but in that case the rule is that the tenses of the indicative and subjunctive mood change into the corresponding tenses of the **optative** mood. Examples of the ordinary kind of indirect question are frequent, and need not be quoted; but note the following :—

(i.) In Greek (α) in indirect deliberative questions εἰ can introduce a subjunctive, for εἰν cannot mean 'whether'; *e.g.* :—

Ἐπανερομένου Κτησιφῶντος εἰ καλέσῃ Δημοσθένην.

(Aeschin. iii. 202.)

'When Ktesiphon was asking if he was to call Demosthenes.'

(β) When the introducing verb is an optative with ἄν referring to the future, a deliberative subjunctive may be attracted into the optative; *e.g.* :—

Οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρᾶο σαυτῷ. (Plat. Crit. 45B.)

‘If you went out you would not know what to do with yourself.’

(ii.) In Latin (α) a question repeated in astonishment has its verb in the subjunctive, if dependent on an interrogative pronoun. It is treated as a dependent question, the verb of asking being understood; *e.g.*:—

Quid ergo narras? AN. *Quid ego narrem?* (Ter. Ph. 685.)

‘What do you say?’ ‘What do I say?’

(β) A question with an indicative verb is always put directly, though a verb of reporting may be inserted parenthetically; *e.g.*:—

Dic, ubi ea nunc est, obsecro. (Plaut. Bac. 203.)

‘Tell me, I beseech you, where is she now?’

228. III. *Indirect Petition.* In indirect petition, that is, in the construction for reporting commands and wishes, there is again a marked difference between Greek and Latin. Whether indirect petitions are part of a formal *Oratio Obliqua*, or directly dependent on verbs of commanding, requesting, and wishing, in Greek they are expressed by an **accusative and infinitive** construction; while in Latin they are regularly expressed by an **oblique jussive subjunctive**, though some verbs of **wishing** and **determining**, and *iubeo* to command may be followed (*iubeo* regularly) by a simple **infinitive** or an **accusative and infinitive** construction. The oblique jussive subjunctive in Latin may depend on the principal verb without any connecting adverb or particle, or may be subordinated to it by the use of *ut* and *ne*. In the latter case the subjunctive is sometimes called final; but it is merely a question of names, as there is no essential difference between the jussive and final constructions.

EXAMPLES.

Προείπον αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις. (Thuc. i. 45.)

‘They forbade them to fight at sea with the Corinthians.’

Ἐβούλοντο γὰρ σφίσιν, εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ὑπάρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν ἔνδον. (Thuc. iii. 5.)

‘They desired anyone whom they captured to serve them as a set-off to those within.’

In haec verba, L. Caecili, iures postulo. (Liv. xxii. 53.)

'I demand that you swear in these words, Lucius Caecilius.'

Nolo me in tempore hoc videat senex. (Ter. Andr. 819.)

'I don't want the old man to see me just now.'

Servis imperat ut se ipsum neglegant. (Cic. Verr. i. 26.)

'He orders his slaves to take no care of him.'

229. Occasionally in Greek an object clause with ὅπως or ὅπως μή follows verbs of entreating, etc., instead of the regular infinitive; e.g.:-

Διακελεύονται ὅπως τιμωρήσεται. (Plat. Rep. 549E.)

'They urge him to punish.'

THE NEGATIVES

230. In Greek the negatives are οὐ and μή; οὐ has other forms, οὐκ, οὐχ, οὐκί, οὐχί. The form οὐ is used before consonants, οὐκ before vowels with a soft, οὐχ before vowels with a rough breathing; οὐκί is found chiefly in Homer, and is probably the original form; οὐχί is an emphatic form, found in Attic; οὐδέ, οὔτε, μηδέ, μήτε are negative conjunctions.

In Latin the negatives are *non*, *nē*, *haud*, *nē*, *nī*. *Nē* is found in compounds; e.g. *nequeo*, *nemo* (= *ne hemo*, an old form of *homo*), *nullus*, etc. *Nē* and *nī* were originally identical, and written *nei* at one time. In classical Latin *nī* is used only as a negative conditional particle, and in some compounds; e.g. *nimirum*, *quidnī*. *Non*, originally *noenum*, is usually regarded as a contraction for *nē unum*. *Neque* and *nec*, probably a contracted form, are the negative conjunctions.

231. It is only possible to discuss side by side the usages of the two languages with regard to these negatives to a limited extent; for the Greeks drew a marked distinction between οὐ and μή, which can only be partially paralleled by the uses of *non* and *nē*, and the other three negatives in Latin have no parallel forms in Greek. We will first explain the difference of usage between οὐ and μή, showing how far the Latin usage of *non* and *nē* corresponds; and

after considering the usage of the negative conjunctions in Greek, with any parallels that may be found in Latin, and of the combinations $\mu\eta\ \omicron\upsilon$ and $\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\eta$, discuss the noticeable usages of the other Latin negatives. Finally we will treat of the effect of adding one negative to another in both languages.

232. $\omicron\upsilon$ and $\mu\eta$, *non* and *nē*. The difference in Greek between the use of $\omicron\upsilon$ and $\mu\eta$ may be most briefly expressed by saying that $\omicron\upsilon$ is the negative of **fact**, $\mu\eta$ of **theory or conception**. In other words, $\omicron\upsilon$ is **absolute, definite, objective**; $\mu\eta$ is **relative, indefinite, subjective**. In practice, therefore, $\omicron\upsilon$ negatives all statements which are expressed **as facts** by the speaker or writer, while $\mu\eta$ negatives those which are expressed as **thoughts**; $\omicron\upsilon$ negatives simple **assertions**, while $\mu\eta$ negatives **commands, wishes, purposes, clauses expressing object, fear, consequence, indefinite relative and temporal clauses, and the protases of conditional clauses**. In Latin also *non* is the negative of simple **assertions**, while *nē* negatives **commands, wishes, and purpose and object clauses**; but there the resemblance to Greek ceases, for the other varieties of sentences, negatived by $\mu\eta$ in Greek, are negatived by *non* in Latin. In fact, in Latin *nē* is merely the negative of the jussive and final sentences, while $\mu\eta$ in Greek negatives all sentences not stated as mere expressions of fact. It follows that while $\omicron\upsilon$ is the appropriate negative of the indicative mood as expressing facts, $\mu\eta$ must be used with the indicative when it expresses **purpose or object, apprehensions, conditions, and (very rarely) prohibitions**, and also when the indicative is used in **generic relative and temporal sentences**. But in Latin *nē* is never used with the indicative. Conversely, in Attic Greek the negative of the **subjunctive**, as it always expresses action as contingent, not as a fact, is $\mu\eta$; and so it is of the **optative**, except when the mood is **potential**. In Latin, however, the **subjunctive** is negatived by *non*, except when expressing command, direct or indirect, and purpose. Again in Greek the negative of the **infinitive**, which expresses action in the abstract, is $\mu\eta$, except in *Oratio Obliqua*, when the infinitive represents the indicative or potential optative; but the Latin infinitive is negatived

by *non*. Similarly the participle in Greek may have either negative, according to the idea it expresses; in Latin the participle is negated by *non*.

233. The difference of meaning conveyed by the use of the two negatives may be considered by contrasting their uses with the various kinds of sentences under the following heads:—

(i.) **Statements of fact.** Negatives, οὐ, *non*.

Expressions of wish, command, purpose, object, apprehension. Negatives, μή, *nē*.

Χεῖρὶ δ' οὐ ψάύσεις ποτέ. (Eur. Med. 1320.)

'Thou shalt never touch with thy hand.'

Non, non sic futurumst: non potest. (Ter. Ph. 303.)

'No, it is not so to be; it cannot be.'

(Simple statement of future fact.)

Οὔτ' ἂν δυναίμην, μήτ' ἐπισταίμην λέγειν. (Soph. Ant. 686.)

'I could not say, nor may I ever know how to say.'

(Potential optative states as a fact; optative with μή expresses a wish.)

Μὴ βουλήσεσθε εἰδέναι. (Dem. xxiii. 117.)

'Do not desire to know.'

(Future indicative expressing prohibition, with negative μή—a very rare use, due perhaps to confusion with subjunctive and imperative uses.)

Foliis tantum ne carmina manda. (Verg. Aen. vi. 74.)

'Only do not entrust the verses to the leaves.'

(Imperative of prohibition with *nē*; rare and poetical in Latin.)

Κρύψον νιν, ἔνθα μήποτε . . .

τούτων πρόσσειι μηδέν. (Soph. El. 436.)

'Hide it, where none of these things may ever come near.'

(Future indicative with relative adverb expressing purpose.)

Cautum erat, quo ne plus auri . . . haberemus.

(Liv. xxxiv. 6.)

'Precaution was taken, that we should not have more gold.'

(Subjunctive of purpose.)

Θέλω πυθέσθαι, μή 'πὶ τοῖς πάλαι κακοῖς
προσκειμένον τι πῆμα σὴν δάκνει φρένα. (Eur. *Heracl.*
432, 3.)

'I would learn, whether beyond thine ancient ills some
added woe devours thy heart.'

(Here μή must be translated 'whether'; but its true
meaning is 'for fear that,' and the clause it introduces
expresses an apprehension.)

Μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω μή σ' ἐγὼ κατακλινῶ χαμαί.
(Aristoph. *Lys.* 917.)

'No, by Apollo, I won't make you lie down on the
ground.'

Μὴ μὲν τοῖς ἵπποισιν ἀνὴρ ἐποχήσεται ἄλλος.
(Hom. *Il.* x. 330.)

'No other man shall be borne by these horses.'

(In these two sentences, and a few similar ones, the
explanation of the use of μή is very difficult. It is to be
noticed that they are oaths of denial; possibly the use of
μή expresses the idea of **protestation** in addition to that
of mere denial. Another explanation is to punctuate them
as questions expecting the answer 'no' [see post, § 240]).

234. (ii.) Statements of fact. Negative, οὐ.

Expressions of Condition. Negative, μή.

We have seen in the chapter on conditions that the
negative of the apodosis is οὐ, it being stated as a **fact**;
while the negative of the protasis, which is stated as an
assumption, is μή; though, from Homeric use, it is pro-
bable that indicative conditions of Class I. were originally
negated by οὐ, as in them the protasis is stated as a fact.
Other instances of οὐ in the protasis have been discussed.

In Latin a negative protasis is usually introduced by
nisi (= *nē si*); but if any particular word is negated, and
not the whole clause, *non* is used.

EXAMPLES.

Ἐὰν μὴ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν . . . οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν
παῦλα ταῖς πόλεσιν. (Plat. *Rep.* 473D.)

'Unless philosophers become kings, there is no pause of
woes for states.'

Si stare non possunt, corruant. (Cic. Cat. ii. 10.)

‘If they are unable to stand, let them fall.’

235. (iii.) **Definite relative and temporal sentences.** Negative, οὐ.

Indefinite relative and temporal sentences. Negative, μή.

In these sentences it is often the negative alone which shows their character, as it has already been pointed out. Οὐ is used when the antecedent is some definite person, thing, or time, with regard to which some statement is made as a fact; μή where the antecedent is some indefinite person, etc., of which a statement is made as a generalization, without any particular reference, or when a definite antecedent is referred to, but generically, as one of a class. In such sentences the Latin negative is always *non*. Observe the difference between

ἄ μή οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι.

‘All I do not know, I do not even imagine I know.’

and ἄ οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι.

‘Particular things I do not know, I do not even imagine I know.’

Other examples will be found in the chapter dealing with these sentences.

236. (iv.) **Consecutive sentences expressing actual result** have the negative οὐ; those expressing natural result, μή. In Latin always *non*.

Here too the οὐ shows that the statement of consequence is made distinctly as a fact; the μή that it is made only as a natural, but not necessarily realized, result. Contrast

οὕτω δειλὸς ὥστε μή μάχεσθαι.

‘So cowardly as not to fight.’

(i.e. if he ever had to fight, though he may never have fought, nor ever will fight.)

οὕτω δειλὸς ὥστε οὐκ ἐμάχεσατο.

‘So cowardly that he did not fight.’

(Stating an actual fact.)

237. (v.) The **negative of an infinitive verb** in Greek is *μή*, unless the infinitive is simply due to *Oratio Obliqua*, representing a statement with negative *οὐ* in *Oratio Recta*, in which case the *οὐ* is retained, though there are some exceptions to this rule, which are mentioned below. In Latin the negative of the infinitive is *non*.

The infinitive in Greek is negated by *μή*: (i.) because it expresses action in an **abstract** or **general** way, and not any particular or definite action—this refers especially to the infinitive with the article; and (ii.) because after verbs of **wishing, commanding**, etc., it represents a subjunctive, optative, or imperative mood, whose negative would be *μή* in the *Oratio Recta*. Thus *ἐβούλοντο μή ποεῖν* implies an *Oratio Recta* *μή ποιῶμεν*; *ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς μή ποεῖν* implies an *Oratio Recta* *μή ποεῖτε*.

238. Verbs of **swearing, promising, hoping, agreeing, persuading**, and **testifying** are regularly followed by an infinitive negated by *μή*. In many cases this may be explained on the ground that the verb in the implied *Oratio Recta* would be in the **subjunctive, optative, or imperative** mood, and negated by *μή*. Thus *ὁμολογοῦσι μή ποεῖν* implies the *Oratio Recta* *μή ποιῶμεν*; or the use of *μή* may express an idea beyond mere denial, as, for example, **protestation**. (See § 233.) But even verbs of **saying** are occasionally followed by an infinitive with *μή*, possibly because the use of *μή* with the infinitive was so fully established in most other uses; *e.g.*:—

Τὸ μή βλέπειν εἰοίμα. (Soph. *El.* 1079.)

‘Ready to cease to see the light.’

Τοῦ μή τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν. (Dem. xviii. 107.)

‘In order not to perform their duties.’

Διεκώλυνσε μή διαφθεῖραι. (Thuc. iii. 49.)

‘He prevented them from destroying.’

Ὡμνυε μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι. (Dem. xxi. 119.)

‘He swore he had said nothing.’

Πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων. (Plat. *Apol.* 37A.)

‘I am convinced that I wrong no man.’

Προὔλεγον μή ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον. (Thuc. i. 139.)

‘They proclaimed that war would not be waged.’

In this sentence from Thucydides (i. 118) the use of *μή* is only explicable on the ground that it appears to be the negative of an articular infinitive, though really the article has no connection with the infinitive:—

*Οντες καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μή ταχεῖς ἵεναι, κ.τ.λ.

‘Having been even previously not quick at going,’ etc.

239. (vi.) Substantives, adjectives, participles, and adjectival phrases with the article are negated by οὐ if the reference is to particular and definite persons or things, by μή if the reference is general and indefinite, or generic.

Here, as always, οὐ is used when a simple objective fact is stated, with reference to particular persons or things; *μή* where the reference is indefinite, or if a single person or thing is referred to, when that person or thing is regarded as one of a class, or as a type; *e.g.*:—

Τοὺς οὐδένα βουλομένους τοιοῦτον εἶναι. (Dem. xix. 228.)

‘Those who do not wish that any such man should exist.’

Demosthenes is here referring to a definite party; the Latin would be *qui nolunt*, while τοὺς μή βουλομένους would be *qui nolint* (generic subj.).

Τῷ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ συνειδῶτι δεινὸν εἰσῆει. (Dem. xix. 33.)

‘It struck as monstrous the man who had no consciousness of crime.’

Here the man is regarded as a type of a class; Latin, *qui sibi non esset conscius*.

*Ἐγὼ μολῶν, ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπαυσά νιν.

(Soph. O.T. 397.)

‘I, Oedipus the ignorant, came and ended her.’

ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς = ὅς μηδὲν οἶδα, ‘who am of such a kind that I know nothing’; Latin, *qui nihil sciam*.

*Οτ’ οὐδὲν ὦν τοῦ μηδὲν ἀντέστης ὑπέρ. (Soph. Ai. 1231.)

‘When thou nobody didst champion him who is as naught.’

οὐδέν = nothing in fact, objective nothing; *μηδέν* = nothing in conception, subjective nothing; ὁ *μηδέν ὦν* = ‘he who is as naught,’ *i.e.* ‘a dead man.’

Τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν τότε δι' αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν. (Thuc. i. 137.)
 'The fact of the non-destruction of the bridge.'

Here the objective fact is insisted upon; and also the οὐ adheres closely to διάλυσιν, as we say 'non-destruction.' The idea might have been expressed by the infinitive, and then the negative would have been μή; τὸ μὴ διαλυθῆναι τὰς γεφύρας; for the infinitive expresses action in an abstract form, the conception, not the fact, of the action.

240. (vii.) In **negative questions** οὐ shows that an **affirmative**, μή that a **negative, answer** is expected.

These usages may be explained as follows. A statement negated by οὐ is positively denied; but the interrogative tone is equivalent to a negative, and this, added to the negative οὐ, cancels it. The two negatives make an affirmative, and so the answer 'yes' is demanded. A statement negated by μή expresses an apprehension (see above, § 233); again the interrogative tone denies this apprehension, and so the answer 'no' is demanded.

Οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει means 'this is not so';

Οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει; means 'surely it is not the case that this is not so?' **ANSWER**, 'it is so.'

μὴ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει means 'perhaps this is so.'

μὴ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει; means 'surely it is not the case that this perhaps is so?' **ANSWER**, 'it is not so.'

In Latin *nonne*? corresponds to οὐ; *num*? to μή; ἀρα is frequently prefixed both to οὐ and μή.

EXAMPLES.

Σὺ δ' οὐχὶ πείσεις καὶ συναινέσεις ἐμοί; (Soph. *El.* 402.)

'Wilt thou not hearken and agree with me?'

Ἄρα μὴ δοκεῖς

λυτήρι αὐτῇ ταῦτα τοῦ φόνου φέρειν; (*Ibid.* 445.)

'Surely thou dost not think that thou art bearing them for her as atonements for the murder?'

Οὐ σίγ' ἀνέξει; μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀρεῖ; (Soph. *Ai.* 75.)

'Wilt thou not be silent? and thou wilt not put on cowardice?'

241. This line, and others like it, are punctuated as above, and explained as separate questions, by Goodwin (*M. & T.*

Appendix II.). Here 'You will be silent, won't you? you won't be cowardly, will you?' The οὐ is not carried on to the μή of the second clause to make an οὐ μή construction. But Professor Jebb (Appendix to his 1896 edition of the *Ajax*, p. 213-217) objects to this explanation on the following grounds:—

(i.) That the prohibition is introduced by μηδέ, or, in other places, καὶ μή, which necessitates the carrying on of the force of the οὐ, as in such sentences as

Οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα μὴδ' ἄψει πέπλων (Eur. *Hipp.* 606),
'Thou shalt not bring near thy hand nor touch my robes,'

where Goodwin allows that the force of οὐ is continued. Had the second clause been an independent question, μή alone ought to have introduced it.

(ii.) That in such sentences as

Οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί; (Ar. *Nub.* 505),
'Will you not cease to prate, and follow me?'

the force of the οὐ must be continued to the second clause, to make the command sufficiently urgent; for though ἀκολουθήσεις, the simple future, can express a command, it is not nearly so forcible as οὐκ ἀκολουθήσεις, the future in a negative question.

(iii.) That in the sentence

Οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ' ἰών,
μὴδ' ἐξομόρξει μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί; (Eur. *Bacch.* 343, 4),
'Wilt thou not keep off thy hand, and go and revel, and refrain from wiping off thy madness on me,'

it is impossible to continue the force of the οὐ to the μὴδ' ἐξομόρξει, and not attach it to the βακχεύσεις, which is Goodwin's view.

242. Professor Jebb's own view is that the idiom was developed as follows:—

(i.) Interrogative οὐ with future indicative expressed a peremptory command, οὐ σίγ' ἀνέξει;

(ii.) When a negative command was linked with this positive command, the negative force of the prohibiting

verb was marked by the prefixing of $\mu\acute{\eta}$, and so we have such a sentence as $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \text{σ}\acute{\iota}\gamma' \text{ἀνέξ}\epsilon\iota \mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon} \text{δειλ}\acute{\iota}\alpha\upsilon \text{ἀρ}\epsilon\acute{\iota}$;

According to him, then, the basis of the construction is interrogative $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}$ with the future indicative; the $\mu\acute{\eta}$ merely negatives the word to which it is prefixed. He would similarly explain all cases of $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta}$ with future indicative expressing prohibition, while not disputing Goodwin's theory of $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta}$ with the future indicative in negative statements, for which see the following sections.

THE GREEK NEGATIVES IN COMBINATION

243. $\text{O}\acute{\upsilon}$ and $\mu\acute{\eta}$ are frequently found together in the combinations $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta}$ and $\mu\acute{\eta} \text{o}\acute{\upsilon}$. The uses of these combinations, which are entirely different, must be considered separately.

244. (i.) $\text{O}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta}$. $\text{O}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta}$ is found in two constructions—(a) with the **future indicative**; (β) with the **subjunctive, aorist or present**, the latter rarely. By these constructions a strong **prohibition or negation** is expressed; and formerly it was stated that the sense of prohibition was confined to the future indicative, that of negation to the subjunctive. But this will not hold, as the sense of negation is found with the future indicative; *e.g.* :—

$\text{O}\acute{\upsilon} \text{σο}\iota \mu\acute{\eta} \text{μεθ}\acute{\epsilon}\psi\omicron\mu\acute{\alpha}\iota \text{ποτε}$ (Soph. *El.* 1052),
'Never will I follow thee,'

and the sense of prohibition with the subjunctive; *e.g.* :—

$\text{O}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta} \text{σκ}\acute{\omega}\psi\eta\varsigma \mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon} \text{πο}\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta\varsigma$, κ.τ.λ. (Arist. *Nub.* 296),
'You must not jest nor do,' etc.

The fact is that either sense may be expressed by either construction. Regarding this as proved, we must attempt to find an explanation of the double negative. Elmsley explained the futures as interrogative— $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta} \text{καταβ}\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota$; = 'will you not not-come down?' *i.e.* 'do not come down'—but they cannot all be made interrogative, though Professor Jebb's explanation may hold for those which can be so treated (see §§ 241, 242). Again, the old explanation of the subjunctive construction was to suppose an ellipse of a verb of fearing, *e.g.* $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \mu\acute{\eta} \text{ληφ}\theta\acute{\omega}$ = $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \text{δέος ἔστ}\acute{\iota} \mu\acute{\eta} \text{ληφ}\theta\acute{\omega}$.

But this is explaining a simple sentence by a complex sentence, and all such explanations are opposed to the facts of the development of constructions; for as in such a final sentence as ἀπειμι ἵνα μὴ ληφθῶ the independent negative hortatory command μὴ ληφθῶ is prior to the compound sentence of purpose, so in the sentence of fearing—δέος ἐστὶ μὴ ληφθῶ—the μὴ ληφθῶ must be considered to be prior, as an independent statement of apprehension (no doubt closely akin to the negative command), to the compound sentence expressing fear.

245. The most satisfactory explanation of the construction is this. We have frequent examples of an independent subjunctive with μή in Homer expressing apprehension; the use is also found in Euripides, Herodotus, Aristophanes, and Xenophon, and is common in Plato, though in the last author its sense is modified to express a cautious assertion (but the difference is very slight, and chiefly dependent on the speaker's tone). We may then assert that μὴ λάβωσί σε (Eur. Or. 776) means 'I fear,' or, 'perhaps they may seize you.' The prefixing of οὐ negatives this 'I fear,' or 'perhaps'; and so οὐ μὴ λάβωσί σε would mean, 'I have no fear, there is no perhaps, about their seizing you,' i.e. a strong negation. And as a strong negation uttered in a certain tone is a strong prohibition (e.g. in English, 'Thou shalt not kill'), this οὐ μὴ construction with the subjunctive could also express prohibitions. The use of the future indicative in place of the subjunctive in Attic Greek may be accounted for by the partiality of Attic for that tense, and the fact that the origin of the construction was probably forgotten, and the οὐ μὴ felt merely as an emphatic negative. This future construction too naturally expressed both prohibition and negation, according to the tone of the speaker. The following examples, in which the future indicative with οὐ μὴ is turned into *Oratio Obliqua*, are noticeable as showing that the origin of the construction was forgotten, and with what freedom it was used:—

Τά τ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἐθέσπιωεν
καὶ τὰπὶ Τροίας πέργαμ' ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτε
πέρσοιεν, κ.τ.λ. (Soph. Ph. 611.)

'He gave all the other prophecies, and that they could never take Troy's citadel,' etc.

Εἶπε Τειρεσίας οὐ μή ποτε
 σοῦ τήνδε γῆν οἰκοῦντος εὖ πράξειν πόλιν.

(Eur. *Phoen.* 1590.)

‘Teiresias said that never, whilst thou dwelt in this land,
 could our city fare well.’

In the Latin comic poets *neque* and *haud* are occasionally combined to form one negative, probably in translating οὐδὲ μή in a Greek original; e.g. :—

Neque tu haud dices tibi non praedictum.

(Ter. *Andr.* 205.)

‘And you shall not say you were not forewarned.’

In Greek : οὐδέ σὺ μὴ ἐρεῖς, κ.τ.λ.

246. This account of οὐ μή is mostly taken from Goodwin (*Moods and Tenses*, p. 389 *sqq.*). Perhaps its weakest point is its explanation of the transference of the use to the future indicative. The suggestion may be offered that originally μή could be used with any tense of the indicative, as well as of the subjunctive, to express apprehension in principal sentences: certainly this is the case in subordinate sentences after verbs of fearing, for φοβοῦμαι μὴ ποεῖ, μὴ ἐποεῖ, μὴ ἐπόησε, μὴ πεπόηκε, and μὴ ποιήσει are all found; and, if the theory is right that compound sentences imply the prior existence of both parts as independent sentences, then μὴ ποεῖ, μὴ ἐποεῖ, μὴ ἐπόησε, μὴ πεπόηκε, and μὴ ποιήσει all had an earlier use as independent expressions of apprehension. In that case οὐ μὴ ποιήσει is equally as natural as οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ; the absence of expressions such as οὐ μὴ ποεῖ may be due to the fact that it is mainly with the future that these emphatic negations are concerned. There is a further possibility that all these uses of μή are originally interrogative; for (as Mr. E. R. Wharton points out, *Classical Review*, vol. x. p. 239) *mā* in Sanskrit is always followed by an enclitic verb, which shows that the sentence was originally interrogative; if μή is in origin only an interrogative particle, naturally it could be used with any tense of any mood. But a question implies an apprehension; and we return to the same account, that in οὐ μὴ sentences οὐ negatives an apprehension. It is also objected to Goodwin's theory that the independent subjunctive in

Homer always expresses prohibition, and not apprehension; one answer to this is (cp. § 244) that the subjunctive of apprehension with verbs of fearing implies an original independent subjunctive of apprehension; another is that the expression of prohibition naturally runs into that of apprehension; such an exclamation as 'don't let him hurt me,' uttered in a tone of alarm, expresses fear much more than prohibition: so in Homer, *Il.* xxii. 123 (for example) μή μιν ἐγὼ μὲν ἴκωμαι ἰών, ὃ δέ μ' οὐκ ἐλέησει, the correct translation appears to be 'I fear I may go and come to him, but he will not pity me,' rather than, 'let me not go'; and such a sentence cannot be treated as simply prohibitory.

In any case the theory of Professor Goodwin is undoubtedly the most satisfactory one which has been proposed. It would be too lengthy a business, and beyond the scope of this work, to examine all the criticisms to which it has been submitted, or alternative proposals which have not won any authority.

247. (ii.) Μὴ οὐ. Μὴ οὐ may be used with **indicative, subjunctive, optative, infinitive, and participle**, and even with **nouns**; but it has two main uses, under which all these can be classified; (α) in clauses expressing **apprehension, cautious assertion, and purpose** (rare); (β) negating a word (usually an infinitive or participle) in a dependent clause, where the **verb of the principal clause is negative, or quasi-negative**.

248. (α) Μὴ οὐ **negating clauses of apprehension**, etc. In this use the οὐ simply negatives the verb,* *μή* the whole sentence: so *μή* ἔλθῃ = '(I fear) lest he may come'; *μή* οὐ ἔλθῃ, '(I fear) lest he may not come.'

EXAMPLES.

Ἀλλὰ μή τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὁμολογήσαμεν. (*Plat. Men.* 89c.)
'But perhaps we have improperly conceded this.'

Ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιείθεο μὴ
μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμωσιν ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ.
(*Il.* i. 565.)

'But hearken to my word, lest all the gods that are in Olympus avail thee not.'

* *Note.*—Οὐ may negative some other word than the verb, as in the first and third examples, but most often it negatives the verb.

Δέδοικα μὴ οὐδ' ὅστιον ᾗ ἀπαγορεύειν. (Plat. Rep. 368B.)
 'I fear that it is even impious to refuse.'

Once or twice μὴ . . . μὴ is equivalent to μὴ οὐ, when the two particles are far apart; e.g.:—

Ῑποτοπήσας μὴ . . . παραλίπη καὶ μὴ δηώσῃ. (Thuc. ii. 13.)
 'Suspecting that . . . he would pass by and not pillage.'
 μὴ οὐ in this use = Latin *ne non*.

249. (β) Μὴ οὐ negating a word in a **dependent clause**, after a **negative principal verb**. In this case μὴ οὐ is used when μὴ alone would have been used after an affirmative principal verb. Here the doubling of the negative **appears** simply to enforce the negative character of the whole sentence. The οὐ never can be translated, nor after verbs of hindrance either the μὴ or the οὐ, in the English idiom. But the μὴ and οὐ both have their full force, which can be seen by a literal rendering of the infinitive; for κωλύω σε μὴ ποεῖν = 'I hinder your doing,' i.e. literally, 'I stop you, so as not to do'—the infinitive expressing the indirect object (purpose* or result) of the principal verb's action. Οὐ κωλύω σε μὴ οὐ ποεῖν = 'I do not hinder you, so as not not to do,' i.e. 'the result is your doing.' With other verbs than those expressing hindrance, and with the participle and nouns, it is more difficult to express the force of the negatives; their use may be due to analogy.

EXAMPLES.

Οὐκ ἂν πιθοίμην μὴ οὐ τὰδ' ἐκμαθεῖν σαφῶς.

(Soph. O.T. 1065.)

'I will not hearken, so as not to learn this clearly.'

Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φίλον τῇ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν.

(Plat. Lys. 212B.)

'Accordingly nothing is loved by the lover except that which reciprocates his love.'

N.B.—Especially that words expressing a **negative idea** may be followed by an expression with μὴ οὐ; e.g.:—

Αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶ μὴ οὐχὶ φάναι. (Plat. Prot. 352D.)

'It is shameful not to say.'

Αἱ πόλεις χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν, μὴ οἱ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ.

(Dem. xix. 123.)

'The cities are hard to take, except by a long siege.'

DOUBLING OF NEGATIVES

250. Here we are to consider the doubling of similar negatives—οὐ with οὐδαμῶς, οὐδεῖς, κ.τ.λ.; and μή with μηδαμῶς, κ.τ.λ.; and so too with *non*, *ne quidem*, *non modo*, *neque*, but to a more limited extent.

251. In Greek the rule is simple—that when the **simple** negative οὐ or μή precedes, an additional **compound** negative (οὐδεῖς or μηδεῖς, κ.τ.λ.) emphasizes the negation; but when the **compound** negative precedes, an additional **simple** negative destroys the negation; and the two together express an affirmative.

EXAMPLES.

Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κρεῖσσον οἰκείου φίλου. (Eur. *And.* 986.)
 ‘There is nothing better than a friend of one’s blood.’

Ὅμνυμι μηδέποτε σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδένος μή.
 ἐπιδείξειν μήτ’ ἐξαγγελεῖν. (Plat. *Phaedr.* 236E.)

‘I swear that I will never show you or report to you another discourse of anyone’s.’

Οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκων τίσιν οὐκ ἀποτίσει.

(Orac. ap. *Hdt.* v. 56.)

‘No man will not pay atonement for his evil deeds.’

Οὐδεὶς τοῦτο οὐκ ἐρεῖ.

252. In Latin the general rule is that negatives cancel each other; *e.g.* :—

Nec hoc ille non vidit. (Cic. *Fin.* iv. 22.)

‘And he did not fail to see it.’

This is especially seen in the phrases *non nemo* (some one), *non nullus* (some, etc.), *nemo non*, *nullus non* (every one, etc.). The effect of the difference of position of the simple negative is to be noticed. But negatives may be doubled in Latin without destroying the negative effect when the first negative is general, followed by

(i.) *Ne quidem*, or *non modo*, negating some particular word or phrase; *e.g.* :—

Negat Epicurus se posse ne suspicari quidem.

(Cic. *Fin.* ii. 10.)

‘Epicurus says he cannot even suspect.’

(ii.) By several subordinate clauses, each with a negative ;
e.g. :—

Nemo umquam neque poeta neque orator fuit.

(Cic. *Att.* xiv. 20.)

‘No one ever lived, either poet or orator.’

Nihil non modo de fructu, sed ne de bonis quidem suis, reliqui fecit. (Cic. *Verr.* iii. 48.)

‘He left nothing, not only of his gains, but even of his property.’

(iii.) By another subordinate clause with *neque* or *nec* ;
e.g. :—

Nequeo satis mirari neque conicere. (Ter. *Eun.* 547.)

‘I cannot wonder enough or guess.’

253. There are a few examples in Plautus, probably imitated from the Greek (compare the use of *neque* . . . *haud* noticed above, § 245), in which the negatives do not destroy one another ; *e.g.* :—

Iura te non nociturum esse de hac re nemini.

(Pl. *Mil.* 1411.)

‘Swear you won’t harm anyone for this.’

THE NEGATIVE CONJUNCTIONS

254. In Greek there are two negative conjunctions for each simple negative ; οὐδέ and οὔτε corresponding to οὐ, μηδέ and μήτε to μή.

255. Οὐδέ and μηδέ have two regular uses :—

(i.) Meaning ‘nor,’ ‘and not’ ; in prose only after a preceding οὐ or μή ; after an affirmative ‘and not’ is translated by καὶ οὐ, καὶ μή in prose ; *e.g.* :—

Ὑμῖν δὲ τοιοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν οὐκ ἦν μηδὲ γένοιτο. (Dem. xviii.)

‘You have had nothing of this kind, and may you not have.’

Τραχὺς μόναρχος, οὐδ’ ὑπεύθυνος. (Aesch. *P. V.* 243.)

‘A stern ruler, and not subject to control.’

(ii.) Meaning ‘not even’ ; when used without a preceding negative, or ‘nor yet,’ after a preceding οὔτε or μήτε ; when

οὐδέ . . . οὐδέ, μηδέ . . . μηδέ are used in pairs, the first οὐδέ or μηδέ means 'not even'; e.g. :—

Τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲ διελέγετο. (*Lys.* 99. 11.)

'He did not even speak to him.'

Μῆτε παιδεία μῆτε δικαστήρια μῆτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη
μηδεμία. (*Plat. Prot.* 327D.)

'Neither education, nor law courts, nor laws, nor yet any kind of constraint.'

Οὐδὲ ἡ ἐπιτείχισις οὐδὲ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι.

(*Thuc.* i. 142.)

'Not even their building forts, nor their navy, merits our fear.'

256. Οὔτε and μήτε must always in prose be followed by another οὔτε or μήτε, or by τε; οὔτε . . . οὔτε, μήτε . . . μήτε = neither . . . nor; οὔτε or μήτε . . . τε = both not, and; e.g. :—

Οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε τοὺς στρατιωτάς.

'He did not win over either the generals or the soldiers.'

Οὔτ' ἂν δυναίμην μήτ' ἐπισταίμην λέγειν. (*Soph. Ant.* 686.)

'I neither could say, nor may I ever know how to say.'

257. The Latin negative conjunction *neque* or *nec* is found both after a preceding *non*, or another *neque* or *nec*, or after an affirmative sentence; examples are numerous. *Nec* occasionally means 'not even' = *ne* . . . *quidem*, and = οὐδέ in Greek; e.g. :—

Tu voluptatem summum bonum putas; ego nec bonum.

(*Senec. Dial.* vii. 10.)

'You consider pleasure the highest good; I, not even a good.'

258. *Various noticeable uses of the Negatives in both Greek and Latin.*

(a) **Redundant Negative.** In Greek a negative which cannot be translated in English is found in *Oratio Obliqua* clauses with ὥς or ὅτι after verbs of **denying**, **doubting**, and **disputing**; and also in the **second member of a comparative**

clause, when the first member is negative. This negative is οὐ; *e.g.* :—

Ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀληθὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν οὐχ ἔξετε ἀντιλέγειν.
(Dem. 97. 20.)

'You will not be able to deny that this is true.'

Ἦκει δ' ὁ Πέρσης οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἡμέας ἢ οὐ καὶ ἐπ' ὑμέας. (Hdt. iv. 118.)

'The Persian has come no more against us than against you.'

Μὴ is also found pleonastically in some clauses with a strong negative idea, simply adding to the negative notion; *e.g.* :—

Ἦν τι παρὰ τὸ μὴ οἶσθαι χρῆναι . . . ἐλασσωθῶσι.
(Thuc. i. 77.)

'If they are reduced contrary to their ideas of right.'

259. In all these cases the negative force existing in the first clause or the preposition (*e.g.* παρὰ = 'contrary to' in the last example) is simply strengthened by the added negative. The fact is that had the second clause been stated by itself it would have needed a negative, and this negative is retained when the clause becomes dependent. For example, in the first instance Demosthenes says that what cannot be said by his opponents is, 'These things are not true'; and taken separately, the second clause in the second instance is, 'the Persian is not coming against you'; in the third the idea is, 'what they think is not right.' Such an added negative is found in the English provincial 'nor' (= than), and in the extra negative in French and Italian in certain comparative sentences, as *il est plus grand que je ne suis*.

260. (b) In Greek οὐχ ὅπως, οὐχ ὅτι, μὴ ὅπως, μὴ ὅτι, and in Latin *non solum, non modo*, frequently translate the English 'not only not' with an apparent ellipse of one negative. In the Greek phrases the explanation is that a **verb is omitted**, such as λέγω (pres. ind.) with οὐχ ὅπως, λέγε, λέγω (pres. subj.), or λέγειν with μὴ ὅτι—the expression meaning, 'I do not say that,' 'not to say that.' In Latin *non modo, non solum* are used as if an additional

negative were present when the predicate or other word is common to both the clauses. Possibly here too a word of saying is understood. *E.g.* :—

Τῶνδε οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . .
περιόψεσθε. (Thuc. i. 35.)

‘You will not only not prevent these things, but even suffer them to be.’

Regnat Romae advena, non modo vicinae, sed ne Italicae quidem stirpis. (Liv. i. 40.)

‘A foreigner is king at Rome, not only not of a neighbouring race, but not even of Italian race.’

261. (c) In answers to questions, *μηδαμῶς*, *μὴ γάρ*, *μὴ ἀλλά* are sometimes found in place of *οὐδαμῶς*. In such cases a **subjunctive** or **optative** verb expressing a **negative command** or **wish**, not a negative assertion, must be understood; *e.g.* :—

Οὗτός σου, ποῖ θεῖς; ἐπὶ καδίσκου; ANSWER, *μηδαμῶς*.
(Arist. *Vesp.* 854.)

‘You there, where are you running? to the voting-urns?’
‘Don’t think so.’

Μὴ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα. ANSWER, *μὴ γάρ*.
(Plat. *Theat.* 177E.)

‘Let not the name be mentioned.’ ‘Let it not.’

Σὲ δὲ ταῦτ’ ἀρέσκει; ANSWER, *μᾶλλον ἢ μαίνομαι*.
(Arist. *Ran.* 103.)

‘Does this please you?’ ‘Not “please”; I’m more than mad at it.’

(*μᾶλλον* = *μὴ ἀλλά* is elliptical for *μὴ τοῦτο λέγε, ἀλλὰ ὅτι*).

262. (d) In Latin *nēdum* (literally, ‘provided that not’) means ‘much less,’ with the second of two clauses; ‘the prevention of the second and greater event being rhetorically supposed to be the purpose of the first.’ (*Roby*, § 1658.)

Vix in ipsis tectis frigus vitatur; nēdum in mari sit facile abesse ab iniuria temporis. (Cic. *Fam.* xvi. 8.)

‘The cold is with difficulty avoided even in houses; much less would it be easy at sea to escape harm from the weather.’

In Post-Augustan Latin *nedum* also means 'much more'; here it seems to equal $\mu\eta\ \delta\tau\iota$ (a verb of saying being understood) = 'not to mention.'

Adulationes etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedum victoribus. (Liv. ix. 18.)

'Flattery was distasteful to the Macedonians in defeat, much more to them in victory.'

USE OF $\alpha\upsilon$ AND $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$

263. The use of the particles $\alpha\upsilon$ and $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ ($\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is not found in Attic, but in Homer it occurs 621 times to $\alpha\upsilon$ 155 times, and it is frequent in the elegiac, lyric, and later epic poets) has necessarily been considered to some extent in dealing with the different forms of construction; but it will be well to give it a separate consideration, with a discussion of the meaning of the two particles, and a classification of their various usages.

264. **Meaning of $\alpha\upsilon$ and $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$.** In practice scarcely any difference of meaning can be detected between $\alpha\upsilon$ and $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$; so that it will be best first to state the meaning which belongs to both of them, and then to consider any difference between them that can be distinguished.

265. It is in Homer that we best see the force of $\alpha\upsilon$ and $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$, by contrasting similar sentences with or without these particles. By so doing we find that sentences with a **general** reference, whether of purpose, condition (protasis), possibility, indefinite relative sentences, and similes almost invariably have neither $\alpha\upsilon$ nor $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$, while the use of $\alpha\upsilon$ or $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ implies limitation to **particular** instances or occasions. It follows that the meaning of $\alpha\upsilon$ and $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is 'then, in that case.' The same meaning of $\alpha\upsilon$ is retained in the apodosis of conditional sentences in Attic, and in those final sentences in which $\alpha\upsilon$ is found; but it disappears in other sentences. The fact is, that the distinction between general and particular conditions, etc., was found cumbrous, and dropped.

266. As to the difference of meaning between $\alpha\upsilon$ and $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ we may notice these points:—

(i.) $\alpha\upsilon$ is more common than $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ in **negative** clauses.

(ii.) ἄν is especially used in the **second** of two parallel clauses; *e.g.*:—

Ὅς μὲν ἀπηνῆς αὐτὸς ἔη καὶ ἀπηνέα εἰδῆ, —

ὃς δ' ἄν ἀμύμων αὐτὸς ἔη, κ.τ.λ. (*Od.* xix. 329.)

‘Whoever is froward himself, and of froward heart; but whoever is noble,’ etc.

(iii.) ἄν is accented, κέν (κέ) is enclitic.

We may conclude from these points that ἄν is (1) **more emphatic**; (2) used in an **adversative** sense: κέν = ‘*in that case*,’ ἄν ‘*in that case rather, then indeed*.’ This meaning is especially implied by the preference for ἄν in negative clauses, which necessarily suggest their opposite; *e.g.* οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμῃ κίθαρις, ‘then (*i.e.* in battle) the lyre will not help you, whatever it may do elsewhere.’

[**Note.**—Ἄν is probably to be identified with the Latin *an*, which is used by the older poets with the **second member** of a **disjunctive** question; *e.g.* *Egone an ille inurie facimus?* (*Naevius*). In single questions the use of *an* implies that it is put as an alternative; *e.g.* *Credam istuc, si te hilarem videro?* **ANSWER**, *An tu me tristem putas?* ‘Do you then think me sad (*i.e.* and not cheerful)?’ Κέν probably is the same as the Sanskrit *kam*, but its meaning is unknown.]

(This account of ἄν and κέν is taken from *Monro, Homeric Grammar*, §§ 362–365.)

267. Uses of ἄν in Attic Greek. The uses of ἄν in Attic Greek (differences of Homeric usage will be considered in later sections) fall into two main heads, as follows:—

(1) In **potential** sentences, with the optative, historic tenses of the indicative, and the infinitive or participle in *Oratio Obliqua* of such sentences; or with the participle, when equivalent to such a potential sentence with a relative.

(2) In **indefinite relative**, **temporal**, and **conditional** sentences, and also in **final** sentences with ὥς and ὅπως with the subjunctive.

268. [N.B.—Ἄν cannot stand with the **primary** tenses of the indicative—present, perfect, and future—nor with the **future optative** and **infinitive**,* which are nearly always

* *Note.*—Nor with the future participle.

merely oblique forms of the future indicative, nor with the **imperative** mood. Ἄν sometimes appears to stand with a primary tense of the indicative in sentences like δοκεῖ δ' ἄν μοι τοῦτο γενέσθαι; but it really goes with the infinitive (ἄν γενέσθαι = ὅτι τοῦτ' ἄν γένοιτο), and is thrown forward merely to mark the potential character of the statement. Other exceptions to this rule occur in the manuscripts; but recent critics have emended the passages by omitting ἄν, or changing a future to a first aorist form; e.g.:—

Νομίζοντες ῥαδίως ἄν σφίσι τὰλλα προσχωρήσειν.

(Thuc. ii. 80.)

‘Thinking that the rest of the country would easily be brought over to them.’

Omit ἄν, or read προσχωρήσαι.

Οὐκ ἦκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἄν ἦξει δεῦρο. (Plat. Rep. 615D.)

‘He has not come, he said, nor will he come hither.’

Here, according to Goodwin (*M. & T.* 197), ‘the colloquial style makes ἄν less objectionable’; rather it may be suggested to read ἀνήξει, ‘he will return.’ To omit it would spoil the rhythm of the sentence.

Τοὺς ὅτιοῦν ἄν ἐκείνῳ ποιήσοντας. (Dem. xix. 342.)

‘Those who would do anything for him.’

(Possibly ὅτιοῦν, which is frequent with ἄν in indefinite relative sentences, accounts for its use here; or ποιήσαντας may be read.)

269. (1) Ἄν with potential sentences. Ἄν here restricts the expression of possibility to circumstances either definitely expressed in a conditional protasis or understood. Instances of the ordinary use with historic indicative tenses, optative, and infinitive or participle in indirect discourse need not be quoted; but its use with the participle equalling a relative clause with ἄν should be marked; e.g.:—

Οὗτ' ὄντ' οὗτ' ἄν γινόμενα λογοποιούσι. (Thuc. vi. 38.)

‘They tell tales of things which are not, and never could be.’

ἄν γινόμενα = ἃ ἄν γένοιτο.

270. N.B.—(α) The doubling or trebling of *άν* when it qualifies the same verb. It is due to a desire to emphasize the potentiality of the whole of a long sentence, or to emphasize particular words with which *άν* is joined; e.g. :—

Οὐ τὰν ἐλόντες αὖθις ἀνθαλοῖεν ἄν. (Aesch. Ag. 340.)

‘Verily having taken not again could they be taken in return.’

Ἄλλους γ’ ἄν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἄν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν. (Thuc. i. 76.)

‘We believe that if another state obtained our empire they would be the best proof of our moderation.’

(β) The elliptic use of *άν*. It shows that a potential optative or indicative is understood. It is most frequent with *κάν* (= καὶ ἄν) and *ὥσπεράνει*; e.g. :—

Ἰκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν;
(Plat. Rep. 477A.)

‘Are we sufficiently assured of this, and (should we be, ἄν implying ἔχομεν) if we were to look at it from more points of view?’

Οἱ δ’ οἰκέται ῥέγκουσιν· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄν πρὸ τοῦ.
(Aristoph. Nub. 5.)

‘My servants are snoring; they would not have done so previously.’

(γ) In some sentences with *ὥς* and *ὅπως* the optative with *άν*, though apparently final, is purely potential, and the *ὥς* or *ὅπως* is relative = ‘in the way in which’; e.g. :—

Ὡς μὲν ἄν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκευάσθε. (Dem. vi. 3.)

‘You are better prepared than Philip for urging a just plea.’

Τὰς πρίρας κατεβύρσωσαν, ὅπως ἄν ἀπολισθάνοι ἡ χεὶρ.
(Thuc. vii. 65.)

‘They covered the bows with leather, so that the grappling-iron could slip off.’

271. (2) Ἄν with the subjunctive.

(i.) In relative, temporal, conditional sentences. Ἄν is only found in dependent sentences with the subjunctive

in Attic. Originally its use limited the application of the verb to **particular** conditions, but this force was lost, and indeed it appears rather to add indefiniteness in the ordinary Attic use. There are no noticeable variations of usage except

(a) **Omission** of *ἄν* (rare in prose); *e.g.* :—

Ὅτ' μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι, μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι.

(Thuc. iv. 21.)

'Where brief speeches suffice, not to use long ones.'

(Probably a quotation from a poet.)

Γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον, ὃς νέος πέσῃ. (Soph. *O.C.* 395).

'It is an evil thing to raise up an aged man, who has fallen in his youth.'

(β) **Retention** of *ἄν* with the optative, as the indirect form of the indefinite subjunctive. This use may be simply due to carelessness; *e.g.* :—

"Εως ἄν σκέψαιο. (Plat. *Phaed.* 101D.)

'Until you consider.'

Ἐπειδὴν ἀνὴρ γενοίμην. (Dem. 865. 23.)

'When I became a man.'

272. (ii.) In **final clauses**, with *ὥς* and *ὅπως* (*ὥς ἄν* poetical). Here *ἄν* seems to have its proper force, limiting the purpose to **particular** circumstances expressed or understood in the context; or the final sense may be derived from an original indefinite relative clause; *e.g.* :—

Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν δίδασχ', ὅπως ἄν ἐκμάθω. (Soph. *O.C.* 575.)

'Now tell me this very thing, that I may learn it fully.'

Here 'that I may learn' may = 'in whatever way I may learn.'

VARIETIES OF HOMERIC USAGE

273. To discuss fully the variations of Homeric from Attic usage would need far more space than can be given here, but a short summary of the more obvious and important differences may be of use. One caution is perhaps necessary—that the Attic usage is not to be regarded as the rule, and the Homeric as an irregularity. The real state of

the case is that in Homer—and in other epic and lyric poetry generally, which, being of later date, largely imitates Homeric usage—the language is in an earlier stage; constructions show a greater variety and flexibility. There are many constructions with slight, though definite, shades of meaning which are represented in Attic by fewer constructions or even a single one; in fact, in the development of the language we can see the principle of the ‘survival of the fittest’ constructions at work. From a grammatical point of view the study of Homeric constructions is most valuable as indicating to us an earlier and more original meaning of forms, especially with regard to the moods and the adverbial particles used in the connection of sentences—such as *εἰ, ὅφρα, ὥς, ὅπως, ἵνα*—which frequently are seen to retain their original force as relative or demonstrative adverbs; in fact, we can trace in Homeric constructions the beginning of the compound sentence. The natural construction in Homer is **co-ordinate** or **paratactic**, and it may really exist in many sentences which we naturally regard as **subordinated** or **hypotactic**; for example, in relative and final sentences particularly. With regard to final sentences, this has been indicated in the chapter dealing with that construction (see § 147).

We will now rapidly note the main varieties of construction in Homer, following the same heads of classification of sentences as before.

274. I. The original meaning of the **subjunctive** and **optative** moods is probably shown by the Homeric use of these moods to express future **contingencies**, more or less remote. (See § 109.)

275. The **subjunctive** is found in **principal** clauses in the following slightly varying uses:—

(i.) When it is used in the **first person** it expresses a future intention of the speaker; *ἄν* or *κέν* is used when that intention is limited by any condition expressed or implied; *e.g.*:—

Δύσομαι εἰς Ἀΐδαο καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φαείνω. (*Od.* xii. 383.)

‘I will go down to Hades, and shine among the dead.’

Δύσεο τεύχεα θάσσον, ἐγὼ δέ κε λαὸν ἀγείρω (*Il.* xvi. 129.)
 'Put on thine armour with speed, and then I will gather
 the host.'

(ii.) When the subjunctive is used in the **second** or **third person** it expresses a future contingency which is expected; ἄν or κέν is always found, except in the phrase καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπησι; *e.g.*:—

Τῶν κέν τις τόδ' ἔχῃσιν. (*Od.* i. 396.)
 'One of them shall have this.'

(iii.) In **negative clauses** the subjunctive denies a future contingency, **generally**, if it is pure; under definite conditions, if with ἄν or κέν; *e.g.*:—

Οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἶδον ἀνέρας, οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι. (*Il.* i. 262.)
 'Never saw I such men, nor ever shall I see.'

Οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμῃ κίθαρις. (*Il.* iii. 54.)
 'Then thy lyre shall not avail thee.'

276. The **optative** is used to express a remote future contingency without ἄν or κέν:—

(i.) In **affirmative sentences**, only in *Od.* iii. 231:—

Ρεῖα θεός γ' ἐθέλων καὶ τηλόθεν ἄνδρα σαώσαι.
 'Lightly can a god at his will save a man even from afar.'

(ii.) In **negative sentences** not infrequently; *e.g.*:—

Οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι. (*Il.* xix. 321.)
 'Naught worse can I suffer.'

These optatives express possibilities which are not limited by any conditions, expressed or understood. With ἄν or κέν the expression of possibility is limited by certain conditions. This use is, of course, common and regular in Attic.

277. II. Jussive Construction. With regard to the expression of commands (positive and negative), wishes, etc., the Homeric use is the same as the later use, with the following exceptions:—

(i.) An optative (without ἄν) is used to express a *mild command*; *e.g.*:—

Ταῦτ' εἰποῖς Ἀχιλλῆϊ. (*Il.* xi. 791.)
 'Thou mightest tell this to Achilles.'

Ἀλλά τις ὀτρηνῶς Δολίον καλέσειε γέροντα. (*Od.* iv. 735.)
 'But one might speedily summon the old man Dolios.'

(ii.) A similar optative is used to express **concession**; *e.g.*:—

Κτήματα δ' αὐτὸς ἔχοις καὶ δώμασι σοῖσι ἀνάσσοις.
 (*Od.* i. 402.)

'Thou mightest have thy possessions thyself, and rule thy house.'

(iii.) The infinitive is frequently used to express command or wish, even with a subject in the 2nd or 3rd person; *e.g.*:—

Ζεῦ ἄνα, ἧ Αἴαντα λαχεῖν ἢ Τυδέος υἱόν. (*Il.* vii. 179.)
 'King Zeus, may Aias win the lot, or Tydeus' son.'

(iv.) A **present optative** may express a **present unfulfilled wish**, and an **aorist optative** less frequently a **past unfulfilled wish**; *e.g.*:—

Νῦν μὲν μήτ' εἴης, βουγαίε, μήτε γένοιο. (*Od.* xviii. 79.)
 'Now would thou wert not, braggart, nor ever hadst been born.'

278. III. Final Construction. We have already noticed that in Homer a purposed or apprehended event may be expressed by an independent subjunctive. It must also be noted

(i.) That in Homeric sentences of purpose the subjunctive usually expresses the **speaker's own purpose**; *e.g.*:—

Ἀλλ' ἴθι, μή μ' ἐρέθιζε, σαώτερος ὥς κε νέηαι. (*Il.* i. 32.)
 'But go, provoke me not, that thou mayest return in safety.'

(ii.) That the subjunctive is **not used vividly** after a historic principal verb, unless that verb is a **gnomic aorist**, or the action expressed in the purpose is still **future** at the time of speaking; *e.g.*:—

Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον ἢ πρὶν ἐπῆεν
 ὄφρ' εὖ γιγνώσκῃς. (*Il.* v. 127.)
 'I have taken the mist from thine eyes, that was on them before, that thou mayest well discern.'

(iii.) That, on the other hand, the **optative** after a **primary** principal verb may express a **remote** or **uncertain** purpose; *e.g.*:—

Τόν ποτ' ἐγών, κ.τ.λ.

ἄξω τῇλ' Ἰθάκης, ἵνα μοι βίοντον πολὺν ἄλφοι.

(*Od.* xvii. 249.)

'Whom one day I will take far from Ithaca, that he may win me much substance.'

(iv.) That **final subjunctives** and **optatives** are freely used with **relative adjectives** and **adverbs**, as in Latin (see *ante*, § 158); *e.g.*:—

Μή τίς τοι τάχα Ἴρου ἀμείνων ἄλλος ἀναστῇ

ὅς τίς σ' . . . δώματος ἐκπέμψῃσι. (*Od.* xviii. 334.)

'Lest a better man than Iros speedily rise up against thee, to drive thee from the house.'

279. IV. Conditional Construction. In Homer the uses of conditional sentences follow the same general lines; but there is much greater variety, which is chiefly due to the use of *κέν* or *ἄν*. With regard to conditional sentences of Class I. (**indicative** without *ἄν* or *κέν* in both clauses) the use is the same, except that the negative of the protasis may be *οὐ*, which is probably the original use. (See *ante*, § 165.)

280. With regard to Class II. (Conditions Present or Past, the non-fulfilment of which is implied) Homer exhibits important variations; for

(i.) He regularly uses a **present optative** to express the **protasis** in a **present unfulfilled condition**, and also the **apodosis**, if it is present; whereas **imperfect indicatives** are only used in **past unfulfilled conditions**; *e.g.*:—

Εἰ μὲν νῦν ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ ἀεθλεύοιμεν Ἀχαιοί

ἦ τ' ἂν ἐγὼ τὰ πρῶτα λαβὼν κλισίῃνδε φεροίμην.

(*Il.* xxiii. 274.)

'If we Achaeans were holding games for another man, then would I have won the first prize, and borne it to my hut.'

But

Καί νύ κε δὴ ξιφέεσσ' αὐτοσχεδὼν οὐτάζοντο

εἰ μὴ κήρυκες . . . ἦλθον. (*Il.* vii. 273.)

'And now would they have thrust close with their swords, had not the heralds come.'

(ii.) He uses an **optative aorist** in the **apodosis** of a past **unfulfilled condition**. This shows that to him the optative tenses still expressed a true difference of time; *e.g.*:—

Καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιτο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυν νόησε Διὸς θυγατὴρ Ἀφροδίτη. (*Il.* v. 311.)
'And then would the king of men, Aeneas, have perished,
had not Zeus' daughter, Aphrodite, quickly seen.'

281. (iii.) With regard to **future nearer conditions** Homer uses the regular Attic form, but with εἰ κε, more often than εἰ ἄν or ἤν; but

(a) He also uses εἰ alone (not in general suppositions); *e.g.*:—

Εἴ περ γάρ σε κατακτάνη, οὐ σ' ἔτ' ἐγὼ γε
κλαύσομαι. (*Il.* xxii. 86.)
'If he slays thee, I shall not bewail thee.'

(b) He uses the **subjunctive** with **κέ** in the **apodosis**, as well as the **protasis**. Here the subjunctive has its original meaning, expressing a contingency, restricted by **κέ** to the particular condition stated; *e.g.*:—

Εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώῃσι, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι. (*Il.* i. 324.)
'If he gives her not, I shall take her myself.'

282. (iv.) With regard to **future remote conditions** Homer also uses **κέ** in the **protasis** with the **optative**, as well as in the **apodosis**, with no perceptible difference of meaning; *e.g.*:—

Εἰ δέ κεν Ἄργος ἰκοίμεθ' Ἀχαιικόν . . . γαμβρός κέν μοι ᾔοι.
(*Il.* ix. 141.)

'If we should come to Achaean Aegos, he would be my son-in-law.'

283. (v.) In **general suppositions** the subjunctive in Homer usually (14 of 19 times) is without **κέ** or **ἄν**; and the **optative**, which only occurs once, also is without **κε** or **ἄν**. This naturally is the case, as **κέ** and **ἄν** restrict to particular conditions; *e.g.*:—

Τῶν δ' οὐ τι μετατρέπομ' οὐτ' ἀλεγίζω
εἴτ' ἐπὶ δέξι' ἴωσιν, κ.τ.λ. (*Il.* xii. 238.)

'I care not nor reckon of them, if they go to the right,' etc.

Ἄλλ' εἴ τις με καὶ ἄλλος ἐνίπτοι

ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸν γ' . . . κατέρυκες. (*Il.* xxiv. 768.)

'But if another chid me, yet didst thou restrain him.'

284. (vi.) Substitution and ellipse in protasis and apodosis. Much the same usages are found in Homer as in Attic in these points. We may notice especially

(a) Omission of verb of protasis in the phrase εἰ δ' ἄγε; *e.g.* :—

Εἰ δ' ἄγε, τοι κεφαλῇ κατανέσομαι. (*Il.* i. 524.)

'But come, I will nod my head to thee.'

(This is one explanation; but εἰ is perhaps better regarded as an interjection, equal to *eia* in Latin. This may be the true explanation of the original use of εἰ; namely, that it was merely an exclamation, intended to call attention to a statement expressed as a condition.)

(b) Omission of verbs of protasis and apodosis with ὥς εἰ, ὥς εἰ τε in similes; *e.g.* :—

Τῶν νέες ὠκεῖαι ὥς εἰ πτερὸν ἦε νόημα. (*Od.* vii. 36.)

'Their ships are swift, as a bird or thought.'

(c) Omission of verb of apodosis alone in such expressions; *e.g.* :—

Καί με φίλησ' ὥς εἰ τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ. (*Il.* ix. 481.)

'And he loved me as a father his son.'

(d) Omission of verb of apodosis, which is supplied from the protasis; εἰ = 'in the hope that,' and expresses purpose.

Ἦστο κάτω ὀρόων, ποτιδέγμενος εἰ τί μιν εἴποι.

(*Od.* xxiii. 91.)

'He sat looking down, waiting if perchance she would speak to him.'

This construction is also found after οἶδα, εἶδον, and verbs of saying; εἰ practically equals 'whether,' but the construction is not an indirect question, but has an omitted clause; *e.g.* :—

Τίς δ' οἶδ' εἰ κέν οἱ σὺν δαίμονι θυμὸν ὀρίναις. (*Il.* xi. 792.)

'Who knows, if perchance with a god's help thou wouldst move his heart?'

285. (vii.) Mixed Constructions. Different forms of conditional sentences are found in protasis and apodosis in Homer, just as in Attic, owing to a change of mental attitude on the part of the writer; *e.g.* :—

Εἰ πειρηθείης . . . οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμῃσι βίος. (*Il.* xi. 386.)
 ‘If thou shouldst make trial . . . then thy bow shall not avail thee.’

Οὐτ’ οὖν ἀγγελίης ἔτι πείθομαι, εἴ ποθεν ἔλθοι,
 οὔτε θεοπροπίης ἐμπάζομαι, ἣν τινα μήτηρ . .
 ἐξερέηται. (*Od.* i. 414.)

‘I lend no ear to messages, if one should come from anywhere; nor reckon I ought of any seercraft, of which my mother enquires.’

Εἰ δέ τις ἀθανάτων γε κατ’ οὐρανοῦ εἰλήλουθας
 οὐκ ἂν ἔγω γε θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισι μαχοίμην. (*Il.* vi. 128.)

‘But if thou art one of the immortals that hast come down from heaven, not then would I fight with gods of the heaven.’

286. V. Relative and Temporal Sentences. These sentences in Homer are constructed in much the same way as in Attic; but observe

(i.) In general relative sentences ἂν or κέν is not as a rule found with the subjunctive; *e.g.* :—

Οὐ δῖναιος ὃς ἀθανάτοισι μάχεται. (*Il.* v. 407.)
 ‘Not long-lived is any man who fights with the immortals.’

(ii.) In similes, which are really general relative sentences, a pure subjunctive is usual. These similes are introduced by ὥς ὅτε, ὥς ὅποτε, ὥς, ὥς τε; *e.g.* :—

Ὡς δ’ ὅτε κινήσῃ Ζέφυρος βαθὺν λίγιον ἐλθών. (*Il.* ii. 147.)
 ‘As when a west wind comes, and stirs the deep corn.’
 (ὥς ὅτε = ‘as happens whenever.’)

Ὡς δὲ γύνῃ κλαίῃσι φίλον πόσιν ἀμφιπεσοῦσα.
 (*Od.* viii. 523.)

‘As a woman weeps, embracing her dear husband.’
 (ὥς = ‘in whatever way.’)

(iii.) In general relative sentences with the optative, *κέ* or *άν* is sometimes found; *e.g.* :—

‘*Ἡ δέ κ’ ἔπειτα
γῆμαιθ’ ὅς κεν πλείστα πόροι.* (*Od.* xxi. 161.)
‘Then she would marry whoever gave most gifts.’

287. VI. *Consecutive Construction.* In Homer the consecutive construction is not developed. The infinitive alone expresses result, as a dative of the indirect object of the action or work contemplated; *e.g.* :—

Πέδησε δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἀθήνη
Τηλεμάχου ὑπὸ χερσὶ καὶ ἔγχει ἱφι δαμῆναι.
(*Od.* xviii. 155, 6.)
‘But him Athene bound, to be laid low by the hands
and spear of Telemachus.’

Ὡς τε is only found with an infinitive in two places, meaning ‘so as’; *e.g.* :—

Εἰ δέ τοι αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται ὥστε νέεσθαι. (*Il.* ix. 42.)
‘If thine own heart is eager to return.’

An infinitive of consequence is found three times with *οἷός τε, ὅσος τε*; *e.g.* :—

Ἀνὴρ οἷός τε μάλιστα
οἴκου κήδεσθαι. (*Od.* xix. 160.)
‘A man such as most to care for his house.’

The construction with the indicative is not found in Homer, nor indeed before Sophocles.

288. VII. *Oratio Obliqua.*

(i.) **Indirect Statement.** In Homer, as in Attic, three forms of indirect statement are found, but the constructions are not so fully developed.

289. (a) **Accusative and Infinitive Construction.** The accusative (or nominative by attraction to the subject of the leading verb) and infinitive is the regular construction in Homer; *φημί* most often introduces it. The only remark necessary is that only one instance occurs of an infinitive with *άν* in indirect statement, *viz.*—

Καὶ δ’ ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἔφη παραμυθήσασθαι. (*Il.* ix. 684.)
‘And he said he would counsel the others.’

290. (b) Construction with ὅτι, ὅ, ὅ τε, ὅτε, κ.τ.λ. It is first to be noticed that ὡς is not used in Homer except as meaning 'how'; but ὅ, ὅ τε, ὅτε, οὐνεκα are used, meaning 'that.' Generally the construction is not so fully developed, especially in the following points—the indicative is not changed to the optative after a secondary principal verb, but is retained; but a present becomes imperfect, a perfect pluperfect, the aorist being unchanged; while the future is once retained, but usually represented by a future infinitive with ἔμελλον.

EXAMPLES.

Οὐδέ τι ἤδη ὅττι δηϊώωντο λαοί. (*Il.* xiii. 674.)

'Nor knew he that the people were hard pressed.'

Οὐδὲ τὸ ἤδη ὁ οὐ πείσεσθαι ἔμελλεν. (*Il.* xx. 466.)

'Nor knew he that he would not hearken.'

(N.B.—The future optative is first found in Pindar.)

291. (c) The participial construction is found in Homer as in Attic; e.g. :—

Τηλέμαχος δ' ἄρα μιν πάλαι ᾗδεεν ἔνδον ἑόντα.

(*Od.* xxiii. 29.)

'Telemachus had long known that he was within.'

292. (ii.) Indirect Question. The construction of indirect question is fully developed in Homer, the optative representing an indicative after a secondary principal verb; e.g. :—

Ἀλλήλους εἶροντο τίς εἴη καὶ πόθεν ἔλθοι. (*Od.* xvii. 368.)

'And they asked each other who he was, and whence he came.'

293. (iii.) Indirect Petition. This construction in Homer follows the same rules as in Attic; e.g. :—

Λαοὺς δ' Ἀτρεΐδης ἀπολυμαίνεισθαι ἄνωγε. (*Il.* i. 313.)

'And Atreus' son bade the people cleanse themselves.'

294. Recapitulation.

In Homer.

(i.) In simple sentences the subjunctive can express a statement of probable future contingency, limited by

ἄν or κέν, or not so limited. The optative can express a similar general possibility without ἄν or κέν, besides having the Attic uses.

(ii.) In subordinate sentences the subjunctive is used in final relative sentences, as is the optative also; and in every kind of sentence the subjunctive or optative may have or lack ἄν or κέν, according as the sentence is general, or limited to definite circumstances, *i.e.* particular.

In Attic.

(i.) In simple sentences the subjunctive expresses hortatory command, prohibition, interrogative command (deliberation), and apprehension. The optative can only express wish when without ἄν. The subjunctive in simple sentences never has ἄν.

(ii.) In subordinate sentences the subjunctive regularly has ἄν (except in final sentences); the optative regularly lacks ἄν; the distinction between general and limited expressions is lost.

THE ARTICLE

295. With regard to the uses of the article, the points that need especially to be noticed are (i.) its Homeric use; (ii.) the contrast between its use in Homer and in Attic; (iii.) survivals of older usage in Attic; (iv.) various idiomatic usages in Attic.

296. The article in Greek, as in most languages, is in fact a **pronoun**, of the kind usually called **demonstrative**, but better named **anaphoric**, or 'referring'; that is to say, that it is not used in pointing at the thing or person spoken of, but only to denote an object mentioned before or otherwise known. This pronoun is formed from a stem $\tau\omicron$, which is also seen in the Latin adverbs *tum*, *tam*, which are really accusatives of this stem; the same stem occurs in *iste*, *tot*, *tantus*, *talis*.

297. (i.) **Homeric use of the Article.** In Homer the article almost always retains its pronominal character, and

it should be translated as a pronoun in many passages where it is more natural to readers accustomed to Attic Greek to treat it as a defining article (see particularly under head *b* 2); its uses may be divided as follows:—

298. (a) Substantival Use. This use is much the commonest in Homer, and the others may be easily derived from it. Here it is merely a pronoun, meaning ‘he, she, it.’ It is especially used at the beginning of a clause; but it also stands as antecedent to a following relative clause. The article with *δέ*, *ἀλλά*, *αὐτάρ* usually marks a change of subject, but sometimes contrasts different actions of the same subject, as *e.g.*:—

Τοῦ μὲν ἄμαρθ', ὁ δὲ Λεύκον . . . βεβλήκει. (*Il.* iv. 491.)
 ‘Him he missed, but he smote Leukos.’

GENERAL EXAMPLES OF THIS USE.

Καί τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν. (*Il.* x. 224.)

‘One perceives before another.’

Ἐσθλὸν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται ὅτ' ἄγγελος αἴσιμα εἶδῃ.

(*Il.* xv. 207.)

‘This, too, is a good thing, when a messenger has right knowledge.’

Ἡ δ' ἀέκουσ' ἅμα τοῖσι γυνὴ κίεν. (*Il.* i. 348.)

‘But she, the woman, went unwillingly with them.’

299. (b) The Attributive Article. Here the article is used with a noun following, but the article is still truly substantival, and the noun is merely in apposition, *e.g.*:—

Αἱ δ' ἐπέμυξαν Ἀθηναίῃ τε καὶ Ἡρῇ. (*Il.* iv. 20.)

‘They murmured, Athene and Here.’

This use is also found with an infinitive following, but is not the same use as the articular infinitive in Attic. In Homer the article means ‘this,’ or ‘it,’ and the infinitive explains what ‘this’ or ‘it’ refers to; *e.g.*:—

Ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἀκούμεν ἔστιν ἀοιδοῦ. (*Od.* i. 370.)

‘Since this is a fair thing to listen to a bard.’

This use is to be noted especially :—

(1) **With connecting particles.** The article marks a contrast; *e.g.* :—

Παῖδα δέ μοι λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

(*Il.* i. 20.)

'Release my beloved daughter, and take the ransom.'

(Here τὰ ἄποινα means not 'this' or 'the ransom,' but 'the other, the ransom'; *i.e.* it contrasts the ransom with the person ransomed.)

(2) **With adjectives**, particularly adjectives of distinction, comparison, numerals, possessives, patronymics, etc. Here still the article contrasts, but does not define; *e.g.* :—

Τὼ δὲ δὺ Αἰνεία δῶκεν. (*Il.* v. 271.)

'Two he gave to Aeneas.'

Τιμῆς τῆς Πριάμοιο. (*Il.* xx. 181.)

'Priam's honour.'

(N.B.—That when a substantive with an adjective has the article the substantive usually comes first, then the article and adjective; *i.e.* the article is resumptive, it repeats the noun with the qualifying word.)

300. (c) The Defining Article. The article in Homer is used with epithets conveying hatred or scorn; *e.g.* :—

Ὁ λυσσώδης (*Il.* xiii. 53); Τὸν ἀλήτην. (*Od.* xviii. 333.)

'That madman.'

'This beggar.'

Still here it is more demonstrative than defining; its force is better conveyed by 'that' or 'this,' than 'the.'

It is also used with titles, with ἔπος, μῦθος, and some other nouns; *e.g.* :—

ὁ γέρων, ὁ ξείνος.

ποίησεν τὸν μῦθον εἶπες;

But, though to translate it as 'the' gives a sufficient sense, it may yet be properly pronominal, and we may render, 'he the old man, the stranger; what is this, the speech thou hast spoken?'

301. (d) The Relative Article. It is convenient to speak of the article as being used as a relative in certain

phrases; but very probably Homer would not have appreciated the distinction. His language is paratactic, not hypotactic; and though we naturally render

Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, τὸν ἡῦκομος τέκε Λητώ (*Il.* i. 36),
 'To Apollo the king, whom fair-tressed Leto bare,'

it may have meant to him, 'to Apollo the king; **him**,' etc.

This view is confirmed by the following facts:—

- (1) The article as relative follows its antecedent.
- (2) It does not define the antecedent, but merely states a further fact about it.
- (3) It rarely expresses an essential characteristic of the antecedent.

In two passages—*Od.* iv. 349 (repeated xvii. 140), and

Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολίων ἐξεπράθομεν τὰ δέδασται (*Il.* i. 125),
 'But the things which we have plundered from the cities,
 they have been divided,'

it does precede its antecedent; but probably we should read, ἀλλά θ' α̂ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.

302. (ii.) Contrast between the Homeric and Attic Article. The difference between the substantival use of the article in Homer and the ordinary Attic use is obvious at once; but it must be observed that in the apparently more similar uses there is always, or nearly always, the essential difference present, that the Attic article introduces an object as **known** or **definite**, while the Homeric article introduces it in a **contrast**. This is especially the case in its use with **cardinal numerals**, and the similar use in Attic may be a survival.

Observe—ὁ δ' ἥρως in Attic = 'but the hero.'

αὐτὰρ ὁ γ' ἥρως in Homer = 'but he, a hero.'

So too—

Ἦ προτέρω Διὸς υἱὸν ἐριγδούποιο διώκοι

ἦ ὃ γε τῶν πλεόνων Λυκίων ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἔλοιτο. (*Il.* v. 672.)

'(He pondered) whether he should first pursue the son of loud-thundering Zeus, or take the life from more Lycians.'

τῶν π. Λ. means not 'the greater number of the Lycians,' as it would in Attic, but 'more Lycians instead.' The Lycians are contrasted with the 'son of Zeus' mentioned.

There are in Homer a few uses of the article which cannot be distinguished from the Attic; *e.g.* :—

Πῶς δ' αἱ τῶν ἄλλων Τρώων φυλακαί, κ.τ.λ. (*Il.* x. 408.)

'But how are the watches of the rest of the Trojans (set)?'

Several occur in the Tenth Book of the *Iliad*, which is usually regarded as later; and attempts have been made to make the use of the article a test of the age of different books. But this expedient is of doubtful certainty and value.

303. (iii.) Survivals of older usage of the Article in Attic. There are found in Attic various survivals of the older usage, both in very common phrases and also in rarer ones. It is used both **substantively** as a true pronoun (anaphoric) and as a **relative**.

304. (a) Substantively as an Anaphoric Pronoun. The commonest Homeric use of the article as substantive is also exceedingly frequent in Attic when the article is used with μέν and δέ, meaning 'the one, the other,' or (in the plural) 'some' and 'others'; *e.g.* :—

Τοὺς μὲν τὰ δίκαια ποεῖν ἠνάγκασα, τοὺς πλουσίους, τοὺς δὲ πένητας, κ.τ.λ. (*Dem. de Cor.* 102.)

'The one party, the rich, I forced to do their duty, but the poor,' etc.

ὁ δέ is also used without ὁ μὲν preceding.

Other Uses :—

Ἦ δ' ὅς = 'said he' (ὅς is not the relative, but an older form of nominative of the article; cp. Sanskrit, *Sas*).

Τὰ καὶ τὰ πεπονθώς. (*Dem.* 560. 18.)

'Such and such things.'

Τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ = 'partly' . . . 'partly.'

Πρὸ τοῦ = 'before this.'

Ἐν τοῖς with superlatives = 'among these'; ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι. (*Thuc.* i. 6.)

Τόν as subject of an infinitive in *Oratio Obliqua*; e.g. τὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, 'but he said.'

305. (b) **As a Relative Pronoun.** This use is not found in Attic prose or comedy, but is found in the Tragedians, in most cases apparently to avoid hiatus; e. g.:—

Τὸ μήτε γῇ | μήτ' ὄμβρος ἱερὸς μήτε φῶς προσδέξεται.
(Soph. *O.T.* 1427.)

'Which neither earth nor holy rain nor light will receive.'

Τοξεύματα | βέβαια, τῶν σὺ θάλπος οὐχ ὑπεκδραμεῖ.
(Id. *Ant.* 1086.)

'Sure arrows, whose smart thou shalt not escape.'

306. (iv.) **Idiomatic Uses of the Article in Attic.** It is unnecessary here to detail all the uses of the article in full, as even an elementary knowledge of Greek implies an acquaintance with them; and we need merely mention its use with **abstract** nouns, with **possessive** and **demonstrative** adjectives, instead of a **possessive** adjective, and with **proper** names, remarking that in all these cases it is used because a **definite** person or thing is referred to. Its omission also with a noun or adjective in the **predicate** is familiar. This usage, by which much is gained in clearness and neatness, is perhaps to be explained on the ground that if the subject is defined the predicate does not need to be so, or it may be purely idiomatic. But there are several uses of the article which are particularly idiomatic, and so need illustration.

307. (a) The article is often used with several substantives or adjectives with a sarcastic effect; e.g.:—

Σὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν, τὸν πικρῶς ὑπέρπικρον,
τὸν ἐξαμάρτοντ' ἐς θεοὺς ἐφημέροις
πορόντα τιμὰς, τὸν πυρὸς κλέπτῃν λέγω.

(Aesch. *P.V.* 944-6.)

'Thee the wise man, thee bitterly over-bitter, thee the offender against the gods by giving honours to mortals, thee the stealer of fire I mean.'

308. (b) It is often used to attach a phrase—whether adverbial, prepositional, participial, or the like—as an attribute to a substantive; *e.g.* :—

‘Ο φόβος τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνίοις διαφορῶν.
(Dem. xiv. 12.)

‘The fear some people have of their quarrels with you,
and among themselves.’

309. (c) Similarly it is used before phrases of all kinds in such a way as to make them substantival; so especially with the infinitive, with adjectives and adverbs, words or phrases quoted, etc.; *e.g.* :—

Κάμοι ταῦτα δοκεῖ, προσδεῖσθαι δ’ ἔτι τοῦ “τὰ δίκαια
ποεῖν ἐθελόντων τῶν ἑτέρων.” (Dem. xvi. 6.)

‘This is my view too, but that it needs the additional
clause “provided the others resolve to do their duty.”’

It is also thus used with relative clauses, combining the relative clause into one substantival expression; *e.g.* :—

Ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ
κεράννυνται. (Plat. Prot. 320D.)

‘Mixing them from earth and fire and from all things
which are compounded with fire and earth.’

Here the article might also be explained as retaining its pronominal force, but the analogy of other uses rather shows that it is the true article.

310. (d) The article is used with the nominative case in addressing a person in familiar language; *e.g.* :—

ΔΙ. Ὁ παῖς! ΞΑ. Τί ἔστιν; (Aristoph. Ran. 40).
‘Slave!’ ‘What is it?’

311. (e) It is used with personal pronouns (only in the accusative case) to give emphasis; *e.g.* :—

Τὸν ἐμὲ and Τὸν αὐτὸν. (Plato.)

312. (f) It is used with interrogative pronouns, with τίς only in the neuter, but with ποῖος, πόσος freely, when

something already mentioned is the object of inquiry;
e.g. :—

Τὸ ποῖον εὐρὼν τῇσδε φάρμακον νόσου; (Aesch. *P. V.* 249.)
'Having found what cure for this disease?'

313. (g) It is to be observed that when a substantive or adjective in the genitive case depends on a substantive or adjective with the article, that substantive or adjective generally also has the article, because a definite object must belong to or be classed with other definite objects; e.g. :—

Τὸν τοῦ κινδύνου λογισμὸν μετενεγκόντες. (Dem. *xvi.* 30.)
'Transferring the calculation of danger.'

314. (h) The omission of the article is to be noticed with certain common nouns, which are used as equivalent to proper nouns; e.g. πόλις, 'the acropolis,' and ἄστυ, 'the city of Athens' (as we say 'town,' of London); βασιλεύς, 'the king of Persia'; πρυτάνεις, 'the presidents of the council'; νῆσοι, 'the islands of the Aegæan.' So we find e.g. :—

Στήλην στήσαι . . . ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ' Ἀθηνᾶ.
(Thuc. *v.* 23.)

'To set up a tablet . . . in Athens in the acropolis, near the temple of Athena.'

315. (i) The position of the article is of great importance; for, when a substantive has the article, but is accompanied by an adjective which is without the article, that adjective is used predicatively, and the phrase should always be translated so as to bring out this effect; e.g. :—

ὦ μάντι, τοῦπος ὡς ἄρ' ὀρθὸν ἤνυσας. (Soph. *Ant.* 1178.)
'Prophet, how true hast thou proved thy word.'

This effect of the position of the article is especially noticeable with the adjectives ἄκρος, μέσος, ἔσχατος, μόνος, πᾶς, and ὅλος; τὸ ἄκρον ὄρος = 'the high mountain,' but τὸ ὄρος ἄκρον, or ἄκρον τὸ ὄρος = 'the top of the mountain'; πᾶς ὁ χρόνος = 'all the time,' but ὁ πᾶς χρόνος = 'all time,

eternity.' So too with the other adjectives named; *e.g.*:—

Ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει
πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. (Plat. *Protag.* 329E.)

'In that way according to my idea, as the parts of the face are related to the face as a whole.'

316. The Article in Latin. Of course there is no regular article, either definite or indefinite, in Latin; but there was a tendency to use *ille* as a definite, and *unus* as an indefinite article. This is proved by the fact that the articles of the Romance languages are derived from these two words, and by a few examples which occur in the authors; *e.g.*:—

Illa dies veniet mea qua lugubria ponam. (Ov. *Tr.* iv. 2. 73.)

'The day will come, when I will cease my mournful strains.'

Sicut unus paterfamilias de his rebus loquor.

(Cic. *de Or.* i. 29. 132.)

'I speak of these things as a father of a family.'

Forte unam aspicio adulescentulam. (Ter. *Andr.* i. 1. 91.)

'I happen to see a girl.'

ATTRACTION

317. By attraction is meant the change of a word in a sentence from its regular grammatical form, such change being due to the proximity of another word, to which the first is assimilated in form. Attraction is found in both Greek and Latin, though it is commoner in Greek. It affects mainly genders, cases, numbers, and moods. The principle which causes attraction is an instinctive desire to make words which are close together similar in form, just as adjacent letters are assimilated.

318. I. Attraction of Genders. This is found chiefly in demonstrative pronouns in both languages, and in relatives also in Greek. At the beginning of a clause they are attracted to the gender of the predicate; *e.g.*:—

Δέομαι τοῦτο σκοπεῖν . . . δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή.

(Plat. *Apol.* 18A.)

'I request you to consider this; for this is the excellence of a judge.'

Αὕτη ἄλλη πρόφασις ἦν.

‘This was another excuse.’

Διὰ δειλίαν ταύτην ἡγήσω σωτηρίαν. (Dem. xix. 221.)

‘Owing to cowardice you considered this your salvation.’

Negat Epicurus; hoc enim vestrum lumen est.

(Cic. *Fin.* ii. 22. 70.)

‘Epicurus says no; for he is your light.’

Hic amor, haec patria est. (Verg. *Aen.* iv. 347.)

‘This is my love, this my country.’

319. II. *Attraction of Cases.* This is found in various forms, as follows:—

(i.) **Attraction of the Relative to the Case of the Antecedent.** In Greek this is very common, when the relative would naturally be in the accusative; but even datives, and rarely nominatives are similarly attracted. The construction is very rare in Latin; it is possibly an imitation; *e.g.*:—

Ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε. (Thuc. vii. 21.)

‘From the cities which he won over.’

Ἐμμένειν οἷς ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν. (Plat. *Prot.* 353 B.)

‘To abide by those things which were approved of by us.’

Τοῖς οἷοις ἡμῖν χαλεπόν. (Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 25.)

‘Hard to men such as we are.’

(In this example the whole relative clause—οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν—is attracted.)

Hoc confirmamus illo augurio quo diximus.

(Cic. *Att.* x. 8. 7.)

‘This we confirm by the augury which we have mentioned.

Raptim quibus quisque poterat elatis exibant. (Liv. i. 29.)

‘They went out hastily, picking up what each could.’

320. (ii.) Conversely the **antecedent** is attracted, though rarely, into the case—usually accusative—of a following relative; *e.g.*:—

Θῆκαι ὅσαι ἦσαν τεθνεωτῶν πάσας ἀνείλον. (Thuc. iii. 104.)

‘They removed all the tombs of the dead that were there.’

Μὴ μόνον πόλεων καὶ τόπων ὧν ἡμέν ποτε κύριοι φαίνεσθαι
προϊεμένους. (Dem. ii. 2.)

‘To be proved to be sacrificing not only towns and places
which we once possessed.’

Istum quem quaeris ego sum. (Plaut. *Cure.* 419.)

‘I am the man whom you are looking for.’

This is particularly idiomatic in Greek with the phrase
οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ; *e.g.* :—

Κλαίων οὐδέν’ ὄντιν’ οὐ κατέκλασε. (Plat. *Phaed.* 117D.)

‘There was no one whom he did not affect by his tears.’

Occasionally not the antecedent itself, but some word in
apposition to it is attracted to the construction of the
relative, when it follows the relative clause; *e.g.* :—

‘Ημῖν ἔσται οὗ φαμέν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως.

(Plat. *Phaed.* 66C.)

‘We shall possess that, of which we say we are lovers,
wisdom.’

Σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας
ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς. (Id. *Protag.* 342B.)

‘They excel the Greeks in wisdom, like those whom
Protagoras mentioned, the Sophists.’

321. (iii.) A similar attraction is that of a neuter
adjective in the nominative to a relative adverb. It is
classed here on the ground that an adverbial termination
represents a case-form; *e.g.* :—

‘Υπερφυῶς ὥς ἀληθῶς λέγεις. (Plat. *Phaed.* 66A.)

‘It is remarkable how truly you speak.’

Mire quam illius loci cogitatio delectat.

(Cic. *Q. Fr.* ii. 4. 5.)

‘It is wonderful how pleasing the thought of that
place is.’

322. (iv.) In sentences of comparison, after words
meaning ‘as’ or the like, where a nominative would be

regular, the same case is found as in the principal sentence, when no verb is used in the dependent clause ; *e.g.* :—

Περιορᾶτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οὐχ ἕκασ, ὥσπερ ἐκείνον, ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς ὄντας. (Thuc. i. 69.)

‘You do not interfere with the Athenians, who are not distant, as he is, but close at hand.’

Suspicio te eisdem rebus, quibus me ipsum, commoveri.
(Cic. Sen. 1.)

‘I suspect that you are affected by the same things as I am.’

323. (v.) In Latin **quisque** is sometimes attracted into the case of **suus**, where the genitive **cuiusque** would be regular ; *e.g.* :—

Cum motibus armorum et corporum suae cuique genti assuetis. (Liv. xxv. 17.)

‘With the movements of weapons and bodies customary to the nation of each man.’

324. III. *Attraction of Numbers.* Sometimes a verb is found to agree in number with its predicate, when it follows it closely, *e.g.* :—

Τὸ χωρίον ὅπερ πρότερον Ἐννέα Ὀδοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο.
(Thuc. iv. 102.)

‘The place which was formerly called Nine Ways.’

Quas geritis vestes sordida lana fuit. (Ov. A. A. iii. 222.)

‘The raiment you wear was dirty wool.’

325. IV. *Attraction of Moods.* This is by some writers called **assimilation** ; but as the principle apparently is the same as in other kinds of attraction, there seems to be no need of a different term. We have seen that with nouns and pronouns words which are near each other tend to show the same case-termination. So, too, in verbs ; verb-forms, which are near each other, are usually in the same mood, and so present a similar ending. This construction is found both in Greek and Latin regularly ; in Greek in the **indicative**, **subjunctive**, **optative**, and **infinitive** moods ; in Latin in the **subjunctive** and **infinitive**.

We may consider—

326. (i.) Attraction into Moods other than the Infinitive. In Greek this is found in **indefinite relative** and **temporal** clauses depending on a subjunctive or optative referring to the future, or on a secondary tense of the indicative referring to the past. The verb in the indefinite relative clause takes the same mood as the verb in the sentence on which it depends; *e.g.* :—

ἵνα ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ, ταῦτα πράττηται. (Dem. iv. 39.)

‘In order that what they please may be accomplished.’

Πῶς ἂν εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος οὐ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης; (Plat. Men. 92c.)

‘How could you have knowledge of that matter, of which you have no experience?’

Ὅποτερον τούτων ἐποίησεν, οὐδένης ἂν ἦττον Ἀθηναίων πλούσιοι ἦσαν. (Lys. xxxii. 23.)

‘Whichever of these things he had done, they would have been richer than any of the Athenians.’

In Latin this is found in sentences depending on a **subjunctive** verb. Unless there is special emphasis on the fact, requiring the indicative, the verb of the dependent sentence is attracted into the subjunctive; *e.g.* :—

Vereor ne dum minuere velim laborem augeam.

(Cic. Leg. i. 4. 12.)

‘I fear I may increase my labour while I desire to lessen it.’

Erant multi, qui quamquam . . . arbitrarentur, tamen . . . praedicarent. (Cic. Or. 2.)

‘There were many, who although they thought . . . professed.’

327. (ii.) Attraction into the Infinitive Mood. Sentences dependent on **infinitives** in *Oratio Obliqua* have their verbs attracted into an infinitive fairly commonly in Greek, less often in Latin (see *supra*, § 218); *e.g.* :—

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμαίῳ ὅτε δὴ ἀλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν . . . τὸν Ἀπόλλω χρῆσαι. (Thuc. ii. 102.)

‘It is said that when Alkmaion was wandering, Apollo gave him an oracle.’

Admonebamus cives nos eorum esse, et si non easdem spes habere, eandem tamen patriam incolere. (Liv. iv. 3.)

'We reminded them that we were their countrymen, and inhabited the same country, if we did not have the same hopes.'

328. Other Forms of Attraction. Besides these forms of construction due to attraction, in Latin there is the well-known use of **gerundive attraction**; see above, § 125; and sentences like

Ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα (ἔστι) τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι
(Aristot. *Eth.* iii. 5. 3),

'It is in our power to be good or bad,'

Vobis necesse est fortibus viris esse (Liv. xxi. 44),

'You must be brave men,'

Huic item nomen Menaechno est (Plaut. *Men.* 1096),

'Further, his name is Menaechnus,'

are often explained as due to attraction, though the fact is rather that the predicate agrees, as regularly with εἶναι and esse, with the case of its subject.

329. In Greek the **personal construction**, which is found in many cases where Latin and English prefer impersonal verbs, is due to a sort of attraction. The impersonal verb is attracted into an agreement with the logical subject of the sentence, and this subject is itself put in the nominative case; e.g. :—

Οὐδὲν οὖν ἐξελέγχεσθαι δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ πρεσβευτής, κ.τ.λ.
(Dem. xix. 5.)

'So the ambassador ought not to be convicted,' etc.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι.

(Plat. *Phaedo*, 93A.)

'Then a harmony is far from exhibiting a contrary movement.'

330. In Greek, again, in sentences of **comparison** introduced by ὥς, ὥσπερ, the main verb occasionally takes the person and number of the subject of the dependent clause; e.g. :—

Ἐὰν οἱ ἡγέμονες ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς . . . διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε.
(Thuc. iii. 62.)

'If our leaders make a resolution, as you are now doing.'

Similarly a participle may be attracted in gender; *e.g.*:—

Ὁ δῆμος . . . ὥσπερ πνεύματι κύμα . . . κινούμενον.
(Dem. xix. 136.)

‘The people stirred as a wave by the wind.’

PREPOSITIONS

331. It is not intended here to discuss in detail the various uses of prepositions in Greek and Latin; but there are some general considerations with regard to their constructions which may be pointed out with advantage.

332. First, it must be remembered that prepositions are only **adverbs** which have acquired special uses with nouns or with verbs in composition. A comparison with Sanskrit shows that the latter use is the earlier one. Like other adverbs, they are mostly cases of nouns or pronouns. Their adverbial nature is shown by the following facts:—

(i.) That in older writers, especially in Homer, they are constantly used as true adverbs, without any close connection with the cases of the nouns, or with the verbs which they accompany; *e.g.* in ἀμφὶ δὲ χαίται ὅμοις αἰσσονται (*Il.* vi. 510) the correct translation is, ‘on both sides his mane tosses on his shoulders.’ Probably the same explanation should be given of the use known as **Tmesis**, by which a verb compounded with a preposition is divided into its component parts, the preposition being separated by one or more words from the verb, or placed after it. The term is properly applied only to those cases in which the sense of the compound verb is necessary in the context; as ὑπὸ δ’ ἔσχετο μισθόν, ‘he promised reward.’ The use is common in Homer; it is also found in the Attic dramatists (*e.g.* ἐν δ’ ἑμεστώθη μέγας αἰθήρ, *Soph. Ant.* 420, ‘the mighty vault of heaven was filled with it’), and in a few instances in Latin, which are possibly imitations of the Greek use. Lucretius is especially fond of this use, as in *conque gregantur, proque voluta, inter enim iecta est, inter quasi rumpere, etc.*

(ii.) Not only are prepositions properly so called used as adverbs, but in both Greek and Latin there are several words which are still freely used both as adverbs and prepositions; e.g. ἐγγύς, ἔνδον, ἔξω, *iuxta*, *contra*, etc.

333. Secondly, it must be understood that the case is not decided by the preposition. The fact is that the case expresses a certain relation generally, and the preposition adds distinctness to the meaning given by the case. For example, the ablative case expresses the place from which a thing is moved; ἔξ or *ex* with the ablative express motion from the **inside**, ἀπό or *ab* motion from the **outside** of a place. It follows that it is rather the case which alters the meaning of the preposition, than that the preposition in a given meaning requires a particular case. Thus παρά with accusative = 'sideways to,' with ablative-genitive, 'sideways from,' with locative-dative 'sideways at'; or, as it is often accurate enough to render, 'to,' 'from,' and 'at.' So too in Latin *in* means 'inwards to,' i.e. 'into' with the accusative; 'inwards at,' i.e. 'in' with the locative-ablative. The same variations of meaning, or similar ones, may be traced with πρós, ἐπί, περί, ὑπό, κ.τ.λ. in Greek, and with *sub*, *subter*, *supra* in Latin.

334. Thirdly, the original meanings of nearly all prepositions have to do with place. Thus in the original language they would accompany accusative, ablative, and locative cases, defining the case-meaning with greater exactness. Accordingly we find that in Greek prepositions can be used with the accusative, the genitive as representing the ablative, and the dative as representing the locative; in Latin with the accusative, and with the ablative as representing both the locative and ablative. In Greek certain prepositions are constructed with the true genitive, either as the partitive genitive expressing the sphere of action with e.g. διά, ἐπί, ἀμφί, περί; or as the ordinary genitive qualifying a noun, as with ἀντί. Similarly in Latin *ergo* and *tenus* are used with genitives. They are both in reality ordinary substantives; *ergo* = 'for the effect of, for the sake of,' and *tenus* = 'the stretch, the extent.' *Tenus* is also used with the ablative, as expressing the point

from which the measure is taken. In both languages the accusative used with prepositions may be either that of the end of motion, or that of extent in time or place.

335. Accordingly we may classify prepositions in both languages by their use—I. with accusative of extension; II. with accusative of the end of motion; III. with the true genitive; IV. with the genitive as representing the ablative in Greek, and with the ablative in Latin; V. with the dative in Greek, and the ablative in Latin, as representing the locative.

336. I. Prepositions qualifying an *Accusative of Extent*:—

ἀμφί .	'about.'	περί .	'around,'
ἀνά .	'up.'		'concerning.'
διά .	'because of.'	πρός .	'with reference to.'
κατά .	'down along,'	ὑπέρ .	'over,'
	'during,' etc.		'beyond.'
παρά .	'alongside of,'		
	'contrary to,'		
	'on account of.'		
ante .	'in front of.'	per .	'through.'
apud .	'in presence of.'	pone, post .	'behind.'
		praeter .	'beside,'
circa, circum,			'except.'
circiter .	'around.'	prope .	'near.'
cis, citra .	'on this side of.'	propter .	'near,'
			'because of.'
contra .	'against.'	secundum .	'following.'
extra .	'outside of.'	super .	'over,'
inter .	'among.'		'above.'
intra .	'within.'	supra .	'above.'
iuxta .	'near.'	trans .	'across,'
ob .	'against,'		'beyond.'
	'because of.'	ultra .	'beyond.'

The uses of μετά ('after') in Greek, and of *clam* ('unknown to') and *penes* ('in the power of'), are probably to be classed here, though the relation expressed by the accusative is not that of extension in time or space, but of mere limitation of the idea of the verb in the sentence.

337. II. Prepositions used with the *Accusative of Motion* to:—

εἰς	. 'into.'	παρά	. 'sideways to, to the side of.'
ἐπί	. 'against.'	πρός	. 'towards,' 'to.'
κατά	. 'down to.'	ὑπό	. 'to the underside of.'
μετά	. 'into the midst of' (Homeric), 'after' (i.e. 'in quest of').		
ad	. 'to the neigh- bourhood of.'	usque	. 'up to.'
adversus	. 'towards.'	versus	. 'towards.'
erga	. 'towards' (only of feel- ings in good Latin).	in	. 'to the inside of.'
		sub	} 'to the under- side of.'
		subter	

338. III. Prepositions used with the *True Genitive*.

(N.B.—Greek only, except *ergo* and *tenuis*, for which see § 334.)

(a) With the **partitive** genitive of the sphere of action:—

διά	. 'through.'	πρό	. 'in front of.'
ἐπί	. 'on.'	πρός	. 'in front of,' 'belonging to.'
μετά	. 'in the midst of,' 'among,' 'with.'	ὑπέρ	. 'above,' 'on behalf of.'

Here may be included the adverbs ἄχρι, μέχρι, 'until'; μεταξύ, 'between'; ἐγγύς, 'near'; ἐνδον, 'within'; ἔξω, 'outside of.'

(β) With the genitive expressing the **class**, genitive of **price**, etc., dependent on nouns.

ἀντί, 'against,' 'instead of'; ἀμφί, 'about,' 'concerning'; περί, 'concerning.'

The adverb ἔνεκα, 'on account of,' may be included here.

339. IV. With the *Ablative-Genitive* in Greek, *Ablative* in Latin, expressing place from which :—

ἀπό	. 'from.'	παρά	. 'from alongside of.'
ἐκ, ἐξ	. 'from inside of.'		
κατά	. 'down from.'	ὑπό	. 'from the under-side of.'
<i>a, ab, abs</i>	. 'from.'	<i>sine</i>	. 'without.'
<i>absque</i>	. 'without.'	<i>procul</i>	. 'far from.'
<i>de</i>	. 'down from.'	<i>tenus</i>	. 'as far as.'
<i>e, ex</i>	. 'from inside of.'		

The adverbs ἄνευ, ἄτερ, χωρίς, all meaning 'without,' may be included here ; and πλήν, χωρίς, meaning 'except.'

340. V. With the *Locative-Dative* in Greek, *Locative-Ablative* in Latin, expressing place or time at which :—

ἀμφί	. 'about.'	παρά	. 'beside.'
ἀνά	. 'up on' (poet.).	πρός	. 'near, in addition to.'
ἐν	. 'in.'		
ἐπί	. 'on.'	σύν	. 'with.'
μετά	. 'among' (poet.).	ὑπό	. 'underneath.'
<i>coram</i>	. 'in presence of.'	<i>tenus</i>	. 'at the extent of.'
<i>cum</i>	. 'with.'	<i>simul</i>	. 'with' (poet.).
<i>prae</i>	. 'in front of.'		
<i>pro</i>	. 'before, instead of, on behalf of.'		

341. It is to be remarked that the use of prepositions extends with the development of a language, and ends by entirely supplanting the use of case-forms. In Homer particularly, and in all poetry, both Greek and Latin generally, we find that prepositions are not used, where they would be required in the more accurate style of prose. This is especially the case with the accusative of the end of motion, the ablative of the place from which, and the locative of the place at which. (See §§ 26, 58, 76.) Again, in Homer the locative-dative is frequently used with prepositions, which are very often merely adverbial. In Attic Greek place-relations are more exactly expressed in other

ways, and the use of prepositions with the dative is rare; ἀμφί, ἀνά, περί, μετά, and σύν are practically never used with the dative in Attic. But, on the other hand, in Attic the use of prepositions with the genitive is much more widely developed, and that in senses in which it is difficult to trace any place-meaning, as, for example, the uses of πρὸς, περί, κατὰ (= 'against') with the genitive. In the orators and philosophical writers the genitive is most freely used. In prose generally, however, the accusative with prepositions is of the greatest frequency in Greek as it is in Latin; and in modern Greek we find that it is the only case used with prepositions in the language of the people. Similarly in the Romance languages prepositional constructions with the accusative case superseded the use of the other case-forms.

342. There are a few special uses of certain prepositions in Greek and Latin which may be noticed as requiring some explanation. We will consider them as follows:—

(i.) **The more exact use with verbs of motion.** In English we say, 'he went to his friend in Italy'; in Greek it would be εἰς Ἰταλίαν, and in Latin *in Italiam*. It is in accordance with this principle that we find, e.g. :—

Οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Δηλίου . . . ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐπ' οἴκου
(Thuc. iv. 96),

'The forces **in** Delium went homewards,'

where the Greek says, 'the forces from Delium,' as the verb gives the idea of motion from. The want of a definite article in Latin prevents any exactly similar construction being employed; a relative sentence would be used with a verb of rest, as *qui in Delio manebant*.

343. (ii.) **The pregnant use of prepositions.** This use is of two kinds: (1) the accusative of motion to is used with prepositions, in conjunction with a verb which expresses rest at a place; the accusative case with the preposition implies that motion preceded the attaining the position of rest; (2) a locative case with a preposition is used with a verb expressing motion to a place, implying

that a position of rest succeeded the action of moving; for (1) compare—

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κρημνὸν αὐτοῖς ἐξείργαστο.

(Thuc. vi. 101.)

‘When the work up to and ending at the precipice had been completed by them.’

Ἡ μὲν οὖν ναυμαχία τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν. (Id. iii. 78.)

‘The sea-fight, which was of the nature described, lasted to sunset, and then ended.’

Φίλιππος δὲ εὐρέθη εἰς Ἀζωτον. (Act. Apostol. viii. 40.)

‘Philip went to Azotus, and was found there.’

For (2) compare—

Ὅταν γὰρ ἐν κακοῖς

ἦδη βεβήκης, τὰμ’ ἐπαινέσεις ἔπη. (Soph. El. 1056, 7.)

‘For when thou standest in evil case, thou wilt approve my words.’

Ἀλλά τε, ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ ἐμπεπτωκότας κακοπαθῆσαι, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἐπεγένετο αὐτοῖς.

(Thuc. vii. 87.)

‘And of all the sufferings that men cast into such a place, and lying there, are likely to endure, there was none that did not afflict them.’

This pregnant use of prepositions is rarer in Latin, but there are instances of it; *e.g.*—

Plebes . . . ad tertium miliarium conседit. (Cic. Brut. 14.)

‘The plebs went to the third milestone, and stopped there.’

344. (iii.) A similar use, but one which needs to be distinguished from the preceding one, is that of prepositions expressing **motion from** with verbs of **position**; it occurs with *ἐκ* and *ἀπό* in a few passages in Greek poetry, and with *ab* and *ex* in certain phrases in Latin. In his note on Soph. Ant. 411, Professor Jebb explains the Greek use on the ground that ‘a picture is presented. We have to glance from a remoter to a nearer object. . . . In each case *ἐκ* or *ἀπό* denotes the quarter in which the remoter object is to be

looked for. . . . The use springs from the . . . tendency to take a rapid glance over the dividing interval' (between the objects referred to); *e.g.*:—

“Ἡρῇ δ' εἰσεΐδε χρυσόθρονος ὀφθαλμοῖσι
στᾶσ' ἐξ Οὐλύμποιο ἀπὸ ρίου. (Hom. *Il.* xiv. 153.)

'Golden-throned Hera beheld with her eyes, standing on Olympus, on a peak.'

(Her position is contrasted with that of Poseidon on the plain.)

Στὰς ἐξ ἐπαλξέων ἄκρων
σφάξας ἑμαυτὸν σηκὸν εἰς μελαμβαθῇ
δράκοντος, κ.τ.λ. (Eur. *Phoen.* 1009.)

'Standing on the top of the battlements, I will slay and cast myself into the dark depths of the dragon's pit.'

(Here the position of Megareus is contrasted with that of the pit into which he is to fall.)

In Latin this use is most frequent in the phrases *a fronte*, *a tergo*, *a laeva*, etc., in expressions denoting the work of a slave or official, *a pedibus*, *ab epistulis*, *a rationibus*, etc., and in the phrase *e regione*. They all seem to denote the quarter from which the perception comes to an observer; *e.g.*:—

Nemo . . . a bonorum causa stetit constantius.
(Cic. *Brut.* 79.)

'No one . . . stood more consistently on the side of the patriots.'

Antonius ab equitatu firmus esse dicebatur.
(Id. *Fam.* x. 15.)

'Antonius was said to be strong in cavalry.'

Libertorum praecipue suspexit Polybium ab studiis.
(Suet. *Claud.* 28.)

'Of his freedmen he especially looked up to Polybius, his assistant in his studies.'

Erat e regione oppidi collis. (Caes. *B.G.* vii. 36.)
'The hill was opposite to (lit. 'in the line of') the town.'

345. There are of course many other idiomatic prepositional uses in Greek and Latin; but they need special consideration, and are not capable of classification under

general principles. They must be noted and studied in the complete collections of prepositional uses in the grammars and dictionaries, and, above all, in the texts of the authors as they are read. Such observation on the part of the student himself will teach him the varieties of usage more effectively than the study of lists compiled by others. And this applies to the study of syntax in general. On every point that he meets he should form the habit of finding his own explanation, under the guidance of the general rules which have been supplied to him.

ADDENDA

Anticipatory Cases

346. In both Greek and Latin there is a use by which a noun which is properly the subject of a dependent clause is brought into relation with the verb of the principal clause, most often as its direct object, but also as a secondary accusative with verbs of asking, as a genitive (partitive) of an object partially affected by the action of the verb, or in a phrase with a preposition. This use has been imitated in English, as in 'I know thee, who thou art'; *e.g.* :—

Αἰγισθον ἔνθ' ᾗκηκεν ἱστορῶ πάλαι. (Soph. *El.* 1101.)

'I have long been asking where Aegisthus dwells.'

Τῆς Μένδης περιωρώμενος, μή . . . τι πάθῃ. (Thuc. iv. 124.)

'Being anxious lest Mende should meet with any calamity.'

Marcellum nosti, quam tardus sit.

(Cael. in Cic. *Fam.* viii. 10. 3.)

'You know how slow Marcellus is.'

In Latin this use is most frequent in the comic poets, and is essentially conversational; in Greek it is more regular in both prose and poetry.

Idiomatic Use of the Present Tense

347. In both Greek and Latin, besides the common use of the present tense to express past actions vividly as if they were still going on (historic present), the present tense is often used, especially in poetry, though occasionally in prose, to express an action which is past, but which is regarded as a **permanent characteristic** of the agent. This is especially the case with words expressing relationship, as

ὁ τίκτων, 'the father,' ἡ τίκτουσα, 'the mother,' *Maïam Atlas generat*, 'Atlas is the father of Maïa' (Verg. *Aen.* viii. 140), etc.; e.g. :—

Τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν.

(Thuc. iii. 81.)

'Nominally accusing them of being destroyers of the democracy.'

Τίς δέ μ' ἐκφύει βροτῶν; (Soph. *O.T.* 437.)

'Who of mortals is my sire?'

Ὁ δὲ μὴ νικῶν τοῖς νικῶσιν ἐφθόνει. (Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 2. 27.)

'He who was not victorious envied those who were.'

Cratera antiquum, quem dat Sidonia Dido.

(Verg. *Aen.* ix. 266.)

'An ancient bowl, of which Sidonian Dido is the giver.'

Pyrrhus,

Natum ante ora patris, patrem qui obtruncat ad aras.

(Id. ii. 662.)

'Pyrrhus, murderer of a son before his father's eyes, of the father at the altar.'

Other expressions in Greek are: οἱ προδιδόντες, 'the traitors,' ὁ φεύγων, 'the exile,' Σόλων ὁ τιθεὶς τὸν νόμον, 'Solon, maker of the law,' etc. In some cases it is doubtful whether this is the correct explanation, or whether the present is merely historic; e.g. :—

Barbatum hoc crede magistrum

Dicere, sorbitio quem tollit dira cicuta. (Pers. iv. 2.)

'Fancy the bearded teacher says this, whom the awful draught of hemlock did away with' (or, 'does away with,' as a characteristic of the Socrates of whom we think).

Historic Infinitive

348. In Latin the infinitive is often used in vivid narration of a rapid sequence of events. It may be explained as giving the effect of a breathless recital, in which the narrator blurts out merely the subject and the predicate, without delaying to put them in agreement with

each other. It is not found in Caesar, and is most common in Tacitus. There is a parallel in French in the use of *de* with the infinitive. It has the force of an imperfect tense; its subject is in the nominative case. It is only used in the present, except for *odisse, meminisse*; e.g.:—

Tum spectaculum horribile in campis patentibus; sequi, fugere, occidi, capi. (Sall. *Jug.* 101.)

‘Then there was a fearful scene in the open plains; men were pursuing, fleeing, being cut down, being captured.’

Rex primo nihil suspicari, nihil metuere.

(Cic. *Verr.* iv. 28.)

‘At first the king was suspecting nothing, fearing nothing.’

The Imperative Mood in Dependent Clauses

349. In Greek it is possible for the tenses of the imperative mood, in both second and third persons, to be used in **dependent** clauses. This use was formerly explained as an abrupt change to a direct command; but it is better to regard it as due to the fact that in Greek the imperative has rather the meaning given by the English, ‘you must, he or they must do,’ and can therefore be used equally in principal and dependent clauses. There seems to be no similar use in Latin. *E.g.*:—

Οἶσθ’ οὖν ὃ δρᾶσον; (Eur. *Hec.* 225.)

‘Knowest thou then what thou must do?’

Χρὴ . . . δεῖξαι ὅτι ὧν μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνουμένους κτάσθων. (Thuc. iv. 92.)

‘We ought to show them that they must satisfy their ambitions by attacks on those who will not resist them.’

The Imaginary Second Person in Latin.

350. There is a frequent use in Latin of the second person in tenses of the subjunctive. It occurs (i.) in prohibitions with *ne* in the present tense (see § 142); and (ii.) in conditional sentences, particularly in an apodosis when there is no expressed protasis. The condition which is implied is the reality of the subject of the verb.

(Cp. Roby, *L. G.* ii. § 1544.) A similar 'you' is constantly used in colloquial English; but this use in Latin is frequent in the highest style of prose. It should usually be translated by 'one,' or by turning the sentence into a passive form; *e.g.*:—

Memoria minuitur nisi eam exerceas. (Cic. *Sen.* 21.)

'Memory is weakened, unless one uses it.'

Nulla est excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris.

(Id. *de Am.* 37.)

'It is no excuse for a crime, that it has been committed for a friend's sake.'

Neminem totis mox castris quietum videres. (Liv. xliv. 34.)

'Soon no one could have been seen at rest in the whole camp.'

The Optative in Indefinite Relative Sentences in Present Time

351. The optative mood is occasionally found in dependence on a principal sentence of which the verb is in the present tense, as in

Ἄλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν. (Soph. *Ant.* 666.)

'But whomever the city appoints, him must we obey.'

Here, and in similar sentences, a subjunctive with ἄν—ὃν ἄν στήσῃ—would be normal. There are two explanations of the use—(1) that as these are universal statements, maxims, proverbial sayings, etc., the optative puts the case in the most general way possible; (2) that the principal verb is equivalent to a potential optative, as *e.g.* χρὴ κλύειν = κλύοιμεν ἄν, in which case the optative in the dependent sentence must be considered to be assimilated to this optative which is felt, though not expressed; *e.g.* :—

Ἄνδρα δ' ὠφελεῖν ἅφ' ὃν

ἔχοι τε καὶ δύναιτο κάλλιστος πόνων. (Soph. *O. T.* 315.)

'For a man to help others with whatever possessions and powers he has is the noblest of toils.'

Ἀποδοτέον οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοίη. (Plat. *Rep.* 232A.)

'We must on no account return them, whenever a man demands them in no sound mind.'

Prolepsis of the Negatives

352. In both Greek and Latin the negative is often prefixed to the principal verb of a compound sentence, where in English it would be attached to the verb of the dependent sentence, as most commonly in οὐ φημί, *nego* ('I say not'). This usage may be explained by the desire to mark as soon as possible the negative character of the whole sentence, as in potential sentences in Greek the *άν* is thrown to the front. The use must be carefully noticed, as translating the negative with the principal verb gives a totally wrong sense in English; *e.g.* :—

Δεῖ δὲ εἰ καὶ ἡδίκησαν, μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι (Thuc. iii. 47.)

'But if they had actually offended, we ought to pretend they had not.'

Τοὺς γὰρ θανόντας οὐχ ὁρῶ λυπουμενούς. (Soph. *El.* 1170.)

'For I see the dead have no pain.'

Οὐκ ἀξιοῖ . . . φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι. (Thuc. i. 136.)

'He begs him not to take vengeance on him in his flight.'

A. *Te ille deseret*, etc.

B. *Non spero*.

(Plaut. *Most.* 197.)

A. 'He will forsake you,' etc. B. 'I hope not.'

So too *haud opinor*, 'I think not'; *non aio*, 'I say no,' etc.

EXAMPLES

I. Their Use.

A large number of sentences are here collected which illustrate the points that have been discussed in these notes. They should be carefully studied and referred to the sections which they respectively illustrate, and it would be advantageous to commit a number of them to memory. Those which contain examples of case-usages have been divided from the others for the sake of distinctness, but otherwise they are arranged in no particular order. In nearly every instance the references have been given, and students would find it extremely instructive to refer to the discussions of the points involved, which are to be found in many of the best editions of the classics.

II. Examples of Case Usages.

(i) GREEK.

- (1) Πατὴρ δὲ πατρὸς ἐστιᾷ γάμους ὄδε. (Eur. *H.F.* 483.)
- (2) Τὸ κοῖλον Ἄργος βὰς φυγὰς. (Soph. *O.C.* 378.)
- (3) Ἄλλ' ἄνα, μὴ τάχα ἄστυ πυρὸς δηϊοιο θέρηται.
(Hom. *Il.* vi. 331.)
- (4) Πέτετο πνοιῆς ἀνέμοιο. (Id. *Il.* xii. 207.)
- (5) Τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κείται
(Thuc. i. 36.)
- (6) Ὡσπερ δεῦρ' ἀπεξύγην πόδας. (Aesch. *Cho.* 676.)
- (7) Σὺ δὲ
κέλευθον ἦνπερ ἦλθες ἐγκόνει πάλιν. (Id. *P.V.* 962.)

- (8) Τάλλ' ἐγὼ καπνοῦ σκιᾶς
οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην ἀνδρὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν.
(Soph. *Ant.* 1170, 71.)
- (9) Νικῆ γὰρ ἀρετὴ με τῆς ἔχθρας πολί. (Id. *Ai.* 1357.)
- (10) Νικᾶν πᾶσι τοῖς κριταῖς καὶ τοῖς θεαταῖς πᾶσι.
(Arist. *Av.* 445.)
- (11) Ἑστίας μεσομφάλον
ἔσθηκεν ἤδη μῆλα. (Aesch. *Ag.* 1023.)
- (12) Καί σ' οὐτ' ἀθανάτων φύξιμος οὐδεῖς. (Soph. *Ant.* 788.)
- (13) Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὲ μέγα σθένος ἔμβαλ' ἐκάστω καρδίῃ.
(Hom. *Il.* xi. 11.)
- (14) Ἀλλ' ὦνπερ ἄρχεις ἄρχε, καὶ τὰ σέμν' ἔπη
κόλαξ' ἐκείνους. (Soph. *Ai.* 1107.)
- (15) Ὅζειν τε τῆς χροᾶς ἔφασκεν ἡδύ με. (Arist. *Plut.* 102.)
- (16) Μάλα δ' ὦκα διέπρησσον πεδίοιο. (Hom. *Il.* ii. 785.)
- (17) Ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὔτε πρόβατα οὔτε ποιμένα γινώσκεις.
(Plat. *Rep.* 343A.)
- (18) Ἦστραπτε γοργωπὸν σέλας. (Aesch. *P. V.* 353.)
- (19) Νῦν πᾶσι χαίρω, νῦν με πᾶς ἀσπάζεται.
(Soph. *O. T.* 596.)
- (20) Ἐτλα δ' οὔν θυτῆρ θυγατρὸς γενέσθαι
γυναικοποιῶν πολέμων ἄρωγάν. (Aesch. *Ag.* 217, 8.)
- (21) Δέρκου θέαμα, τόνδε τὸν Διὸς φίλον . . .
οἷαις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πημοναῖσι κάμπτομαι. (Id. *P. V.* 304, 6.)
- (22) Δέξασθε μ' εὐτυχοῦντα ταῖς οδοῖς. (Soph. *El.* 68.)
- (23) Ἀψυχία γὰρ γλῶσσαν ἀρπάζει φοβος.
(Aesch. *Sept.* 259.)
- (24) Ἐδραν γὰρ εἶχε παντὸς εὐαγῇ στρατοῦ.
(Aesch. *Pers.* 466.)
- (25) Διὸς εὐφροني βήματι
μολόντα τάνδε γὰν Ὀρέσταν. (Soph. *El.* 162, 3.)
- (26) Τοὶ δ' ἄμ' ἔποντο
Ἀργείων βασιλῆες, ὅσοι κεκλήατο βουλὴν.
(Hom. *Il.* x. 195.)
- (27) Κρατὶ δ' ἡλιοστέρης
κυνῇ πρόσωπα Θεσσαλὶς νιν ἀμπέχει. (Soph. *O. C.* 314.)

- (28) Καὶ γῆς ὁποίας ἦλθον, εἰρηκὼς κυρεῖς. (*Ibid.* 572.)
- (29) Γένους μὲν ἦκεις ὧδε τοῖσδε, Δημοφῶν.
(*Eur. Heracl.* 213.)
- (30) Ὅς πάσῃ Πλευρῶνι καὶ αἰπεινῇ Καλυδῶνι
Αἰτωλοῖσιν ἀνασσε. (*Hom. Il.* xiii. 217.)
- (31) Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦνθρωπε, ναύφαρκτον βλέπεις.
(*Arist. Ach.* 95.)
- (32) Ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως.
(*Plat. Apol.* 17D.)
- (33) Ὡς ἐστί τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ μετέωρα
φροντίστης. (*Ibid.* 18B.)
- (34) Τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίῳ ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος
εἰσάγειν ἐστίν. (*Ibid.* 26A.)
- (35) Χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις εἶναι σοφοῖς.
(*Ibid.* 33C.)
- (36) Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; (*Ibid.* 37C.)
- (37) Φημί γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν
ἤξειν πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκ-
τόνατε. (*Ibid.* 39C.)
- (38) Τῶν ἡλιβάτων θρόνων ἄρχοντα θεοῖς. (*Arist. An.* 1732.)
- (39) Καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου τὸ
χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀπώσασθαι. (*Thuc.* iii. 44.)
- (40) Τὴν πόλιν ξυμίκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίσας. (*Id.* vi. 4.)
- (41) Καὶ τινες καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο, ὥς πλουσιώτεροι
ἐαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι. (*Id.* i. 8.)
- (42) Πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας οὖν καὶ ἐλαχίστας ναῦς τὸ μέσον
σκοποῦντι οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες. (*Ibid.* 10.)
- (43) Κορίνθιοι περιῖοντι τῷ θέρει πέμπαντες ναῦς καὶ στρατίαν
ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο. (*Ibid.* 30.)
- (44) Εἰωθὼς λούεσθαι ἐνρρείῳ ποταμοῖο. (*Hom. Il.* vi. 508.)
- (45) Οὐ καὶ σὺ τύπτει τὰς ἴσας πληγὰς ἐμοί;
(*Arist. Ran.* 636.)
- (46) Καίτοι σ' ὁ φύσας χή τεκοῦσα προὔδοσαν,
καλῶς μὲν αὐτοῖς κατθανεῖν ἤκον βίου, κ.τ.λ.
(*Eur. Alc.* 290, 1.)
- (47) Ἑλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεω λύπην πικράν.
(*Eur. Or.* 1105.)

- (48) Ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν. (Thuc. vi. 26.)
- (49) Χείρας νιψάμενος πολιῆς ἁλός. (Hom. Od. ii. 261.)
- (50) Μαστιγόφοροί τε παριόντες ἐπετάχυνον τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς
σχολαίτερον προΐοντας. (Thuc. iv. 47.)
- (51) Θαυμάζω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλήσει μου τῶν πυλῶν καὶ εἰ μὴ
ἄσμενοις ὑμῖν ἀφίγμαι. (Ibid. 85.)
- (52) Τίνας ποθ' ἔδρας τάσδε μοι θαάζετε; (Soph. O.T. 2.)
- (53) Ἀνῆρετ' ἄρτι Χαιρεφῶντα Σωκράτης
ψύλλαν, ὅπόσους ἄλλοιτο τοὺς αὐτῆς πόδας.
(Arist. Nub. 144.)
- (54) Ἐγγὺς δ' ὅδ' αὐτὸς ἀρτίπους θρώσκει δόμους.
(Soph. Tr. 58.)
- (55) Τοιοῖσδέ τοί νιν ἀξιῶ προσφθέγμασιν. (Aesch. Ag. 876.)
- (56) Καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εὖ καλὸν τὸ μαρθάνειν.
(Soph. Ant. 723.)
- (57) Καὶ συμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας. (Ibid. 537.)
- (58) Τῆς θυμοβόρου φρένα λύπης. (Aesch. Ag. 103.)
- (59) Ἀλλ' εὐτυχοίης, καί σε τῇσδε τῆς ὁδοῦ
δαίμων ἄμεινον ἢ ἔμε φρουρήσας τύχοι.
(Soph. O.T. 1478.)
- (60) Καὶ φιλῶ τοὺς ἱππέας
διὰ τοῦτο τοῦργον· ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι. (Arist. Ach. 7.)
- (61) Ἡ πόλις ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ
καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ. (Thuc. iv. 108.)
- (62) Τοὺς γὰρ εὐσεβεῖς θεοὶ
θνήσκοντας οὐ χαίρουσι. (Eur. Hipp. 1339.)
- (63) Λέγ', ὥς τὸ μέλλον καρδία πῆδημ' ἔχει.
(Eur. Bacch. 1289.)
- (64) Ὁ Βρασίδας διέπλευσε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν Σκιώνην, τριήρει
μὲν φιλία προσπλεύουσα, αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κελητῇ ἄπωθεν
ἐφεπόμενος. (Thuc. iv. 120.)

- (65) Ἦν δ' ἔρις στρατηλαταῖς,
οἱ μὲν πατάξαι πρόσθε Πολυνείκην δορί,
οἱ δ' ὥς θανόντων οὐδαμοῦ νίκη πέλοι.
(Eur. *Phoen.* 1476-8.)
- (66) Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐξέπνευσεν Ἀγαμέμνων βίον
πληγείς θυγατρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ὑπὲρ κára. (Eur. *Or.* 496, 7.)
- (67) Βυζάντιον γὰρ ἐλὼν τῇ προτέρᾳ παρουσίᾳ . . . τούτους
οὓς ἔλαβε πέμπει βασιλεί. (Thuc. i. 128.)
- (68) Οἱ ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ . . . ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ῥητοῦ
ἕκαστον ἀργυρίου ἀπολυθῆναι ὅπλα παραδόντας.
(Id. iv. 69.)
- (69) Τοῦ περ δὴ θυγατὴρ ἔχεθ' Ἑκτορι χαλκοκορυστῇ.
(Hom. *Il.* vi. 398.)
- (70) Ἄλλ' ἔμενον νεφέλῃσιν ἐοικότες, ἃς τε Κρονίων
νηνεμῆς ἔστησεν ἐπ' ἀκροπόλοισιν ὄρεσσιν. (Id. v. 523.)
- (71) Ὡ γέρον, οὗ τι ψεύδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας.
(Id. ix. 115.)
- (72) Αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνοδος
τοῦ πλήσιον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. (Plat. *Phaedo.* 97A.)
- (73) Ἄλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως
κρίνεις; (Id. *Rep.* 576D.)
- (74) Ἀρχὴ γενήσεται πρὸς Φίλιππον ἔχθρας, εἰ τῶν πρεσ-
βευσάντων τὴν εἰρήνην καταψηφιεῖσθε.
(Dem. xix. 134.)
- (75) Κινδυνεύουσιν . . . ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιῶς
σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν. (Plat. *Gorg.* 479B.)
- (76) Μνημεῖον ἔσται . . . τῆς ἀδικίας ἧς τὸν ἄνδρ' ἠδίκηκεν
διὰ τοῦτον. (Dem. xlv. 79.)

II. LATIN.

- (i.) *Tum se ad Caietae recto fert litore portum.*
(Verg. Aen. vi. 900.)
- (ii.) *Munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat.*
(Caes. B.G. v. 9.)
- (iii.) *Iuxta periculoso ficta seu vera promerent.*
(Tac. Ann. i. 6.)
- (iv.) *Consurgit senior, tunicaque inducitur artus.*
(Verg. Aen. iii. 545.)
- (v.) *Vox hominem sonat.* (Ibid. i. 328.)
- (vi.) *Notus in fratres animi paterni.*
(Hor. Od. ii. 2. 6.)
- (vii.) *Mancus, et extinctae corpus non utile dextrae.*
(Juv. iii. 48.)
- (viii.) *Curatus inaequali tonsore capillos.*
(Hor. Ep. i. 1. 94.)
- (ix.) *Num vanae releat sanguis imagini,
Quam virga semel horrida
Non lenis precibus fata recludere
Nigro compulerit Mercurius gregi?*
(Hor. Od. i. 24. 15-18.)
- (x.) *Invitum qui servat, idem facit occidenti.*
(Id. A.P. 467.)
- (xi.) *Heu, terra ignota canibus date praeda Latinis
Alitibusque iaces, nec te tua funera mater
Produxit.* (Verg. Aen. ix. 485-7.)
- (xii.) *Curionis fuit puro sermone adsuefacta domus.*
(Cic. Brut. 59.)
- (xiii.) *Verba refers aures non pervenientia nostras.*
(Ov. Fast. iii. 462.)
- (xiv.) *Pastorem saltaret uti Cyclopa rogabat.*
(Hor. Sat. i. 5. 63.)
- (xv.) *Vela damus, vastumque cava trabe currimus aequor.*
(Verg. Aen. iii. 191.)
- (xvi.) *Flores inscripti nomina regum.* (Id. Ecl. iii. 106.)
- (xvii.) *Sternitur et toto proiectus corpore terrae.*
(Id. Aen. xi. 87.)

- (xviii.) *Lateri capulo tenus abdidit ensem.* (*Ibid.* ii. 553.)
- (xix.) *Hic tamen hanc mecum poteras requiescere noctem.*
(*Id. Ecl.* i. 79.)
- (xx.) *Quid tibi hunc receptio ad te est meum virum!*
(*Plaut. Asin.* 919.)
- (xxi.) *Negavit id iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse sed coactu civitatis.* (*Caes. B.G.* v. 27.)
- (xxii.) *Non dubitavit vel in foro alea ludere.*
(*Cic. Phil.* ii. 23.)
- (xxiii.) *Arcem iam scelere emptam Sabini habent.*
(*Liv.* i. 12.)
- (xxiv.) *Leporum disertus puer ac facetiarum.*
(*Catull.* 12. 9.)
- (xxv.) *Nec erit iustior in senatum non veniendi causa morbi quam mortis.* (*Cic. Phil.* i. 11.)
- (xxvi.) *Et vel equo magnus vel pede maior erat.*
(*Ov. Fast.* iv. 882.)
- (xxvii.) *Ut neque fas neque fidem pensi haberet.*
(*Tac. Ann.* xiii. 15.)
- (xxviii.) *E seditiosis unum vinciri iubet, magis usurpandi iuris, quam quia unius culpa foret.*
(*Tac. Hist.* iv. 25.)
- (xxix.) *Solvendo non erat Magius.* (*Cic. ad Att.* xiii. 10.)
- (xxx.) *Magnus civis obit et formidatus Othoni.*
(*Juv.* vi. 559.)
- (xxxi.) *Interdictum mari Antiati populo est.* (*Liv.* viii. 14.)
- (xxxii.) *Edocet quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam.*
(*Caes. B.G.* vii. 19.)
- (xxxiii.) *Respondit illud argentum se paucis illis diebus misisse Lilybaeum.* (*Cic. Verr.* iv. 18.)
- (xxxiv.) *Telum hastili abiegno et cetera tereti, praeterquam ad extremum, unde ferrum exstabat.*
(*Liv.* xxi. 8.)
- (xxxv.) *Absentium bona iuxta atque interemptorum divisus fuere.* (*Liv.* i. 54.)

- (xxxvi.) *Damnatusque longi*
Sisyphus Aeolides laboris. (Hor. Od. ii. 14. 19, 20.)
- (xxxvii.) *Inductaque cornibus aurum Victima vota cadit.*
(Ov. Met. vii. 161.)
- (xxxviii.) *Vitandae suspicionis Nare delectus est.*
(Tac. Ann. iii. 91.)
- (xxxix.) *Non ego . . . Graiis servitum matribus ibo.*
(Verg. Aen. ii. 786.)
- (xl.) *Cur valle permutem Sabina*
Divitias operosiores. (Hor. Od. iii. 1. 46-48.)
- (xli.) *Servorum legionibus Ti. Sempronius toties cum*
hoste signis collatis conflixit. (Liv. xxv. 6.)
- (xlii.) *Phaselus ille quem videtis, hospites,*
Ait fuisse navium celerrimus. (Catull. iv. 1. 2.)
- (xliii.) *Ceteri pecudum vicem obtruncabantur.*
(Sall. Fr. 497.)
- (xliv.) *Aram posuit casus suos in marmore expressam.*
(Tac. Hist. iii. 74.)
- (xlv.) *Ad Cannas fugientem consulem vix quinquaginta*
secuti sunt; alterius morientis prope totus
exercitus fuit. (Liv. xxii. 50.)
- (xlvi.) *Propius quaedam subibant naves, quo interiores*
ictibus tormentorum essent. (Liv. xxiv. 34.)
- (xlvii.) *Laevinum, Valeri genus, unius assis*
Non umquam pretio pluris licuisse, notante
Iudice, quo nosti, populo. (Hor. Sat. i. 6. 12.)
- (xlvi.) *Cum temere anguino creditur ore manus.*
(Propert. v. 8. 10.)
- (xlix.) *Perque pedes traiectus lora tumentes.*
(Verg. Aen. ii. 273.)
- (l.) *Fac tibi paternae legis Aciliae veniat in mentem.*
(Cic. Verr. i. 17. 51.)
- (li.) *Nuda genu, nodoque sinus collecta fluentes.*
(Verg. Aen. i. 320.)
- (lii.) *Matutine pater, seu Iane libentius audis.*
(Hor. S. ii. 6. 20.)

- (liii.) *Aut oculis capti fodere cubilia talpae.*
(Verg. *Georg.* i. 183.)
- (liv.) *Da Lunae propere novae*
Da noctis mediae, da, puer, auguris
Murenæ. (Hor. *Od.* iii. 19, 9, 10.)
- (lv.) *Nunc Satyrum, nunc agrestem Cyclopa movetur.*
(Hor. *Ep.* ii. 2. 125.)
- (lvi.) *Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.*
(Lucr. iii. 971.)
- (lvii.) *Lucius Catilina nobili genere natus, fuit magna vi*
et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo pravoque.
(Sall. *Cat.* 5.)
- (lviii.) *Verres pretio, non aequitate, iura describat.*
(Cic. *Verr.* v. 11.)
- (lix.) *Quibus bellum volentibus erat, probabant exemplum.*
(Tac. *Agr.* 18.)
- (lx.) *Mitte sectari, rosa quo locorum*
Sera moretur. (Hor. *Od.* i. 38. 3, 4.)
- (lxi.) *Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum*
Thessaliæ venientibus ab Epiro.
(Caes. *B.C.* iii. 80.)
- (lxii.) *Inde bonam partem in lectum maerore dabantur.*
(Lucr. vi. 1249.)
- (lxiii.) *Romanorum nemo id auctoritatis aderat ut pro-*
missa eius magni penderentur. (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 18.)
- (lxiv.) *Corpore tela modo atque oculis vigilantibus exit.*
(Verg. *Aen.* v. 438.)
- (lxv.) *Otia divitiis Arabum liberrima muto.*
- (lxvi.) *Socii cesserunt aequore iusso.* (Verg. *Aen.* x. 444.)
- (lxvii.) *Litora que alcyonen resonant, acalanthida dumi.*
(Verg. *Georg.* iii. 338.)
- (lxviii.) *Fama dediti benigneque excepti Segestis vulgata,*
ut quibusque bellum invitis aut cupientibus erat,
spe vel dolore accipitur. (Tac. *Ann.* i. 59.)
- (lxix.) *Ibi tribuni militum nec auspicato, nec litato*
instruunt aciem. (Liv. v. 38.)

- (lxx.) *Marsi miserunt Romam oratores pacis petendae.*
(Liv. ix. 48.)
- (lxxi.) *Primam hanc tibi magnus Apollo*
Concedit laudem, et paribus non invidet armis ;
Cetera parce, puer, bello. (Verg. Aen. ix. 654-6.)
- (lxxii.) *Paemula inretitus, raeda impeditus, uxore paene*
constrictus erat. (Cic. Mil. 20.)
- (lxxiii.) *Tutumque putavit*
Iam bonus esse socer.
- (lxxiv.) *Vultus umbrante tumultu*
Vix inter sese clamore et nomine noscunt.
- (lxxv.) *Indoctus quid enim saperet liberque laborum*
Rusticus. (Hor. A.P. 212.)

Miscellaneous Examples

I. GREEK.

- (1) Οὐ μὴ δυσμενῆς ἔσει φίλοις
παύσει δὲ θυμοῦ. (Eur. Med. 1151.)
- (2) Νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν.
(Thuc. iii. 53.)
- (3) Οὐδ', εἰ μὴ ποιήσαιτ' ἂν τοῦτο, εὐκαταφρόνητόν ἐστι.
(Dem. iv. 17.)
- (4) Τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὁ νόμος ἵνα μηδὲ πεισθῆναι μηδ'
ἐξαπατηθῆναι γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ. (Dem. xxii. 11.)
- (5) Ὑμῖν δὲ τοιοῦτον οὗτ' ἦν μήτε γένοιτο τοῦ λοιποῦ.
(Dem. xviii. 163.)
- (6) Ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἀλκηστis ἐς γῆρας μόλοι ;
(Eur. Alc. 52.)
- (7) Ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ὥστε μὴ στρατεύειν.
(Thuc. iii. 114.)
- (8) Κατθανὼν δὲ πᾶς ἀνὴρ
γῇ καὶ σκία' τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει.
(Eur. Fr. Melegr. 20.)
- (9) Καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγῃς.
(Plat. Cri. 43B.)

- (10) Δεδιότες μὴ καταλυθείη ἂν ὁ δῆμος. (*Lysias*, xiii. 51.)
- (11) Οὐκ εἴ σύ τ' οἴκους, σύ τε, Κρέον, κατὰ στέγας,
καὶ μὴ τὸ μηδὲν ἄλγος εἰς μέγ' οὔτετε;
(*Soph. O.T.* 637.)
- (12) Εἰρήνη μὲν οὖν ἄπιστος γέγονε διὰ τούτους δωροδοκή-
σαντας. (*Dem.* xviii. 100.)
- (13) Οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακράν
ἔχνεον αὐτὸς, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον.
(*Soph. O.T.* 221.)
- (14) Ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς τὴν προτέραν ζήτησιν ζητεῖν, ἵνα ἀπηλ-
λάγμεθα τούτου τοῦ κινδύνου. (*Dem.* i. 10.)
- (15) Εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐσώθησαν ἂν οἱ Φωκεῖς.
(*Dem.* xix. 74.)
- (16) Οὐ γὰρ ὅπως πλείονος ἄξιος γένηται ἐπιμελεῖται, ἀλλ'
ὅπως αὐτὸς ὅτι πλείστα ὥραῖα καρπώσεται.
(*Plato, Symp.* viii. 25.)
- (17) Ἐξώλης ἀπολοίμην καὶ προώλης, εἰ προσλαβὼν γ' ἂν
ἄργυρίον πάνυ πολὺ μετὰ τούτων ἐπρέσβευσα.
(*Dem.* xix. 172.)
- (18) Καὶ μὲν ἀποφῆνω μόνην
ἀπάντων ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν αἰτίαν ἐμέ
ὑμῖν, δι' ἐμέ τε ζῶντας ὑμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
ποιεῖτον ἤδη τοῦθ' ὅ τι ἂν ὑμῖν δοκῇ. (*Ar. Plut.* 468 sqq.)
- (19) Ὁ μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἀδικῶν ἐφοβούμην ἐγώ. (*Dem.* xviii. 244.)
- (20) Φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ μὴ τὰ πράγματ' ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν
φωνήν, ἣν ἦσαν μὴδὲν οἱ δεινοὶ λέγειν. (*Eur. Fr.* 442.)
- (21) Ἐξὶ ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας ὅπως ὥς ἐλάχιστα μὲν
ὄψοιτο ἐλάχιστα δ' ἀκούσοιτο. (*Xen. Oec.* vii. 5.)
- (22) Τοὺς οὐδένα βουλομένους εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐ διαφεύζεται.
(*Dem.* xix. 228.)
- (23) Ἐλογιζόμην ὥς ἐξέσοιτό μοι διαλέγεσθαι ὁπόσον ἂν
χρόνον βουλοίμην.
- (24) Πείσειν ἔφη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν.
- (25) Καὶ γὰρ ὑστέρῳ τό γ' εὖ
πράσσειν, ἐπεὶ πύθοιτο, κέρδος ἐμπολῇ.
(*Soph. Trach.* 92, 3.)

- (26) Ζῶντ' εἰσακούσας παῖδ', ὃν ἐκσώζει ποτέ. (Eur. *El.* 416).
- (27) Ἐσκοπεῖτο πότερον κρεῖττον εἴη ἀπάγειν, ὥς ἀλόντος ἂν τοῦ χωρίου.
- (28) Εὖ ἐπίστασθε ὅτι οὐ μὴ λάθωμαι ἡμῶν.
(Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 1. 5.)
- (29) Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα προεῖτο . . . τίς οὐχὶ κατέπτυσεν ἂν σοῦ; μὴ γὰρ τῆς πόλεως μηδ' ἐμοῦ.
(Dem. xviii. 200.)
- (30) Μόλις ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ἂν παντάπασιν διαφθαρήναι.
(Thuc. vi. 37.)
- (31) Βῆναι κεῖθεν ὀθενπερ ἦκει
πολὺν δεύτερον ὥς τάχιστα. (Soph. *O.C.* 1227, 8.)
- (32) Οὔτε κατειπεῖν τοιούτων εἶχε καλῶς οὐδ' εἰπεῖν . . .
οὔτε φυγεῖν τὸ ἀνάλωμα. (Dem. xviii. 158.)
- (33) Ἀμύντωρ, ᾧ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεδείξατο Δημοσθένης καὶ ἀνεκοινοῦτο εἰ δὴ τῷ γραμματεῖ. (Aesch. *F.L.* 64.)
- (34) Μίαν ταύτην ἀποφυγὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἡῦρισκον.
(Lucian, *Phalaris*, 2.)
- (35) Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. (Plat. *Prot.* 325D.)
- (36) Ὅρωντα μὲν ναῦς, ἃς ἔχων ἐναυστόλουν
πάσας βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἐντοπον,
οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, οὐδ' ὅστις νόσου
κάμνοντι συλλάβοιτο. (Soph. *Phil.* 279–282.)
- (37) Καὶ αὐτοὶ, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλεόν δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἐκείνων κρατήσαι, τοῦτ' ἂν ἔχειν (ἔφασαν). (Thuc. iv. 98.)
- (38) Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς φῆς γινῶναι, ὁπότε γε μήτε ἰατρὸς μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γινώσεται, μηδ' ἀνδρείος ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ; (Plat. *Lach.* 196D.)
- (39) Τότ' ἂν τις εἰσίδοιτο, τὴν αὐτοῦ σκοπῶν
πράξιν, κακοῖσιν οἷς ἐγὼ βαρύνομαι.
(Soph. *Trach.* 151, 2.)
- (40) Σωφρόνων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν.
(Thuc. i. 120.)

- (41) Πείσομαι γὰρ οὐ
τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν, ὥστε μὴ οὐ καλῶς θανεῖν.
(Soph. *Ant.* 95, 6.)
- (42) Ἔδεια μὴ σοι πολέμιος λειφθεὶς ὁ παῖς
Τροίαν ἀθροίσῃ καὶ ξυνοικίσῃ πάλιν·
γνόντες δ' Ἀχαιοὶ ζῶντα Πριαμίδων τινα
Φρυγῶν ἐς αἶαν αὐθις ἄρειαν στόλον. (Eur. *Hec.* 1138-41.)
- (43) Τείνοντα πάλαι τόξον ὅπως ἄν
μήτε πρὸ καιροῦ μήθ' ὑπὲρ ἄστρον
βέλος ἡλίθιον σκῆψειεν. (Aesch. *Ag.* 355.)
- (44) Τελείαν ψῆφον ἄρα μὴ κλύων
τῆς μελλονύμφου πατρὶ λυσσαίνων πάρει;
(Soph. *Ant.* 632.)
- (45) Μὴ νῦν μοι νεμεσήσεται Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες,
μηδ' ὄφελος λίσσεσθαι ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα.
(Hom. *Il.* ix. 698, 9.)
- (46) Ὡστ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίσαιμ' ἂν εἰσιδών.
(Eur. *Orest.* 379.)
- (47) Ὅπου δ' Ἀπολλῶν σκαῖος ᾗ, τίνες σοφοί;
(Eur. *El.* 972.)
- (48) Αὐτὸς βαδίζω καὶ πονῶ, τοῦτον δ' ὀχῶ
ἵνα μὴ τालαιπωροῖτο μηδ' ἄχθος φέροι.
(Arist. *Ran.* 22, 3.)
- (49) Οὐχ ὅπως ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπιδημοῦντες, ἐφυγα-
δευόμεθα. (Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 14.)
- (50) Πολλοῖσι δούλοις τοῦνομ' αἰσχροὺς, ἣ δὲ φρὴν
τῶν οὐχὶ δούλων ἐστ' ἐλευθερωτέρα. (Eur. *Fr. Phrix.* 17.)
- (51) Μὴ μοι θάνῃς σὺ κοινὰ, μηδ' ἂ μὴ θίγῃς
ποιοῦ σεαυτῆς· ἀρκέσω θνήσκουσ' ἐγώ.
(Soph. *Ant.* 546, 7.)
- (52) Λόγοι δ' ἐν ἀλλήλοισιν ἐρρόθουν κακοί,
φύλαξ ἐλέγχων φύλακα. (Soph. *Ant.* 259.)
- (53) Δαρείῳ δὲ δεινὸν ἐδόκεε εἶναι μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν τὰ χρήματα.
(Hdt. i. 187.)
- (54) Τί μ' οὐ λαβὼν
ἐκτεινας εὐθὺς, ὥς ἔδειξα μήποτε
ἑμαυτὸν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐνθεν ἢ γεγώς;
(Soph. *O.T.* 1391-3.)

- (55) Ὅλοιο μίπω, πρὶν μάθοιμ' εἰ καὶ πάλιν
γνώμην μετοίσεις. (Soph. *Phil.* 961.)
- (56) Μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν
ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο φυσικόν.
(Arist. *Pol.* ii. 1262.)
- (57) Δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν
εἶην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτεῖρων ἔδραν. (Soph. *O.T.* 12.)
- (58) Ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδέν' ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμωσγέπως μετέχειν
αὐτῆς. (Plat. *Protag.* 323o.)
- (59) Καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἔξω πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι ἀλλ' ἣ
ἄδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν, κ.τ.λ.
(Thuc. iv. 85.)
- (60) Οἱ δ' αἰθόμαιμοι ποῦ νεανῖαι πονεῖν; (Soph. *O.C.* 335.)
- (61) Βούλει τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῖς θεαταῖσιν φράσω; (Arist. *Eq.* 36.)
- (62) Κραυγὴν πολλὴν ἐποιοῦν καλοῦντες ἀλλήλους, ὥστε καὶ
τοὺς πολεμίους ἀκούειν ὥστε οἱ μὲν ἐγγύτατα τῶν
πολεμίων καὶ ἔφυγον ἐκ τῶν σκηνῶν.
(Xen. *Anab.* ii. 2. 27.)
- (63) Μ. Φεῦ φεῦ· βροτοῖς ἔρωτες ὡς κακόν μέγα.
Κ. Ὅπως ἂν, οἶμαι, καὶ παραστῶσιν τυχαί.
(Eur. *Med.* 330, 1.)
- (64) Εἰ τοίνον τις ὑμῶν ἄλλως πως ἔχει τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπὶ
Μειδίαν ἢ ὡς οὐ δέον αὐτὸν τεθνάναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει.
(Dem. xxi. 70.)
- (65) Μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὥμῶν τὸ
βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι
μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους. (Thuc. iii. 36.)
- (66) Τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν,
ᾧ περ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν. (Id. ii. 63.)
- (67) Ὁ μὴδὲν ὦν κάξ οὐδένων κεκλήσομαι. (Eur. *Ion.* 594.)
- (68) Ἀξιοὶ ἔφασαν εἶναι σφέας ζημιῶσαι. (Hdt. ix. 77.)
- (69) Ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσιν. (Plat. *Rep.* 443b.)
- (70) Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάττονται
λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. (Id. *Apol.* 17a.)
- (71) Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὦν ἔτυχεν ἦν, ἀλλ' οἷς ὁ δῆμος καταρᾶται.
(Dem. xviii. 130.)

- (72) Ὁμολογήκαμεν δέ γε πράγματος οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι
μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι.
(Plat. *Meno*. 96a.)
- (73) Ὅντος πάγου οἴου δεινοτάτου. (Id. *Symp*. 220b.)
- (74) Οὐδὲν πέπονθας δεινὸν, ἣν μὴ προσποιῇ.
(Menander, Ἐπιτρ. 8.)
- (75) (Πολλαὶ νῆες) ῥᾶσται ἐς τὸ βλάπτεσθαι ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν
παρεσκεύασται. (Thuc. vii. 67.)
- (76) Διὰ τοῦτ' εἰκότως
βούλονται ἂν ὑμᾶς πάντας ἐξολωλέναι
ἵνα τὰς τελετὰς λάβοιεν. (Arist. *Pax*. 410-12.)
- (77) Διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας.
(Thuc. i. 89.)
- (78) Δεινὴν γάρ τιν' ἂν πράξιν τύχοις
λέξας, ὅποίας ἐξαφισταίμην ἐγώ. (Soph. *O.C.* 560, 61.)
- (79) ΕΠ. Ποίαν τιν' οὖν ἤδιστ' ἂν οἴκοιτ' ἂν πόλιν;
ΕΥ. Ὅπου τὰ μέγιστα πράγματ' εἴη τοιαυτά.
(Arist. *Aves*. 127, 8.)
- (80) Οἱ Κερκυραῖοι δέισαντες μὴ οἱ πολέμιοι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς
ἀναλάβωσι, διεκόμισαν, κ.τ.λ. (Thuc. iii. 79.)
- (81) Καὶ ταῦτ' ἰὼν
εἶσω λογίζου· κἂν λάβῃς ἐψευσμένον,
φάσκειν ἔμ' ἤδη μαντικῇ μηδὲν φρονεῖν.
(Soph. *O.T.* 464-6.)
- (82) Καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ὀψέ. (Thuc. iii. 108.)
- (83) Ἐλπίδα οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἶχον μή ποτε Ἀθηναίων
τῆς θαλάσσης κρατούντων ναῦς Πελοποννησίων ἐς
Ἰωνίαν παραβαλεῖν. (*Ibid.* 32.)
- (84) Οἶσθα δῆθ' ἃ μοι γενέσθω; (Eur. *I.T.* 1203.)
- (85) Ἀνδρί τοι χρεών
μνήμην προσεῖναι, τερπνὸν εἶ τί που πάθοι.
(Soph. *Ai.* 521.)
- (86) Ἀνὰ δ' ἐβόασεν λεώς
Τρῳάδος ἀπὸ πέτρας σταθείς. (Eur. *Tro.* 522.)
- (87) Ὡ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαι μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι.
(Hdt. v. 105.)

- (88) Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῇ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάσασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι;
(Xen. *Mem.* i. 5.3.)
- (89) Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον οἰοί τε εἶναι κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε. (Plat. *Crit.* 44A.)
- (90) Εἰ νῆ Δί' ἀντὶ τῆς κακῆς γλώττης ποθὲν πυροὺς πρίαο, σωφρονεῖν ἂν μοι δοκεῖς.
(Arist. *Vesp.* 1404, 5.)
- (91) Ἐκεῖνο δεινὸν τοῖσιν ἡλίκοισι νῦν. (Arist. *Eccl.* 465.)
- (92) Ἐφευγον ἔνθα μίποτ' ὀψοίμην κακῶν χρησμῶν ὀνειδῇ τῶν ἐμῶν τελούμενα.
(Soph. *O.T.* 796, 7.)
- (93) Πότερ' οὐχ ἡγεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτοὺς ὅστις εἶ; ἢ τοσοῦτον ὕπνον καὶ λήθην ἅπαντας ἔχειν ὥστ' οὐ μεμνήσθαι τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἐδημηγόρεις ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κ.τ.λ.
(Dem. *de Cor.* 283.)
- (94) Καὶ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι;
(Soph. *O.C.* 1173.)
- (95) Πάντα τᾶλλ' εἰπὼν ἂν ἡδέως ἐάσω.
- (96) Μὴ ψεύσον, ὦ Ζεῦ· μή μ' ἔλγῃς ἄνευ δορός.
(Soph. *Fr. Peleus*, 450.)
- (97) Πύργοι ἦσαν μεγάλοι . . . ὥστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πύργον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν διῆσαν.
(Thuc. iii. 21.)
- (98) Εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι.
(Dem. iv. 1.)
- (99) Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὕτωςι μὲν ἀκοῦσαι λόγον τιν' ἔχον.
(*Id.* xx. 19.)
- (100) Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο . . . Τάνταλον παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίου καταδῆσαι.
(Thuc. iv. 57.)
- (101) Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖσι πύλας ποιήσομεν εὖ ἀραρυίας, ὅφρα δι' αὐτῶν ἐππηλασίῃ ὁδὸς εἴη.
(Hom. *Il.* vii. 339, 40.)
- (102) Τοιοῦτοι νῦν πάντες, ὅσοι Τρώεσσιν ἀρωγοί, εἶεν, ὅτ' Ἀργείοισι μαχοίατο θωρηκτῆσιν.
(*Ibid.* xxi. 428, 9.)

- (103) Ἐνθα κε ρεῖα φέροι κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πανθοῖδαο
Ἄτρεϊδης, εἰ μὴ οἱ ἀγάσσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.
(*Ibid.* xvii. 70, 1.)
- (104) Καὶ δ' ἄλλω νεμεσᾶτον, ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι.
(*Ibid.* xxiii. 494.)
- (105) Ταῦτά τε πάντα πύθοιτο, καὶ ἄψ εἰς ἡμέας ἔλθοι.
(*Ibid.* x. 211.)
- (106) Νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅστις θάνατον φύγῃ, ὃν κε θεός γε
Ἰλίου προπάροιθεν ἐμῆς ἐν χερσὶ βάλῃσι.
(*Ibid.* xxi. 103, 4.)
- (107) Καί ποτέ τις εἴπησι καὶ ὀψιγόνων ἀνθρώπων.
(*Ibid.* vii. 87.)
- (108) Εἰ μὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης,
οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμῃσι βιὸς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί.
(*Ibid.* xi. 386, 7.)
- (109) Ὅ μὲν σ' ἐνδυκέως ἀπεπέμπομεν, ὄφρ' ἂν ἴκηαι. [*var.*
lect. ἴκοιο]. (*Id.* *Od.* x. 65.)
- (110) Ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ πάντες ἔχωμεν
ἄθροοι, εἴ κέ μιν οὐδοῦ ἀπώσομεν ἥδὲ θυράων,
ἔλθωμεν δ' ἀνὰ ἄστυ, βοῇ δ' ὤκιστα γένοιτο.
(*Ibid.* xxii. 75-77.)
- (111) ὦ μοι ἐγὼν, μὴ τίς μοι ἵφαινήσιν δόλον αὔτε
ἀθανάτων. (*Ibid.* v. 356.)
- (112) Δῶρα δ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ φερέμεν τά κε θυμὸν ἰήνῃ.
(*Id.* *Il.* xxiv. 19.)
- (113) Ταῦτ' εἰποῖς Ἀχιλλῆϊ δαΐφρονι εἴ κε πίθηται.
(*Ibid.* xi. 791.)
- (114) Κτήματα δ' αὐτὸς ἔχοις καὶ δώμασι σοῖσι ἀνάσσοις.
(*Id.* *Od.* i. 402.)
- (115) Ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃς σῆς γε κύνας κεφαλῆς ἀπαλάλκοι.
(*Id.* *Il.* xxii. 348.)
- (116) Καὶ νύ κ' ὀδυρομένοισιν ἔδν φάος ἡελίοιο
εἰ μὴ Τηλέμαχος προσεφώνεεν ὃν πατέρ' αἶψα.
(*Id.* *Od.* xvi. 220, 21.)
- (117) Εἰ μὲν τις τὸν ὄνειρον Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἐνισπε,
ψεῦδος κὲν φαῖμεν καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον.
(*Id.* *Il.* ii. 80, 81.)

- (118) Οὐ γάρ οἱ τις ἐτήτυμος ἄγγελος ἔλθων
ἡγγειλ' ὅτι, ῥά οἱ πόσις ἔκτοθι μίμνε πυλάων.
(*Id. Il. xxii. 438, 9.*)

Miscellaneous Examples

II. LATIN.

- (i.) *Antoni gladios potuit contemnere, si sic
Omnia dixisset.* (*Iuv. Sat. x. 123-4.*)
- (ii.) *Sunt multi qui eripiunt aliis quod aliis largiantur.*
(*Cic. Off. i. 14.*)
- (iii.) *Non ego cuncta meis amplecti versibus opto,
Non mihi si linguae centum sint oraue centum.*
(*Verg. Georg. ii. 42.*)
- (iv.) *Haud equidem credo quia sit divinitus illis
Ingenium.* (*Verg. Georg. i. 415.*)
- (v.) *Hoc reprehendis, quod solere me dicas de me ipso
gloriosius praedicare.*
- (vi.) *Verum anceps pugnae fuerat fortuna. Fuisset ;
Quem metui moritura? faces in castra tulissem, etc.*
(*Verg. Aen. iv. 603, 4.*)
- (vii.) *Iam tamen et turmas facili praevertere gyro
Fortis et Eoas iaculo damnare sagittas.*
- (viii.) *Diu non perlitatum tenuerat dictatorem.*
(*Liv. vii. 8.*)
- (ix.) *Obsistere et retinere conati sunt, ni lictores sum-
movissent.*
- (x.) *In tanta paupertate decessit, ut qui efferretur vix
reliquerit.* (*Corn. Nep. Aristid. 3.*)
- (xi.) *Socrates dicere solebat, omnes in eo quod scirent
esse eloquentes.*
- (xii.) *Non haec, O Palla, dederas promissa parenti,
Cautius ut saevo velles te credere Marti.*
(*Verg. Aen. xi. 152, 3.*)
- (xiii.) *Date volnera lymphis,
Abluam.* (*Ibid. iv. 683.*)

- (xiv.) *Non populi gentesque tremunt . . .
Nequid ob admissum foede dictumve superbe
Poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adultum.*
(Lucr. v. 1222.)
- (xv.) *Tarquinius quid impudentius, qui bellum gereret
cum iis qui eius non tulerant superbiam?*
- (xvi.) *Res, cum haec scribebam, erat in extremum adducta
discrimen. (Cic. ad Fam. xii. 6.)*
- (xvii.) *Cum palam eius annuli ad palmam converterat, a
nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat.*
(Id. Off. iii. 9. 38.)
- (xviii.) *Quaeris, quid agam. Ita vivam, ut maximos
sumptus facio. (Id. ad Att. v. 15. 2.)*
- (xix.) *Celsa sedet Aeolus arce,
Sceptra tenens, mollitque animos, ac temperat iras.
Ni faciat, maria ac terras coelumque profundum,
Quippe ferant rapidi secum, verrantque per auras.*
(Verg. Aen. i. 56-9.)
- (xx.) *Non modo ad expeditiones, sed vix ad quietas
stationes suppeditabant. (Liv. iii. 6. 8.)*
- (xxi.) *Debebat Epicrates nummum nullum nemini.*
- (xxii.) *Non medius fidius prae lacrimis possum reliqua
nec cogitare nec scribere. (Cic. ad Att. ix. 12. 1.)*
- (xxiii.) *Quantum mutatus ab illo
Hectore, qui redit exuvias indutus Achilli.*
(Verg. Aen. ii. 274, 5.)
- (xxiv.) *Magna proponit iis qui regem occiderint praemia.*
(Caes. B.G. v. 58.)
- (xxv.) *Omne cum Proteus pecus egit altos
Visere montes. (Hor. Od. ii. 2. 7, 8.)*
- (xxvi.) *Senes omnia quae curant meminere; qui sibi,
cui ipsi debeant. (Cic. Sen. 7. 21.)*
- (xxvii.) *Germanicus Caecinam cum quadraginta cohortibus
distrahendo hosti ad flumen Amisiam misit.*
(Tac. Ann. i. 60.)
- (xxviii.) *Notumque, furens quid femina possit.*
(Verg. Aen. v. 6. 7.)

- (xxix.) *Musis amicus tristitiam et metus
Traclum protervis in mare Creticum
Portare ventis.* (Hor. Od. i. 26. 1-3.)
- (xxx.) *Vir bonus et sapiens dignis ait esse paratus.*
(Hor. Ep. i. 7. 22.)
- (xxxi.) *Senseram, noram inductus, relictus, proiectus ab eis.*
(Cic. ad Att. iv. 5. 1.)
- (xxxii.) *Ut quaeras omnia quomodo Graeci ineptum ap-
pellent, non reperies.* (Id. de Or. ii. 4.)
- (xxxiii.) *Aristides nonne ob eam causam expulsus est, quod
praeter modum iustus esset?* (Id. Tusc. v. 36.)
- (xxxiv.) *Multa quoque et bello passus, dum conderet urbem.*
(Verg. Aen. i. 5.)
- (xxxv.) *In omnibus saeculis pauciores viri reperti sunt, qui
suas cupiditates quam qui hostium copias vin-
cerent.* (Cic. ad Fam. xv. 4.)
- (xxxvi.) *Isto bono utare, dum adsit; quum absit, ne requiras.*
(Id. Sen. 10. 33.)
- (xxxvii.) *Dum haec agebantur, interea arx Romae in periculo
fuit.* (Liv. v. 47.)
- (xxxviii.) *Illa quidem, dum te fugeret per flumina praeceps,
Immanem ante pedes hydrium moritura puella
Servantem ripas alta non vidit in herba.*
(Verg. Georg. iv. 457.)
- (xxxix.) *Ex quo efficitur, non ut voluptas ne sit voluptas,
sed ut voluptas non sit summum bonum.*
(Cic. Fin. ii. 8. 24.)
- (xl.) *Quid primum deserta querar? comitemne sororem
Sprevisti moriens? eadem me ad fata vocasses.*
(Verg. Aen. iv. 677, 8.)
- (xli.) *Nec veni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent.*
(Ibid. xi. 112.)
- (xlii.) *Contentum rebus suis esse maximae sunt certissi-
maeque divitiae.* (Cic. Par. 6. 3.)
- (xlili.) *Scribebant, ut feras quasdam mitescere arte, sic
immitem et implacabilem eius viri animum esse.*
(Liv. xxxiii. 45.)

- (xliv.) *Urbem quam statuo vestra est.* (Verg. *Aen.* i. 573.)
- (xlv.) *Me nulla dies tam fortibus ausis
Dissimilem arguerit; tantum fortuna secunda
Haud adversa cadat.* (*Ibid.* ix. 281.)
- (xlvi.) *Haec cum legas tu, bellus ille et urbanus
Suffenus unus caprimulqus aut fossor
Rursus videtur.* (Catull. xxii. 9-11.)
- (xlvii.) *Multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant
Ni signum caelo Cytherea dedisset ab alto.*
(Verg. *Aen.* viii. 522, 3.)
- (xlviii.) *Iam fuerit, neque post umquam revocare licebit.*
(Lucr. iii. 915.)
- (xlix.) *Troum socia arma secutum
Obruerent Rutuli telis; animam ipse dedissem,
Atque haec pompa domum me, non Pallanta,
referret.* (Verg. *Aen.* xi. 162-4.)
- (l.) *Tentatum domi per dictatorem ut ambo patricii
consules crearentur rem ad interregnum perduxit.*
(Liv. vii. 22.)
- (li.) *Bene maiores accubitionem epularum amicorum,
quia vitae coniunctionem haberet, convivium
nominaverunt.* (Cic. *de Sen.* 15. 45.)
- (lii.) *Litteras quas me sibi misisse diceret recitavit homo.*
(Id. *Phil.* ii. 2. 3.)
- (liii.) *Et ni docta comes tenues sine corpore vitas
Admoneat volitare cava sub imagine formae,
Irruat, et frustra ferro diverberet umbras.*
(Verg. *Aen.* vi. 161-3.)
- (liv.) *Haud procul inde citae Mettum in diversa quad-
rigae
Distulerant, at tu dictis, Albane, maneres.*
(*Ibid.* viii. 642.)
- (lv.) *Me truncus illapsus cerebro
Sustulerat, nisi Faunus ictum
Dextra levasset.* (Hor. *Od.* ii. 17. 27-29.)
- (lvi.) *Continui montes, ni dissocientur opaca
Valle* (Hor. *Ep.* i. 16. 5.)

- (lvii.) *Ut ignava animalia, quibus si cibum suggeras, iacent, torpentque.* (Tac. Hist. iii. 36.)
- (lviii.) *Ut sit magna, tamen certe lenta ira decorum est.*
(Juv. xiii. 100.)
- (lix.) *Post si quis vellet te, haud non velles diviti.*
(Plaut. Aul. ii. 4. 7.)
- (lx.) *Nihil habebam, quod scriberem; neque enim novi quicquam audieram, et ad omnes tuas epistulas rescripseram hodie; erat tamen rumor comitia dilatum iri.* (Cic. ad Att. ix. 10. 1.)
- (lxi.) *Scire tuum nihil est nisi te scire hoc sciatur alter.*
(Pers. i. 27.)
- (lxii.) *Valeri genus, unde superbus Tarquinius regno pulsus fugit.* (Hor. Sat. i. 6. 12.)
- (lxiii.) *Nec alia magis Romanum impendebat res, quam capita hostium pretia libertatis facta.*
(Liv. xxiv. 15.)
- (lxiv.) *Haec tibi dictabam post fanum putre Vacunae, Excepto quod non simul esses, cetera laetus.*
(Hor. Ep. i. 10. 40, 1.)
- (lxv.) *Lacedaemonii senem sessum receperunt.*
(Cic. Sen. 18.)
- (lxvi.) *Ludum insolentem ludere pertinax.*
(Hor. Od. iii. 29. 51.)
- (lxvii.) *Mediterranea Galliae petit, non quia rector ad Alpes via esset, sed quantum a muri recessisset, minus obvium fore Romanum credens.*
(Liv. xxi. 31.)
- (lxviii.) *Ipsae inter se legiones octava et quinta decima ferrum parabant, ni miles nonanus preces et minas interiecisset.* (Tac. Ann. i. 23.)
- (lxix.) *Blandum et auritas jilibus canoris Ducere quercus.* (Hor. Od. i. 12. 11, 12.)
- (lxx.) *Latiumque vocari Maluit, his quoniam latuisset tutus in oris.*
(Verg. Aen. viii. 322, 3.)
- (lxxi.) *Vincebat auxilio loci paucitas, ni Veiens in verticem collis evasisset.* (Liv. ii. 50.)

- (lxxii.) *Maesti (credere victos) in castra redeunt.*
(*Ibid.* 43.)
- (lxxiii.) *Putasne illum immortalitatem mereri voluisse, ut propter armorum habendorum licentiam metueretur?* (Cic. *Phil.* i. 34.)
- (lxxiv.) *At non historia cesserim Graecis, nec opponere Thucydidi Sallustium verear.* (Quint. x. l. 101.)
- (lxxv.) *Fuere quos pavor nando etiam capessere fugam impulerit.* (Liv. xxii. 6.)
- (lxxvi.) *Non vereor, ne tua virtus opinioni hominum non respondeat.* (Cic. *ad Fam.* ii. 5.)
- (lxxvii.) *Tarquinius Superbus bellica arte superasset superiores reges, nisi degeneratum in aliis rebus huic quoque laudi offecisset.* (Liv. i. 53.)
- (lxxviii.) *Dum unum gradum ascendere conatus est, venit in periculum.* (Cic. *pro Mur.* 55.)
- (lxxix.) *Novarum (comoediarum) qui spectandi faciunt copiam.* (Ter. *Heaut.* 29.)
- (lxxx.) *Pacem Troiano ab rege petendum.*
(Verg. *Aen.* xi. 230.)
- (lxxxi.) *Mirari magis adeo discrepare inter auctores quam quid veri sit discernere queas.* (Liv. xxii. 61.)
- (lxxxii.) *Unus ex eis domum abiit quod fallaci reditu in castra iureiurando se exsolvisset.* (*Ibid.*)
- (lxxxiii.) *Poeni, ut quibus locus aequior esset, deturbant nitentes per ardua hostes.* (Id. xxv. 13.)
- (lxxxiv.) *Non contentus agrariis legibus, quae materia semper tribunis plebi seditionum fuisset.* (Id. vi. 11.)

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